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What Are the Early Lessons?
Sheldon Danziger 
University of Michigan
The papers in this volume were commissioned and presented at a 
conference held in November 1998 in Washington, D.C. The Joint 
Center for Poverty Research at the University of Chicago and North 
western University organized the conference, which was funded by the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) 
at the Department of Health and Human Services. Assisting me in 
planning the conference were Greg Duncan of Northwestern Univer 
sity and Donald Oellerich of ASPE. Special thanks are due to the con 
ference discussants and participants, who provided valuable sugges 
tions for the revisions that are published here, and to Julie Balzekas 
and Diane Kallenback for excellent staff assistance.
Based on early analyses of the effects of the 1996 welfare reform 
act, this introduction focuses on three key questions: Why are case 
loads falling? How are recipients faring? How are the states respond 
ing?
REFORMING WELFARE
Welfare reform has generated a great deal of interest in the 1990s. 
No other domestic policy has generated such intense media coverage, 
popular discussion, and policy debate. This round of welfare reform 
began when presidential candidate Clinton gave a 1992 campaign 
speech calling for dramatic changes in welfare policy: "No one who 
works full-time and has children at home should be poor anymore. No 
one who can work should be able to stay on welfare forever." Shortly 
after Clinton took office, he appointed an interagency task force to turn
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this promise into legislation. At the time, few expected the years of 
contentious debate that ensued. In the summer of 1994, the Clinton 
administration issued its welfare reform plan; it was set aside after the 
Republican victory in the 1994 elections. A Republican welfare 
reform plan that had been part of the "Contract with America" shaped 
much of the subsequent debate. In August 1996, amid great contro 
versy, Congress passed and the president signed P.L. 104-93, the Per 
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA).
Since 1996, much attention has focused on the effects of 
PRWORA. In this volume, economists and policy analysts use the best 
data that are currently available and sophisticated research techniques 
to answer some key policy questions. Their goal is to evaluate what 
has happened to date and what is likely to happen as the business cycle 
ebbs and flows in the coming years. In particular, the authors were 
asked to use their analyses to predict what is likely to happen to wel 
fare caseloads, to recipient well-being, and to state budgets and poli 
cies when the next recession arrives. The authors present their 
estimates and predictions, but they leave it to the reader to weigh the 
available evidence and decide how successful PRWORA has been in 
its first few years of "ending welfare as we know it" and to consider 
how welfare reform might be further reformed when the 1996 act 
comes up for re-authorization.
The 1996 act represents a dramatic change in the way cash assis 
tance and services are delivered to single mothers and their children. 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program had 
evolved over the previous 60 years to provide cash benefits to all who 
met state and federal eligibility criteria. Benefit levels were set by the 
states, but total costs for this entitlement program were shared between 
the states and the federal government. The Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, which replaced AFDC, now pro 
vides greater discretion to the states concerning eligibility criteria, 
work requirements, and other programmatic rules. In return, the fed 
eral government provides a block grant of fixed size to each state and 
no longer shares in the cost increases or decreases associated with ris 
ing or falling caseloads. The provisions of TANF are discussed in 
detail in this volume, especially in the chapters of Part III.
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Welfare reform has led to a more rapid decline in the cash assis 
tance caseload than most analysts would have predicted in 1996 when 
the act was signed. In part, this is because few analysts predicted that 
the economy would continue to grow so rapidly with so little inflation 
and with such low unemployment rates. As the papers in Part I discuss, 
welfare caseloads began falling several years before PRWORA became 
law, but caseload declines have accelerated since that time.
Consider the trend in the number of welfare recipients (first under 
AFDC, now under TANF) from 1960 to December 1998 (Figure 1). 
The caseload rose rapidly in the aftermath of the "War on Poverty" 
from about 4 million persons in the mid 1960s to about 10 million by 
the early 1970s; it then fluctuated between 10 and 12 million until the 
early 1990s, when it rose to about 14 million. By December 1998, the 
caseload had declined to about 7.5 million, 47 percent below the level 
of January 1994 and 38 percent below the level of August 1996. l The 
four papers in Part I of this volume analyze the causes of these case 
load fluctuations, primarily through 1996, due to data constraints.
Reducing caseloads is a major goal of welfare reform, but it is not 
the only goal. One issue that has not been resolved in the few years 
since PRWORA was enacted is how recipients who have left the rolls 
are faring in the labor market. How interested are employers in hiring 
them? What kinds of jobs are they getting? How much are they earn 
ing? The tight labor markets and low unemployment rates of the late 
1990s provide the best possible environment for welfare recipients 
who are entering the labor market. As a result, the caseload declines 
have been accompanied by increased employment among unmarried 
mothers. However, the increased employment has not led to increased 
economic well-being for some former recipients, and some of the most 
disadvantaged single mothers have been unable to find jobs. The two 
papers in Part II address these issues.
Some other recent studies that have focused on all single mothers, 
regardless of welfare participation, are relevant to understanding the 
overall labor market context in which welfare reform is proceeding. 
First, more unmarried mothers are working. According to Gary Burt- 
less (1998), by 1998 the employment-to-population ratio of unmarried 
mothers—divorced, separated, and never-married women—had caught 
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only 2.2 percentage points in the 14 years prior to 1993, but rose 11.5 
points between that year and 1998.
Second, the poverty rate for single mothers remains quite high, in 
part because welfare caseloads have fallen much faster than the poverty 
rate. Consider the trend in the official poverty rate for families with 
female householders and no husband present (the group from which 
most welfare recipients are drawn). According to the Census Bureau 
(P-60, no. 201), the 1997 rate (35.1 percent) is about the same as the 
1989 rate (35.9 percent) and the 1979 rate (34.9 percent). This sug 
gests that many of those who are leaving the cash assistance rolls 
remain poor. It is possible, however, that the data for 1998 and 1999, 
when available, will show that poverty rates have fallen further as the 
economy has continued to grow and caseloads have continued to fall 
during these years.
On the other hand, the experience in the year following PRWORA 
suggests caution. Wendell Primus (1999) documents that disposable 
income increased on average for all single mothers between 1993 and 
1997. Yet, the poorest fifth of single-mother families, many of whom 
are current or former welfare recipients, had less disposable income in 
1997 than in 1995. The disposable income of the next fifth of these 
families was unchanged over these two years because declines in 
income from public assistance programs offset increased earnings and 
benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit.
Although there has been some discussion about how families that 
were receiving cash assistance are faring, much greater attention has 
been given by policy makers and the media to caseload declines. A few 
studies on how families are faring have recently appeared, and many 
more will appear in the next few years. It takes time to gather and eval 
uate this evidence, as it is more difficult to follow families leaving wel 
fare and find out about their incomes than it is to count the number of 
families remaining on the welfare rolls. Several continuing studies 
and the Cancian et al. study (Chapter 6 in this volume) suggest that 
reductions in caseloads do not mean that most families who leave the 
rolls are "making it." Recipients are looking harder for jobs in 
response to the increased policy pressure than were recipients prior to 
1996; and, in part because the labor market is so tight, many are getting 
jobs. Greater numbers of recipients have left the rolls than are getting 
jobs, however.
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In addition, in some states, recipients have been terminated from 
the rolls because of rule changes, not because they are finding jobs. 
For example, a report in The New York Times ("West Virginia Trims 
Welfare, but Poor Remain," March 7, 1999) noted that West Virginia 
had begun to count child Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits 
as income for TANF recipients, rendering them ineligible for TANF 
benefits regardless of their ability to find work. A court ruling subse 
quently overturned this policy. Yet, this demonstrates that some states 
have instituted administrative rule changes that have reduced case 
loads, with little regard for the employability of the affected recipients. 
For example, some states are pursuing diversion policies that attempt 
to minimize the number of applicants who enter the rolls, and other 
states, sanction policies that attempt to maximize exit from the rolls.
To date, all studies, including those in this volume (which were 
completed in early 1999) can provide only short-term responses to the 
questions posed here. Because it has only been three years since wel 
fare reform was passed and because macroeconomic conditions have 
been unusually good, we do not yet know how families who have left 
the rolls will fare in the long run or in ordinary or recessionary eco 
nomic periods. Some recipients who have left the rolls, even if they 
now have earnings below their former welfare benefit level, may gain 
additional hours of work and/or wage increases if they stay employed. 
Of course, their current situation might be better than their long run 
prospects because the labor market is so tight.
Over the next few years, we will learn much more about the issues 
analyzed in this volume. For now, however, the chapters that follow 
tell us about what we have learned so far and speculate about what 
might happen in the long run. In particular, the authors consider what 
is likely to happen during an economic slowdown: How responsive are 
caseloads to changes in economic conditions and policy changes? 
How are recipients likely to fare as employer willingness to hire them 
fluctuates over the business cycle? What policy changes might state 
governments undertake? I now turn to a brief summary of the chapters. 
Parts I, II and III are organized around the three broad questions: Why 
are caseloads falling? How are recipients faring? How are the states 
responding?
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WHY ARE CASELOADS FALLING?
The four chapters in Part I analyze trends in welfare caseloads in 
recent years, with particular emphasis on sorting out how much of the 
caseload changes—increases in the late 1980s and early 1990s, fol 
lowed by decreases—can be attributed to macroeconomic conditions 
and how much to welfare reform policy changes. A careful reading of 
all four papers, each of which uses different data or different estima 
tion strategies, shows how difficult it is to explain caseload changes.
In their chapter, David Figlio and James Ziliak attempt to reconcile 
a controversy about the relative effects of changes in the unemploy 
ment rate and pre-TANF changes in state welfare policies on the wel 
fare caseload. In 1997, a paper by staff members of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) attributed more than one-third 
of the decline in caseloads between 1993 and 1996 to declining unem 
ployment and less than one-third to state waiver policies. Another 
1997 paper by Ziliak, Figlio, and colleagues attributed a greater share 
to the former and a smaller share to the latter. In their replication of the 
CEA model, about one-third of the caseload decline is again attributed 
to the economy, but only about one-sixth to waivers; their preferred 
models attribute about half to three-quarters of the change to the econ 
omy, but virtually none to welfare reform. Figlio and Ziliak conclude 
that these differences are due to the fact that the CEA uses a static 
model, while they prefer a dynamic one, and that "the primary conse 
quence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to reduce the role of 
welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in generating the decline 
in AFDC caseloads." They also point out that welfare reform has 
played a larger role in the post-PRWORA caseload decline than it did 
prior to 1996.
Geoffrey Wallace and Rebecca Blank analyze trends in both AFDC 
and food stamp caseloads for the 1980-1996 period. They document a 
significant unexplained increase in both caseloads, even after they con 
trol for a broad range of economic, demographic, political, and policy- 
related variables. During the 1994-1996 period, about half of the 
AFDC caseload change is attributed to the unemployment rate and 
about one-fifth to state welfare waivers, but for the 1994-1998 period, 
a much smaller part of the decline is due to unemployment rate
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changes. They conclude that, based on their historical estimates, "the 
expected effect of any future one-point increase in unemployment will 
be to increase TANF caseloads by 4 to 6 percent and food stamp case 
loads by 6 to 7 percent." This suggests that a severe recession that 
raises the unemployment rate by 3-4 percentage points, to 7.5-8 per 
cent, would leave welfare caseloads well below the levels reached in 
the early 1990s. They conclude that the 1996 welfare reform seems to 
have achieved a large reduction in caseloads independent of the state of 
the economy.
Robert Moffitt applies the CEA methodology not to time series 
data, but to micro data from the 1976-1996 Current Population Sur 
veys. This allows him to focus more directly on specific population 
groups such as less-educated women, who are most likely to be 
affected by welfare reform, and to examine not only changes in welfare 
caseloads, but also changes in earnings and family income. He finds 
that state welfare waivers reduced AFDC participation rates among 
women without high school degrees and increased their labor force 
attachment, but had little effect on their earnings. Women who were 
high school graduates fared better: their AFDC participation rates fell, 
their work effort increased, and their earnings also increased.
In the last chapter of Part I, Timothy Bartik and Randall Eberts 
extend the kinds of models estimated by the CEA, Figlio and Ziliak, 
and Wallace and Blank to include measures of economic conditions 
other than unemployment rates, notably labor demand factors. They 
focus on state employment growth, the wage premium associated with 
an area's industrial mix, the educational requirements implied by the 
industrial mix, and the extent to which a state's industries tend to 
employ welfare recipients. They find that a welfare recipient faces 
greater barriers to employment than does a typical worker because of 
low educational attainment and greater volatility in industries that tend 
to hire recipients, and that caseloads are higher in states with higher 
concentrations of industries that hire more educated workers. They 
conclude that the national trend toward higher educational require 
ments in many industries can account for some of the increase in wel 
fare caseloads in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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HOW ARE RECIPIENTS FARING?
The two chapters in Part II focus on the labor market, first on recip 
ient work and earnings outcomes and then on employer willingness to 
hire welfare recipients. The findings are similar to those in the Moffitt 
and Bartik/Eberts chapters; i.e., the least-skilled have the hardest time 
making it in the labor market.
Maria Cancian and her colleagues review evidence from several 
data sources about the post-welfare work effort and the economic well- 
being of former recipients. Although most former recipients can find 
some work, most cannot get and keep full-time, year-round work. In 
their analysis of pre-TANF data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth, in each of the five years after exit, about two-thirds worked. 
However, in any of these years, only about one-sixth to about one- 
quarter worked full-time, full-year. The same was true in the post- 
TANF Wisconsin administrative data they analyze; during the first year 
after leaving the rolls, about two-thirds of leavers worked. They also 
found that most former recipients (at least in the first few years) will 
earn relatively low wages, between $6.50 and $7.50 per hour. This is 
not surprising, given that welfare recipients have low skills and that the 
real wages of less-skilled workers have fallen dramatically over the 
past quarter century and have not increased much during the current 
economic boom.
This finding about the wage prospects of less-skilled workers is 
not new. It was the motivation for the proposal of the first Clinton 
administration "to make work pay and end welfare as we know it." 
This suggests that former welfare recipients will continue to need gov 
ernment income supplements if they are to support their family at 
incomes above the poverty line. The expanded Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) has a very important role here, as does post-welfare 
access to subsidized child care, health care, and food stamps. As the 
Cancian et al. chapter cautions, "Even consistent work may not suffice 
for self-support if wages are low . . . The relatively modest growth in 
wages for this sample is inconsistent with the suggestion that even if 
former welfare recipients start in low-paying jobs, they will soon move 
on to jobs that pay wages that can support a family above the poverty 
line." The good news in Wisconsin for the sample of families that had
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left the welfare rolls is that twice as many of them were above the pov 
erty line relative to those remaining on the rolls. Yet, only 27 percent 
of those who left cash assistance and did not return escaped poverty, 
and only about one-third of all leavers obtained the income level they 
received just before they left welfare.
An additional caveat is in order. The first wave of data from a 
panel study of welfare recipients being conducted at the University of 
Michigan2 shows that women remaining on welfare have characteris 
tics, not evaluated in most studies of recipients, that make their labor 
market prospects more problematic than those of all single mothers 
and even those of recipients who have already left the rolls. The study 
examined 14 potential barriers to employment, including major depres 
sion, post-traumatic stress disorder, maternal health, child health, labor 
market skills, perceived experiences of discrimination, and several 
standard human capital measures. It found that about 75 percent of 
single mothers who received cash welfare in February 1997 and had 
zero or one of these barriers were working in Fall 1997, whereas only 
about 40 percent of those with four or more barriers were working. As 
welfare caseloads continue to decline, this suggests that the recipients 
who remain will be the least employable.
Harry Holzer presents evidence from his survey of a large sample 
of employers in several metropolitan areas in Michigan. He concludes 
that labor market tightness has a substantial effect on employer 
demand for welfare recipients. Like Cancian et al., he finds that most 
welfare recipients can get some work when labor markets are very 
tight, as they have been in the late 1990s. In fact, many of the employ 
ers whom Holzer interviewed in Fall 1997 told him that they were will 
ing to hire welfare recipients in 1998, although many had not yet done 
so. Thus, a recession is likely to significantly reduce employer demand 
for less-skilled workers in general and welfare recipients in particular, 
because, at the time of the interviews, the employers expected labor 
market tightness to increase and they were already having difficulty 
filling current vacant positions. Holzer estimates that a recession 
would reduce demand for recipients by 25 to 40 percent from current 
levels, suggesting that the employment experience of recipients may 
provide a classic example of the "last hired, first fired" syndrome. In 
addition, he finds that employers are more receptive to many public 
interventions on behalf of welfare recipients (such as tax credits for
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hiring or training workers) because of current labor market tightness 
and their difficulty in finding qualified workers.
HOW ARE THE STATES RESPONDING?
The three chapters in Part III all focus on what states are doing 
now and how they are likely to respond when a recession comes. This 
is unchartered territory, as PRWORA has given states a fixed block 
grant along with greater discretion. The block grant provides states in 
each year with an amount of federal funds that is the higher of the 1994 
or 1995 level or the average for the 1992-1994 period. Because wel 
fare caseloads were much higher during these years than they now are, 
this has produced a financial windfall for the states. However, as the 
authors discuss, the federal government will not share the increased 
welfare costs associated with a recession as it did in the past.
LaDonna Pavetti analyzes how states have begun to implement the 
new work-oriented welfare system in a "resource-rich" environment. 
Given available resources and declining caseloads, many states have 
provided expanded job search assistance and support services to many 
more recipients than was the case prior to PRWORA. The challenge 
when the economy turns down, according to Pavetti, is that state 
resources will be fixed, the number of recipients seeking assistance 
will increase, jobs will be harder to find, and time limits will have 
come into effect in a greater number of states. She concludes that 
given the emphasis on mandatory work, it may be necessary to broaden 
the definition of what constitutes participation in a work activity. 
Alternatives include increased use of vocational education or training 
programs, participation in community work experience or public ser 
vice employment programs, or volunteer activities in the community.
Pavetti's concerns are important given the difficulty of many 
former recipients in finding stable employment in the tight labor mar 
ket of 1998 and 1999. She suggests that states should begin experi 
menting with community service employment or work-for-your- 
welfare policy options now, while caseloads are still declining and 
resources are plentiful. The next recession is likely to occur when 
some single mothers will have already exhausted their lifetime eligibil-
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ity for TANF benefits. It will be easier to pilot these programs now 
when the labor market is good than to reach the next recession without 
this kind of safety net in place. 3
In his chapter, Phillip Levine examines how much states will likely 
be forced to spend on additional welfare payments in the event of a 
recession. He concludes that costs will rise by $7-14 billion, depend 
ing on the severity of the recession, and this will impose a serious 
financial burden on some states. He also shows that the rules govern 
ing how states can draw funds from the federal contingency fund are 
such that many states will receive little relief. Levine uses the states' 
experiences with the unemployment insurance system to predict how 
states are likely to handle the burden imposed by the increased cycli- 
cality of their welfare spending. His simulations suggest that some 
states will have a very hard time saving for a rainy day.
Howard Chernick and Therese McGuire speculate about how 
states might respond now that the open-ended matching grant program 
of AFDC has been changed to a fixed block grant. They analyze the 
long-run spending responses of governments to other matching and 
block grants and past variations in state revenues and expenditures over 
the business cycle. They argue that because PRWORA's maintenance- 
of-effort requirement limits a state's spending reduction to 20 or 25 
percent of the 1994 level, and because caseloads have already declined 
by so much, the shift to TANF's block grant has not led to immediate 
cuts in benefit levels. Over time, benefits are likely to be, at most, 10 
percent lower as a consequence of the price increase for public assis 
tance that is associated with PRWORA's elimination of matching 
grants. This reduction does not lend support to the idea that there will 
be a "race to the bottom" in state benefit levels. They estimate that in a 
recession comparable in magnitude to the 1990-1991 recession, most 
states should be able to avoid drastic spending cuts. However, in the 
past, some states have sharply reduced their welfare spending in 
response to a downturn, and some states now have tax systems that 
make their revenues especially sensitive to economic downturns. 
Some states, like California, are considered likely to face difficult 
problems by both the Levine and the Chernick/McGuire analyses.
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SUMMARY
Taken together, the chapters in this volume suggest that, in its first 
few years, the 1996 welfare reform has been more successful in some 
dimensions (notably, reducing caseloads) than in others (raising dis 
posable income). Much of the success to date is due to a booming 
economy and to a fiscal environment in which states have more funds 
to spend per recipient than they had in the past. Nonetheless, even 
under these optimal economic and fiscal conditions, some recipients 
have already "slipped through the cracks." The end of entitlement has 
meant that some single mothers, with poor labor market prospects and 
no other means of support, have not received the benefits they would 
have under the pre-PRWORA welfare system. Indeed, there are con 
cerns that some recipients have lost not only their cash assistance, but 
also the food stamp and Medicaid benefits to which they are still enti 
tled.
The chapters collectively raise a cautionary flag that, given current 
rules, much of the success achieved to date may disappear during the 
next recession. The cyclical effects on state budgets will be greater 
during the next recession than they were during previous ones. Then, 
some single mothers will have reached their lifetime benefit limit and 
will require benefit extensions/exemptions; others will not be able to 
get benefits to which they are eligible without some changes in diver 
sion/sanction policies; and both groups may need access to community 
service jobs if they are to avoid serious material hardships.
The authors analyze some of the key issues that Congress and the 
next administration should consider when the 1996 act comes up for 
re-authorization, and they provide a road map for "reforming welfare 
reform" to avoid problems that are inherent in current law. State poli- 
cymakers would also be well-served if they began to make contingency 
plans in response to the authors' projections. To end on an optimistic 
note, the relative success of welfare reform in reducing caseloads may 
have created the fiscal and political context that will allow the reform 
ing of welfare reform in order to better serve those who need further 
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Welfare Reform, the Business Cycle, 
and the Decline in AFDC Caseloads
David N. Figlio 
University of Florida
James P. Ziliak 
University of Oregon
The past decade has witnessed unprecedented changes in both the 
caseload size and administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program. Welfare caseloads increased nationwide 
by about 26 percent from 1990 to the peak in early 1994, and then 
declined by 35 percent as of the third quarter of 1998. With the lone 
exception of Hawaii, every state has experienced caseload reductions, 
ranging from a 13 percent drop in Alaska to an 86 percent drop in Wis 
consin. Two factors are widely credited for these declines: strong eco 
nomic growth and a fundamental transformation of the welfare system 
(Blank 1998; Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Ziliak et al. 1997). 
Since 1993, nearly 18 million new jobs have been created, unemploy 
ment rates have fallen to their lowest level in a generation, and employ 
ers of low-wage workers are arguably facing the tightest labor market 
in 50 years (Maharaj 1998). During this same period, the U.S. Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) became more liberal in 
granting waivers from federal AFDC requirements, permitting states to 
experiment in earnest with their welfare systems. These experiments 
culminated in the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA cre 
ated a new federal block-grant program called Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) to replace AFDC; the new program elimi 
nates individual entitlement to cash assistance and gives states wide 
latitude in setting program parameters.
While it is generally incontrovertible that the business cycle and 
welfare reform underlie the dramatic decline in the AFDC program, the 
relative contribution of each factor is in dispute. While the Council of
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Economic Advisers (CEA) presents a number of specifications, their 
preferred estimate suggests that the business cycle accounts for 44 per 
cent of the decline in AFDC caseloads from 1993-1996, while welfare 
waivers account for 31 percent of the decline. Alternatively, Ziliak et 
al., using higher-frequency data and a more dynamic specification, 
attribute nearly two-thirds of the decline to the robust economy but 
nearly nothing to welfare reform.
Because the policy implications from the CEA and Ziliak et al. dif 
fer significantly, it is important to delineate the methodological differ 
ences in order to make more informed fiscal and welfare policy. For 
example, if AFDC cases only weakly respond to business-cycle condi 
tions, then we would expect the welfare-program budget surpluses that 
many states have enjoyed recently to persist even into a recessionary 
period. Alternatively, if caseloads are strongly countercyclical, then 
states that have failed to save for a "rainy day" may face difficult fiscal 
constraints during the next cyclical downturn. In addition, any interre 
lationship between welfare reform and the macroeconomy may 
become disentangled when the economy turns toward recession. 
Bishop (1998) presented evidence that most of the increase in labor 
force participation rates since 1994 is among single women with chil 
dren. If a large share of these women are former welfare recipients and 
the recent success of welfare reform is tied to the robust economy, then 
the movement from welfare to work could be much weaker in a slug 
gish economy.
Our purpose here is threefold. First, we conduct an extensive rec 
onciliation between the findings in Ziliak et al. and those of the CEA. U 
Specifically, using the data and sample period employed by the CEA, 
we examine the relative impacts of the business cycle and welfare 
reform on the 1993-1996 caseload decline via numerous modeling 
choices, including using recipients versus cases as the outcome of 
interest, using year dummies versus a cubic trend to control for macro- 
economic factors, using controls for welfare benefits, using weights in 
the regression model, using different sample periods, using first differ 
ences instead of levels, and using a dynamic framework. Second, we 
turn our attention to the issue of how welfare recipiency might respond 
in the event of a recession. To address this question, we employ the 
preferred dynamic specifications that arise from the reconciliation and 
simulate how caseloads respond to alternative "shocks" to the unem-
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ployment rate. Third, we examine the possibility of interactions 
between the macroeconomy and welfare reform.
Our reconciliation suggests that the differences in results between 
Ziliak et al. and the CEA emanate largely from the treatment of 
dynamics. These dynamics surface in the form of sluggish adjustment 
of current caseloads to past caseloads, from lags in the response of 
caseloads to changes in unemployment rates, and from nonstationari- 
ties in caseloads (especially at monthly frequencies). The primary con 
sequence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to reduce the role of 
welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in generating the decline 
in AFDC caseloads. Once we control for dynamics, we attribute up to 
75 percent of the 1993-1996 caseload decline to the macroeconomy 
and at most 1 percent to welfare reform.
Moreover, the simulations underscore both the importance of con 
trolling for dynamics and the cyclical sensitivity of welfare recipiency. 
We find that the implied long-run effect of a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate is 2.5 and 6 times the static estimate 
in levels and first differences, respectively. In addition, we find that a 
2-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads up to an 
11.7 percent increase in welfare recipiency after four years, while a 4- 
percentage-point increase yields a 23.4 percent increase in recipiency. 
Finally, the results from interactions between the macroeconomy and 
welfare reform indicate that pre-TANF welfare reform requires a 
robust economy (i.e., low unemployment rates) in order to have a neg 
ative impact on recipiency rates.
REVIEW OF CASELOAD LITERATURE
Research on modeling aggregate AFDC caseloads is a relatively 
recent addition to the welfare literature. This stands in contrast to the 
large microeconometric literature that focuses either on the determi 
nants of AFDC participation or the duration of welfare spells (Dan- 
ziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992). A few previous 
papers have considered the impact of economic stimuli on caseload 
levels without examining the concurrent effects of welfare reform. 3 
The purpose of most of these studies has been to develop models that
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can accurately forecast changes in the number of families receiving 
AFDC over time. They tend to use time series data and focus on a sin 
gle state, and in some cases on a single city (New York). The study by 
Peskin, Tapogna, and Marcotte (1993) for the Congressional Budget 
Office is a notable exception in their application of quarterly time- 
series data for national AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP (unemployed par 
ents) caseloads.4 They employed a distributed lag model, permitting 
the business cycle to have a dynamic impact on caseloads, and found 
that both Basic and UP caseloads exhibit strong countercyclical move 
ments. Specifically, their model predicts that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the employment gap (the percentage difference between 
potential and actual employment) leads to a 0.5 percent decline in 
Basic and a 1.7 percent decline in UP caseloads in that quarter.
Moffitt (1987) used cross-sectional and time-series data separately 
to study the large run-up in AFDC recipiency in the late 1960s. For the 
cross-sectional analysis, he employed a static model of AFDC partici 
pation for 1967, 1973, and 1979, where participation is a function of 
measured demographics, AFDC program parameters, and the unem 
ployment rate. The model predicts that most of the run-up is unex 
plained by economic and demographic factors. Instead, Moffitt 
attributed the increase to non-economic factors, such as court-ordered 
and legislative decisions that made eligibility easier and an increased 
willingness to participate in the program, possibly due to a reduction in 
the stigma associated with benefit receipt.
More recently, researchers have turned to state-level administrative 
data to model the impact of both the business cycle and welfare reform 
on AFDC caseloads. The advantage of the state panel-data approach is 
that it fosters identification of the business-cycle and welfare-reform 
effects by exploiting spatial differences across states and time-series 
differences within states. Because the focus of this paper is in reconcil 
ing the results from this literature, we provide a more detailed sum 
mary of the methods.
The Council of Economic Advisers (1997) employed annual state- 
level panel data for 1976-1996 to model per capita AFDC recipiency 
rates. The dependent variable combines AFDC recipients, not cases, in 
both the Basic and UP programs; this implicitly assumes that the busi 
ness-cycle and welfare-reform responses between the two groups are 
identical. The CEA modeled per capita recipiency as a function of the
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business cycle, waivers from federal welfare programs, program 
parameters, and unobserved state fixed effects and trends. To capture 
the impact of the business cycle, the CEA used current and one-period- 
lagged state unemployment rates; the lag controls for any delays 
between the timing of unemployment and the receipt of welfare. The 
waiver variables were defined as the fraction of the year that the (full- 
state) waivers are approved. In some specifications the waivers were 
aggregated as "any statewide waiver," while in others they were disag 
gregated as "JOBS sanctions," "time limits," "work requirements," 
"family cap," and "earnings disregards." In several specifications, the 
CEA included both contemporaneous waiver variables and one-period 
"lead" waivers. The latter was an attempt to control for political ratio 
nal expectations on the part of welfare recipients, signifying that wel 
fare benefits were soon to be threatened. The AFDC program 
parameter was the AFDC maximum-benefit guarantee for a family of 
three, which is used to capture the "price" of welfare. Lastly, the state 
fixed effects and trends controlled for permanent differences in labor- 
force composition and welfare populations, as well as trending differ 
ences across states.
In their preferred results (Council of Economic Advisers 1997, 
Table 2, Column 6), the CEA found that contemporary unemployment 
has little effect on AFDC recipiency, but that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in lagged unemployment increases recipiency by almost 5 per 
cent. The waiver effects are mixed—there is no significant current effect 
from the variable "any statewide waiver," but the lead effect suggests 
that states with any anticipated federal waiver could expect a 6 percent 
decline in annual recipiency rates. The conclusions were reversed for 
the "JOBS sanctions" variable: the current effect suggests a 7 percent 
decline, but there is no significant lead effect.
The specifications in Blank (1998) are similar to the CEA's, with a 
few notable exceptions. She used annual state panel data from 1979- 
1995 and estimated separate models for AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP 
caseload levels. In addition to the explanatory variables used by the 
CEA, Blank controlled for a second lag in unemployment, along with 
interstate differences in median and 20th percentile wages, racial com 
position, female headship, age composition, average years of school 
ing, and political affiliation of the governor and state legislature.
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Overall, Blank's estimates of the effects of the business cycle and 
welfare waivers do not differ substantively from the CEA's (see Blank 
1998, Table 2, Column 1). The net effect of a 1-percentage-point 
increase in unemployment leading to a 3.8 percent increase in cases is 
comparable to the CEA's estimate of 4.07 percent. When Blank 
included a lead waiver (Blank 1998, Table 3, column 2) she estimated 
that "any statewide waiver" leads to about an 12.8 percent reduction in 
caseloads; again, this is similar to the CEA's overall estimate of about 
12.5 percent (summing up the current and lead coefficients). It is 
important to note how closely the results mimic each other even though 
Blank's pertain to Basic cases while the CEA's pertain to total recipi 
ents. Blank did find that the UP program is more responsive to macro- 
economic and policy variables than the Basic program; however, since 
UP cases are only about 6 percent of the total, pooling the samples ade 
quately represents the majority of cyclical and welfare-reform move 
ments in cases. Unlike the CEA, Blank did not prefer the models with 
lead waiver variables, because the latter likely capture other factors 
changing in the states (prior to waiver approval) and not true program 
effects.
The paper by Ziliak et al. (1997) differs in several dimensions from 
those of the CEA and Blank. The period under study was shorter 
(1987-1996), the data were monthly as opposed to annual state-level 
data, and the empirical specification was more parsimonious in control 
variables because there is very little within-year variation in measured 
demographics. The dependent variable was per capita AFDC-Total 
caseloads, while the measures of the business cycle were either 
employment per capita or the unemployment rate. The welfare waiver 
dummy variables (1 = month waiver was approved) were broken down 
into four categories: work requirements, time limits, work pays (e.g., 
higher earnings disregard), and responsibility (e.g., family cap). 
Finally, there were controls for state fixed effects and time trends, as 
well as month-of-year dummy variables to control for seasonality in 
caseloads and employment.
Two additional methodological differences in Ziliak et al. are that 
the model was estimated in first differences and it had a richer dynamic 
structure. Ziliak et al. provided evidence that monthly caseloads are 
nonstationary in levels but stationary in first-differences. Moreover, 
they introduced dynamics into the model in the form of state depen-
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dence (6 lags of the dependent variable), lagged business cycles (11 
lags of employment per capita), and an "implementation lag" for the 
welfare waivers. The implementation lag was defined as the number of 
months since approval and was designed to capture the fact that it may 
take several months or even years to revamp the program with the 
reforms in place.
The results and subsequent policy implications of Ziliak et al. dif 
fer markedly from those in the CEA and Blank. Ziliak et al. gave much 
more weight to the business cycle relative to welfare reform in explain 
ing the recent decline. The small overall effect of welfare waivers 
arises because the type of waiver that a state adopts matters for aggre 
gate caseload levels: some are caseload-decreasing while others are 
caseload-enhancing. In simulations of the dynamic model, they 
showed that work requirements and responsibility waivers significantly 
reduce caseloads, yet waivers that make work more attractive increase 
caseloads by nearly the same percentage. Ziliak et al. conducted a lim 
ited reconciliation of their results with those of the CEA and Blank and 
concluded that the key difference arose through the modeling of 
dynamics.
In the following sections, we expand on the reconciliation begun in 
Ziliak et al. One issue that we do not address econometrically is the 
effect of lead waivers. As mentioned above, Blank did not believe that 
the lead variables signal true program effects. Martini and Wiseman 
(1997) went even further in their critique of the CEA's use of lead 
effects, arguing that many of the waivers are not "threatening" per se 
and the one waiver that might be perceived as threatening, "JOBS 
sanctions," has no significant lead effect. Moreover, they claimed that 
it is unlikely that welfare recipients would respond one year in advance 
of waiver approval when the approval date is so uncertain, and that if 
lead effects are to be interpreted literally, then all states without waiv 
ers as of August 1995 should be coded with a lead effect anticipating 
PRWORA. However, the latter would be unreasonable, because pas 
sage of PRWORA was uncertain up to a month before President Clin 
ton signed it into law. Additionally, Ziliak et al. presented evidence 
that lead effects disappear in annual first-difference models. Because 
of these limitations, we do not explore the role of lead waivers further. 
Consequently, our reconciliation focuses on the CEA's specification 2, 
which does not control for lead waiver effects.
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RECONCILING THE CEA AND ZILIAK ET AL.
The data used in this study are the same as those employed by the 
CEA. Although Ziliak et al. used state-level monthly data, for the pur 
poses of the reconciliation it is most instructive to use the same data as 
the CEA in order to abstract from data issues and focus on modeling 
choices. The annual state-level panel data are for the 1976-1996 fed 
eral fiscal years and contain information on AFDC recipients, state 
unemployment rates, state population, real AFDC maximum benefits 
for a family of three, and statewide welfare waivers. In addition to the 
CEA data, we collected information on caseload levels by state and 
year. The reader is referred to the CEA technical report (1997) for 
more extensive details about the data.
We begin our reconciliation by replicating specification 2 from 
Table 2 of the CEA. This static model regresses the log of AFDC 
recipients per capita on the unemployment rate, the real maximum 
AFDC benefit for a family of three, year dummies, and state-specific 
fixed effects and trends. The year dummies control for macroeconomic 
factors that affect all states in a given year, such as federal expansions 
in the Earned Income Tax Credit or oil-price shocks. Meanwhile, the 
controls for time-invariant state fixed effects and for state-specific 
trends are intended to capture not only fixed unobserved state-specific 
propensities to take up welfare, but also slow-moving state-specific 
trends in demographics such as fertility rates, marital status, and 
migration patterns. Thus, the static model for each state z (i = 1, . . . , 
51) in period t(t= 1,..., 21) is
Eq. 1 Rit = |i + aURu + pW,-, + QBU + y, + 8, + V + e«v»
where
Rit = the natural log of per capita AFDC recipients
URit = the unemployment rate
Wit = the welfare reform indicator that equals the fraction of a
year (based on the approval date) that "any statewide
waiver" is in effect
Bit = the real maximum AFDC benefit for a family of three 
jt = a vector of year effects
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8j = the time-invariant state-specific deviation from the overall 
constant ji
\t = the state-specific trend,
£lt = a random error.
To control for possible heteroskedasticity, the regression is weighted 
by state population.
In column 1 of Table 1, we present the base-case, weighted-least- 
squares estimates of the effects of the business cycle and welfare 
reform on per capita AFDC recipients (CEA's specification 2). The 
results suggest that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate will yield a 3.1 percent increase in per capita AFDC recipients. 
Alternatively, states with a statewide welfare waiver experience a 5.5 
percent decline in AFDC recipiency relative to states without a waiver. 5 
The point estimates are useful for decomposing the fraction of the 
1993-1996 decline in recipients attributable to the business cycle and 
to welfare reform. The estimates indicate that the robust economy 
accounted for 31 percent of the decline, while welfare reform 
accounted for 16 percent.
Recipients versus Caseloads
The first step towards reconciling the results from Ziliak et al. with 
those from the CEA involves the choice of dependent variable. Ziliak 
et al. used AFDC caseloads per capita as the dependent variable, rather 
than the number of AFDC recipients. Cases may be preferred to recip 
ients because the latter confounds the number of households receiving 
AFDC with the within-household fertility behavior. In addition, the 
number of cases may better represent the underlying household behav 
ioral response to changes in economic conditions and welfare reform, 
because it is the adult who makes the decision about whether or not to 
participate in AFDC. In most situations, there is only one adult per 
AFDC household, while there may be several children, so the caseload 
correlates most closely with the number of decision makers. Lastly, 
there appears to be more political interest in understanding the factors 
that affect the number of cases than those that determine the number of 
recipients per se. In fact, most welfare reform waivers are designed to 
affect the caseload rather than the number of recipients.
Table 1 Sensitivity of Static Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita AFDC 



























































due to the economy
% of 1993-1996 decline 
due to welfare reform
15.8 157 23.7 14.6 18.3 9.6 4.2 2.6 0.4
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the Dis 
trict of Columbia. Unless noted otherwise, all regressions are based on fiscal years 1976-1996, use total recipients, are weighted by the 
state population, use levels, and have controls for the real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state- 
specific trends, and year dummies.
Col. 6 = Blank (1998) sample period
Col. 7 = Ziliak et al. (1997) sample period
Col. 8 = first differences
Col. 9 = unweighted first differences
b Col. 1 = CEA (1997) specification 2. 
Col. 2 = AFDC caseloads 
Col. 3 = cubic trend 
Col. 4 = no AFDC benefits 
Col. 5 = unweighted
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To test the sensitivity of the model estimates to the choice of 
dependent variable, we report the results from a model of AFDC case 
loads in column 2 of Table 1. The estimates are nearly identical, espe 
cially for the welfare waivers, to those from the model with AFDC 
recipients reported in column 1. This indicates that the differences 
between the CEA and Ziliak et al. are not due to the use of a different 
dependent variable. 6
Year Dummies versus Cubic Trend
The next dimension that differentiates the models of the CEA and 
Ziliak et al. is in the way that they controlled for period-specific macro- 
economic factors that are common to all states. The CEA used annual 
year dummies; Ziliak et al. used a cubic trend because they used 
monthly data, and rather than append 120 month dummies to the 
regression, they parameterized the national trends with a cubic polyno 
mial in order to capture the fall (1987-1990), rise (1990-1993), and 
subsequent fall (1993-1996) in caseloads. It is not clear a priori 
whether the use of a cubic trend is likely to favor the business cycle or 
welfare reform relative to year dummies.
Column 3 reports the sensitivity of the model estimates to the use 
of a cubic trend rather than year dummies. Relative to column 1, it 
appears that the cubic trend imputes less of an effect to the economy 
and considerably more to welfare reform; that is, the fraction of the 
1993-1996 decline attributable to the economy falls to 26 percent and 
the fraction attributable to welfare reform rises to 24 percent. This 
suggests that, if anything, the specification used by Ziliak et al. is likely 
to favor welfare reform relative to the economy. Since Ziliak et al. 
attributed a smaller effect to welfare reform relative to the CEA, it is 
clear that the choice of a cubic trend cannot explain the discrepancy in 
results.
Benefits versus No Benefits
Unlike the studies by the CEA and Blank, Ziliak et al. did not 
include welfare benefit levels as a regressor because of the lack of suit 
able instruments that could deal with the possible simultaneity with 
recipiency. It is sensible to think that while benefit levels might
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explain welfare recipiency, the size of the caseload might also affect 
the benefit level. Indeed, the simultaneity between welfare benefits 
and recipiency has been shown by Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (forthcom 
ing), Gramlich and Laren (1984), and Shroder (1995). Nonetheless, it 
is instructive to examine the sensitivity of the estimated business-cycle 
and welfare-reform effects to the inclusion of welfare benefits, even 
though they may be endogenous.
Column 4 of Table 1 presents a reduced-form version of the base- 
case model in which welfare benefits are omitted. As shown, the esti 
mated welfare-reform and business-cycle effects differ trivially 
whether one includes or omits welfare benefits. Again, this suggests 
that controlling for welfare benefits, even if endogenous but treated as 
if they are exogenous, does not lead to substantive differences between 
Ziliak et al. and the CEA.
Weighted versus Unweighted
Both the CEA and Blank weighted their regression models; the 
CEA used total population and Blank used the population of women 
between the ages of 15 and 45 (under the assumption that the latter are 
more likely at risk for entering AFDC). On the other hand, Ziliak et al. 
did not weight their regression model. In general, weighting a regres 
sion model is recommended in situations of nonrandom sampling, non- 
spherical disturbances, or random parameter heterogeneity (Deaton 
1997, pp. 67-73). Since all 50 states and the District of Columbia are 
represented in the data, they clearly are not subject to problems associ 
ated with nonrandom sample-selection bias. The disturbances may, 
however, be nonspherical, most likely in the form of heteroskedasticity 
(and serial correlation in the absence of controls for caseload dynam 
ics). Nonetheless, it not clear that the only source of heteroskedasticity 
arises from population as assumed in the CEA and Blank. A more 
agnostic approach is to assume that the form of heteroskedasticity is 
unknown and to simply adjust standard errors using the Eicker-Huber- 
White correction.
Martini and Wiseman (1997) criticized the CEA for weighting by 
arguing that if states are viewed as "laboratories" for waiver experi 
ments, then each state should be given equal weight. Indeed, we have 
no a priori reason to believe that a state's population factored into
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HHS's decision-making process for welfare waivers. Martini and 
Wiseman's argument suggests that the impact of waivers is homoge 
neous across states, and if so, then unweighted regression is superior to 
weighted regression on efficiency grounds. If, instead, we expect the 
responses to the experiments to be different across states, then weight 
ing like that of the CEA and Blank produces consistent estimates when 
the parameter heterogeneity is unrelated to the other variables in the 
regression model (i.e., random coefficients). If this is a correct param 
eterization of the unobserved heterogeneity, then the usual weighted- 
least-squares standard errors are incorrect, although this obviously has 
no effect on the parameter estimates (Deaton 1997, p. 73). Indeed, as 
long as the model is correctly specified, there should be no significant 
difference between weighted and unweighted parameter estimates. If, 
however, the model is misspecified (e.g., through a lack of controls for 
caseload, business-cycle, and welfare-reform dynamics), then weighted 
and unweighted parameter estimates may diverge.
In column 5 of Table 1, we report unweighted business-cycle and 
welfare-reform estimates. Weighting by population in column 1 has 
the effect of reducing the estimated impact of both the business cycle 
and welfare waivers. The fraction of the 1993-1996 decline attribut 
able to the economy rises from 31 to 36 percent, while the fraction 
attributable to welfare reform rises from 16 to 18 percent when moving 
from weighted to unweighted regression analysis. The downward 
effect that weighting has on the waiver estimates is most likely due to 
the fact that the larger states had both relatively smaller caseload 
declines and later (or no) pre-TANF waiver approvals. Likewise, these 
larger states also experienced less-pronounced reductions in their 
unemployment rates. Because the share of the caseload decline due to 
the business cycle and welfare reform between the weighted and 
unweighted models differs by about 17 percent, this suggests that the 
static model in Eq. 1 is mispecified. However, because the proportion 
ate increase attributable to the economy and to welfare reform is nearly 
identical, weighting the regression model is not likely the primary 
source of difference between the CEA and Ziliak et al.
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Sample Period
The CEA's estimates were based on federal fiscal years 1976- 
1996, while Blank used 1977-1995 fiscal years and Ziliak et al. used 
1987-1996 fiscal years (although the latter used monthly, not annual, 
data). Because many states did not receive a welfare waiver until 1995 
or 1996, it is possible that ending the sample in 1995 (as Blank did) 
would lead to a lower welfare-reform estimate. However, her esti 
mated business-cycle effect should be quite comparable to that of the 
CEA because both samples include the dramatic contraction and sub 
sequent expansion of the 1980s. The sample used in Ziliak et al., on 
the other hand, included the entire pre-TANF waiver period (like the 
CEA) but misses the substantial cyclical movements of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. This suggests that Ziliak et al. and the CEA should 
have comparable welfare-reform estimates, but that the Ziliak et al. 
business-cycle effect may be either dampened or strengthened relative 
to the CEA, depending on the relative changes in caseloads associated 
with economic fluctuations. 7
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 1 present business-cycle and welfare- 
reform estimates for the sample periods used by Blank and Ziliak et al., 
respectively. In general, the results confirm prior expectations, espe 
cially with regard to the 1977-1995 sample used by Blank. The frac 
tion of the decline attributable to the economy using Blank's sample 
period is about 30 percent, compared with the 31 percent in the base 
model (Column 1). Alternatively, the fraction due to welfare reform is 
a much lower 9.6 percent due to the termination of the sample at the 
same time that many states were still in the process of receiving waiver 
approvals. The results in column 7 based on the Ziliak et al. sample, 
however, are somewhat perverse, in that a negative 9.7 percent share is 
attributed to the economy and only a 4.2 percent share to welfare 
reform. In annual data, we expect the Ziliak et al. sample may yield a 
smaller share to the economy than the CEA, but not a negative share. 8
The differences in the point estimates in columns 1 and 7 seem too 
pronounced to be explained simply by different aggregate macroeco- 
nomic conditions between 1976 and 1987. Indeed, further analysis 
indicates that the differences (at least for the welfare waivers) are 
explained to a large extent by three states: Florida, Iowa, and Michi 
gan. Eliminating those three states yields welfare waiver coefficients
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of-1.69 for the CEA sample period and -2.22 for the Ziliak et al. sam 
ple period. However, the coefficient on unemployment remains nega 
tive in the Ziliak et al. sample. What is special about Florida, Iowa, 
and Michigan that by eliminating them from the sample makes the 
welfare-waiver effects comparable across sample periods? From 
1987-1992, these three states saw a 19 percent increase in the case 
load, while the rest of the country saw a slightly larger increase of 22 
percent. However, from 1976-1987, the two sets were much different: 
the three states saw an increase of 11 percent when the rest of the coun 
try saw a reduction of 7 percent. As a result, from 1976-1992, these 
three states saw an increase of 30 percent while the rest of the country 
saw an increase of 15 percent. From 1992-1996, the three states saw a 
decline of 16 percent while the rest of the country saw a decline of 12 
percent. Put differently, Florida, Iowa, and Michigan saw a bigger 
deviation from trend in the welfare-reform years than did the rest of the 
country. This suggests that the sample period matters in the annual 
static model, but it is not clear whether the CEA's period is preferable 
to the Ziliak et al. period, because the differences in welfare-reform 
estimates are driven by a few states.
Levels versus First Differences
The CEA model in Eq. 1 above is estimated in levels; however, Zil 
iak et al. estimated their model in first differences. It is important to 
note that asymptotically fixed effects and first differences should pro 
vide the same point estimates as long as the model is well specified. 
The two estimators could diverge if there is measurement error in the 
regressors or if there are misspecified dynamics either in the form of a 
nonstationarity in caseloads or in state dependence. Ziliak et al. pre 
sented evidence that nonstationarity in AFDC caseloads is likely to be 
a problem, especially at the monthly level but also in annual data; 
indeed, formal augmented Dickey-Fuller tests cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 percent level. In many panel-data 
applications, nonstationarity is less problematic because the asymptot- 
ics are based on the cross-sectional dimension (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen 1988, p. 1373). However, in the CEA and Ziliak et 
al. papers, the cross-sectional dimension was only 51, which is sub 
stantially less than "large" as typically implied in panel-data asymptot-
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ics, and thus suggests that nonstationarity cannot be dismissed out of 
hand.
Columns 8 and 9 in Table 1 present weighted and unweighted 
first-difference estimates, respectively. Both specifications yield sub 
stantially lower point estimates relative to the levels models. The 
fraction of the 1993-1996 decline attributable to the economy falls to 
10 (14) percent, while the fraction attributable to welfare reform falls 
to a meager 2.6 (0.4) percent in the weighted (unweighted) model. 
Because of the substantial difference in parameter estimates, this sug 
gests that the static model in Eq. 1 suffers from some form of mis- 
specification, whether it be nonstationarity, lack of controls for state 
dependence, measurement error, or some combination of the three. 
Ziliak et al. argued that the difference is due to nonstationarity and 
state dependence in caseloads; however, they did not address the pos 
sibility of measurement error. It may be the case that measurement 
error in state unemployment rates is exacerbated in the monthly data 
relative to annual and in first-differences relative to fixed effects as 
noted by Griliches and Hausman (1986). If that is the case, then Zil 
iak et al. should be biasing their estimates of the effect of the macro- 
economy toward zero relative to the CEA by estimating the first- 
difference model with monthly data. This bias, however, is in the 
opposite direction to that argued by those who believe the Ziliak et al. 
model is somehow biased toward the macroeconomy. We do not for 
mally address the issue of measurement error here, but instead pro 
ceed with the maintained assumption in CEA, Blank, and Ziliak et al., 
i.e., that unemployment rates are not measured with error.
Static versus Dynamic Specifications
We now extend the static model in Eq. 1 to allow a detailed param 
eterization of dynamics. As shown in Ziliak et al., these dynamics are 
manifest both in the form of state dependence in caseloads and in 
lagged responses to cyclical movements in the economy. Specifically, 
even after controlling for heterogeneity in the form of state-specific 
fixed effects and trends, previous AFDC recipiency may have a direct 
impact on future recipiency, i.e., recipiency may sluggishly adjust to 
changing economic and political conditions. In addition, we expect 
lagged unemployment to be important as well because welfare recipi-
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 33
ents are likely to be the last ones hired during an economic recovery 
and thus may not instantaneously move from welfare to work.
We consider two variants of the dynamic model, one in levels and 
the other in first differences. The dynamic levels estimating equation is
S J
Eq.2 Rlt = |I+ X P sRlt -s + I (
5=1 7=0
and the dynamic first-difference estimating equation is 
Eq.3 A*,, = Xp5A*I,_,+ l
s=\ 7 = 0
where all variables are defined as in Eq. 1 and where yt in Eq. 3 is a re- 
normalized vector of year effects. Notice that in Eq. 2 and 3 the lag 
lengths for recipiency and the unemployment rate are not restricted to 
be the same. One can approach the issue of lag length either by start 
ing broadly and then eliminating lags to improve model fit or by start 
ing with a short lag structure and adding additional lags. We use the 
latter approach, in conjunction with the Schwarz criterion, and find that 
four lags of recipiency rates and unemployment rates provides the best 
model fit.
In Table 2 we present the estimates of the dynamic models for a 
variety of specifications, including levels and first differences, weighted 
and unweighted, and the Ziliak et al. sample period. Column 1 presents 
weighted estimates of Eq. 2, which is the dynamic analogue to the 
weighted static CEA model in Table 1 . The estimates reveal a strong 
degree of state dependence and lagged responses to changes in the 
unemployment rate. Important here is the change in the fractions of the 
decline attributable to the macroeconomy and to welfare reform in the 
dynamic context: we now attribute about 48 percent of the decline to 
the economy and -6.7 percent to welfare reform. The negative impact 
of welfare reform follows from the positive coefficient on "any waiver." 
A positive coefficient on welfare reform is not implausible if one con 
siders that the variable "any waiver" is an aggregate of all waiver types,
Table 2 Sensitivity of Dynamic Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita 






















































































































































































% of 1993-1996 decline 47.5 56.4 18.3 30.5 68.9 75.5 22.9 30.7
due to the economy
% of 1993-1996 decline -6.7 1.1 -4.2 -2.8 -3.1 -2.5 -5.6 -5.7
due to welfare reform
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. Unless noted otherwise, all regressions are based on fiscal years 1976-1996, use total recipients, are weighted by the state 
population, are in levels, and have controls for the real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state- 
specific trends, and year dummies.
b Col. 1 = base case Col. 5 = base case 
Col. 2 = unweighted Col. 6 = unweighted 
Col. 3 = Zihak et al. sample period Col. 7 = Ziliak et al. sample period 
Col. 4 = unweighted + Ziliak et al. sample period Col. 8 = unweighted + Ziliak et al. sample period
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and a positive effect simply implies that the weighted impact of case 
load-increasing waivers (e.g., higher earnings disregards and asset lim 
its) dominates caseload-decreasing waivers. Ziliak et al., in their 
dynamic model of monthly data, disaggregated waiver types into work 
requirements, time limits, work incentives, and responsibility waivers 
and also permitted lag effects of waivers, yet still found that, for the 
nation as a whole, the economy accounts for 66 percent of the 1993- 
1996 decline and welfare reform for -9 percent. This suggests that the 
results in Table 2 are not an artifact of the aggregated "any waiver" 
specification. Consequently, controlling for dynamics in welfare recip 
iency enhances the role of the economy and reduces the role of welfare 
reform in accounting for the decline in welfare utilization between 1993 
and 1996.
We also reconsider several of the model specifications reported in 
Table 1; in particular, in the static model we found that there are differ 
ences depending on whether one weights the regression. In column 2 
(Table 2) we report the results from the unweighted analogue to col 
umn 1. As in the static model, the contributions of both the macro- 
economy and welfare reform increase relative to the weighted model, 
although the share attributable to welfare reform is effectively zero. 
We also noted that the results are sensitive to sample period. Hence, in 
columns 3 and 4, we present weighted and unweighted parameter esti 
mates from the Ziliak et al. sample period. While the welfare reform 
effects are quite comparable (columns 3 and 4 relative to columns 1 
and 2), the share of the decline attributable to the economy falls sub 
stantially.9 This result underscores the potential pitfall of using a rela 
tively short time horizon to identify business-cycle effects. Again, 
however, it is important to emphasize that this criticism does not apply 
directly to the Ziliak et al. paper, as they used 120 months rather than 
10 years.
Lastly, we address the issue of levels versus first differences in col 
umns 5 to 8. Recall that dynamics might arise not only from state 
dependence and lagged responses to unemployment rates, but also 
through nonstationarity. Columns 5 and 6 indicate that first differences 
increase the fraction of the decline attributable to the robust economy a 
further 45 percent over the col. 1 weighted model (to 69 percent) and 
by 34 percent over the col. 2 unweighted model (to 76 percent). Inter 
estingly, though, the first-difference specifications do little to the wel-
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fare reform estimates. Consequently, while the dynamic first- 
difference specification enables the model to identify a larger role for 
the macroeconomy relative to a dynamic levels model, this is not 
accomplished at the expense of welfare reform, but instead from other 
previously unobserved factors in the model (such as state-specific 
trends). 10
In summary, we conclude from our reconciliation that the majority 
of the difference in model estimates between the CEA and Ziliak et al. 
arises from the treatment of dynamics. These dynamics surface in the 
form of nonstationarities in caseloads, sluggish adjustment of current 
caseloads to past caseloads, and lags in the response of caseloads to 
changes in unemployment rates. First-differencing to eliminate a pos 
sible nonstationarity permits the dynamic model to attribute a larger 
role to the macroeconomy relative to a static or dynamic levels model. 
However, after differencing the dynamic model, weighting the regres 
sion no longer has a substantive impact on the parameter estimates. 
The primary consequence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to 
reduce the role of welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in 
accounting for the decline in AFDC recipiency. Our preferred model 
specification indicates that the macroeconomy accounted for three- 
quarters of the 1993-1996 decline in welfare recipients, while welfare 
reform had a negligible impact.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO RECIPIENCY RATES IN THE 
NEXT RECESSION?
A key issue confronting policymakers is how welfare caseloads 
might respond in the event of a recession. If AFDC cases only respond 
weakly to business-cycle conditions, then we would expect the wel 
fare-program budget surpluses that many states have enjoyed recently 
to persist even into a recessionary period. Alternatively, if caseloads 
are strongly countercyclical, then states who have failed to save for a 
"rainy day" may face difficult fiscal constraints during the next cyclical 
downturn. Moreover, if the robust economy has fostered implementa 
tion of welfare reform, then when the economy turns toward recession 
this interrelationship may become disentangled. To address these
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issues, we use several of the dynamic models from Table 2 to examine 
the responsiveness of recipiency rates to alternative "shocks" to unem 
ployment. We then investigate the extent to which the economy and 
welfare reform are interrelated and the implications of this link in the 
event of a recession. 11
Dynamic Short-Run and Long-Run Simulations
In Table 3 we present both short-run and long-run impacts of alter 
native unemployment rate increases on recipiency rates. Specifically, 
based on the parameter estimates from the dynamic models in Table 2, 
we solve for the long-run, steady-state impact of the unemployment 
rate on recipiency rates. We then simulate the impact of unemploy 
ment rate increases of 1 to 5 percentage points four years into the 
future; these simulations are possibly more reasonable estimates given 
that the long-run steady state is rarely attained. While our preferred 
model in Table 2 is the unweighted, dynamic first-difference column 6, 
we also present simulation results for the weighted and unweighted 
dynamic levels models (from columns 1 and 2, as well as the weighted, 
dynamic first-difference model in column 5).
The first column of Table 3 contains the implied long-run effect of 
a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate on welfare 
recipiency. This effect ranges from 6.26 percent in the weighted, 
dynamic first-difference model to 8.81 percent in the unweighted, 
dynamic levels model. Interestingly, although the short-run effect of 
the unemployment rate on recipiency is higher in the first-differences 
models relative to levels, the levels models imply a larger long-run 
effect because the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is more 
attenuated in levels. Most important, however, the long-run equilib 
rium estimates underscore the importance of controlling for dynamics 
in modeling AFDC recipiency. In the static models of Table 1, the 
short-run and long-run effects coincide. However, the estimates in 
Table 3 reinforce the fact that the static model is a misspecification, 
because the long-run estimates in levels are 2.5 times their static coun 
terparts in Table 1, while the long-run estimates in first differences are 
5-6 times the static estimates.
The remaining five columns in Table 3 present estimates four years 
into the future of increases of various magnitudes in the unemployment
Table 3 Simulated Long-Run and Four-Year Impacts of Alternative Unemployment Rate Increases on Welfare 
Recipient Rates (%)
Implied long-run 
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rate. For example, after four years, the unweighted first-difference 
model predicts that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate will lead to a 5.9 percent increase in welfare recipients, while a 3- 
percentage-point increase generates a 17.6 percent increase. In these 
simulations, the first-difference models yield a larger effect on recipi 
ents than the levels models. This arises because the first-difference 
models yield larger short-run effects relative to levels, and simulations 
based on a four-year time horizon are dominated by short-run influ 
ences. The simulations suggest that welfare caseloads are quite cycli 
cally sensitive, and that if the economy were to make a substantive turn 
for the worse, many states may experience a surge in welfare recipi 
ents.
Interactions between Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy
An issue neglected up to this point is the potential role of an inter 
action between welfare reform and the robust economy since 1993 in 
fostering the rapid decline in AFDC caseloads. We address the possi 
bility of interactions between welfare reform and the business cycle in 
the context of the dynamic levels and first-differences models in Eq. 2 
and 3. Specifically, we consider interactions between the "any waiver" 
variable with the contemporaneous unemployment rate and then with 
the full set of current and lagged unemployment rates. If economic 
activity stimulates the caseload reductions associated with welfare 
reforms and if this effect is independent of the "natural" relationship 
between the business cycle and the welfare caseload, the coefficients 
on these interactions will be positive. 12
In Table 4, we present estimates of the interaction between welfare 
reform and the macroeconomy on per capita AFDC recipients in the 
pre-TANF period. For ease of presentation, we suppress the coeffi 
cients on the lagged dependent variable and the current and lagged 
unemployment rates; we present the waiver coefficient along with the 
interactions. In addition, because the partial effect of welfare reform is 
dependent on the level of the unemployment rate, we compute the 
impact of welfare reform after four years in situations with a sustained 
unemployment rate of 2, 4, 6, or 8 percent. Finally, we also present the 
p-value on the (Jomt) significance of the interaction term(s); that is, for 
models with one interaction, the p-value refers to the r-statistic, while
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 41
for models with several interactions the p-value refers to a Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the interactions are jointly zero.
In the weighted, dynamic levels model column 1, we confirm our 
prior expectation of a positive interacted effect between the macroecon- 
omy and welfare reform. 13 This interaction is highly significant, with a 
p-value of 0.00. The model predicts that after four years, welfare reform 
leads to a 5.6 percent reduction in per capita recipients in states with an 
unemployment rate of 2 percent, while it leads to an increase of 2.8 per 
cent in states with an unemployment rate of 8 percent. Comparable esti 
mates are found in the fully interacted (column 2) as well as in the 
multiple-interaction difference specifications (columns 6 and 8), while 
evidence of a caseload-decreasing effect of welfare reform is less obvi 
ous in the unweighted levels models and the single-interaction first-dif 
ference specifications. Taken as a whole, the estimates in Table 4 
suggest that pre-TANF welfare reform require a robust economy (i.e., 
low unemployment rates) in order to have a negative impact on recipi 
ency rates.
A Lagniappe
While our primary focus in this paper is to provide a reconciliation 
between the CEA and Ziliak et al. estimates of the effect of welfare 
reform and the macroeconomy on per capita AFDC recipients in the 
pre-TANF period, there is much policy interest in understanding the 
sources of caseload declines after passage of PRWORA in August 
1996. A difficulty in applying the model described here to the post- 
TANF period is correctly defining the welfare-reform variable, because 
the reform applies to all states (unlike the pre-TANF waiver programs). 
Nonetheless, one possible strategy is to use the date of waiver approval 
for those states that obtained waivers and to use the date of approval for 
the TANF plan for those states without waivers. We did this, and then 
updated our data to include observations from the 1997 and 1998 fed 
eral fiscal years and re-ran the dynamic levels and first-difference mod 
els in Eq. 2 and 3.
The estimates of the impact of the macroeconomy on recipiency 
rates are nearly identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. For 
instance, the estimated long-run effect of a 1-percentage-point increase 
in the unemployment rate is 6.55 percent in both the weighted and
Table 4 Estimates of the Interaction between Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita AFDC 
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Wald test of significance of interactions
P-value____________0.00_____0.00_____0.11_____0.08______0.62_____OOP_____0.96_____0.00 
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia for fiscal years 1976-1996. Each regression controls for 4 lags of per capita recipients, 4 lags of unemployment rates, the 
real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state-specific trends, and year dummies. 
b Cols. 1 and 2 = weighted Cols. 5 and 6 = weighted 
Cols. 3 and 4 = unweighted Cols. 7 and 8 = unweighted
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unweighted dynamic differences model. However, the welfare-reform 
variable is uniformly negative in both the levels and differences mod 
els, although the effects are relatively small and statistically insignifi 
cant. These updated estimates are suggestive, though, that welfare 
reform has played a larger independent role on the decline in recipi 
ency rates in the post-PRWORA period. The finding of an enhanced 
welfare reform effect in the post-PRWORA period is fully expected, as 
our prior, stated in Ziliak et al. (1997), is that welfare reform should 
take more time to affect caseloads than the period covered in the CEA, 
Blank, and Ziliak et al. studies.
CONCLUSION
Our reconciliation with the previous caseload literature suggests 
that the differing conclusions emanate largely from the treatment of 
dynamics. These dynamics surface in the form of nonstationarities in 
caseloads, sluggish adjustment of current caseloads to past caseloads, 
and lags in the response of caseloads to changes in unemployment 
rates. The primary consequence of controlling for caseload dynamics 
is to reduce the role of welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in 
generating the decline in AFDC caseloads. Our preferred specifica 
tion, an unweighted, dynamic first-difference model, predicts that the 
macroeconomy accounted for about 75 percent of the 1993-1996 
decline in recipiency rates, while the effect of welfare reform was neg 
ligible. We find that the implied long-run effect of a 1-percentage- 
point increase in the unemployment rate is 2.5 to 6 times the static esti 
mate in levels and first differences. In addition, we find that recipiency 
rates (caseloads) are quite cyclically sensitive: a 2-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate leads to an 11.7 percent increase in 
welfare recipiency after four years, while a 4-percentage-point increase 
yields a 23.4 percent increase in recipiency.
Further underscoring the important role that the macroeconomy 
plays in determining caseloads, the analysis suggests that welfare 
reform efforts have been greatly aided by the simultaneous presence of 
a robust economy. Bishop (1998) presented evidence that most of the 
increase in labor force participation rates since 1994 are among single
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 45
women with children. If a large share of these women are former wel 
fare recipients, then the results here suggest that the movement from 
welfare to work would be much weaker in a sluggish economy. How 
ever, even in the presence of economic growth, many welfare recipi 
ents may face substantial personal barriers to employment (Danziger et 
al. 1998).
This raises the broader task of delineating the goals of welfare 
reform. Reducing the caseload may be worthy in its own right if one's 
objective is to reduce the size of government spending, and the results 
here present evidence on the influence of the macroeconomy and wel 
fare reform in achieving that goal. However, if the objective is to 
reduce poverty, then the results of this study do not directly speak to 
the outcomes of former welfare recipients. Unfortunately, many states 
are not following their former welfare cases; thus, a better understand 
ing of welfare reform is incumbent upon correcting this deficiency.
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1. For reasons discussed below, the replication of the CEA actually focuses on their 
specification 2 of Table 2, which predicts a 31 percent share of the decline to the 
business cycle and a 15 percent share to welfare reform.
2. To a lesser extent we reconcile the results with Blank (1998) as well. Blank 
focused primarily on the 1990-1993 run-up in caseloads and argued that the econ 
omy does not explain this unexpected run-up. Instead, she attributed the increase 
to a rise in child-only cases, an increase in take-up rates, and a long-term, yet 
unexplained, increase in eligibility.
3. See Peskin, Tapogna, and Marcotte (1993) for a complete list of these studies.
4. The Basic program, which comprises about 95 percent of total cases, consists of 
single parents (mainly women) and their children. The UP program permits both 
parents to be present, although the primary income earner must be under fiscal
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stress, e.g., must work less than 100 hours in a month. The UP program was 
available only in about one-half of the states prior to the Family Support Act of 
1988, which mandated all states to offer the program by 1990. However, HHS 
stopped making the distinction between the Basic and UP programs as of June 
1997 because many states only maintain a single program under PRWORA.
5. The estimated welfare-waiver coefficient differs slightly from that reported in the 
CEA. The discrepancy arises from a miscoded waiver for West Virginia in the 
original CEA data, as noted in Levine and Whitmore (1998). The different coeffi 
cients, coupled with a slightly different weighting scheme, results in our simula 
tions yielding a bit more of the share of the 1993-1996 decline to welfare reform 
than did the CEA.
6. Blank (1997) differed from the CEA and Ziliak et al by conducting her analysis 
for the Basic and UP programs separately. The estimates reported here are very 
similar to those reported by Blank for the Basic program, but the UP program is 
much more cyclically sensitive. This suggests that examining total recipients is 
not misleading if one is interested in movements in the largest segment of the pro 
gram or in forecasting aggregate recipients in general.
7. Importantly, though, Ziliak et al actually attributed a larger share to the economy 
and a smaller share to welfare reform. This is partly due to their use of monthly 
data, which picks up high-frequency movements in the business cycle, and from 
the use of a dynamic model as described below.
8. In results not tabulated, we estimated column 7 without weighting the regression 
model and found the business cycle to have a small, but positive, share of the 
1993-1996 decline in recipients.
9. The estimates in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are only meant to be suggestive, because 
the relatively short time horizon may make the coefficients of the lagged depen 
dent variables susceptible to the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell 1981), that is, the 
bias (toward zero) in the lagged dependent variable that arises from the correla 
tion between the lagged dependent variable and the model's error term. Ziliak et 
al. argued that this bias is negligible in their sample of monthly data since T = 
120; however, the annualized version of the Ziliak et al. sample in Table 2 only 
has T= 10. The CEA sample, however, has T= 21 and thus again the Nickell bias 
is likely to be of smaller concern. The latter seems verified in that the results in 
columns 5 and 6 are quite similar to the results in Ziliak et al.
10. One further difference between Ziliak et al. and the CEA is that Ziliak et al. intro 
duced a "time since waiver approval" variable We examined a comparable speci 
fication in the context of the annual models here without any substantive change 
in the conclusions. If anything, the share attributable to welfare reform was more 
negative.
11. There might be some concern that with passage of PRWORA in August 1996, a 
structural change took place in the relationship between unemployment rates and 
welfare caseloads. If so, then out-of-sample forecasts based on pre-PRWORA 
data might be unreliable. We investigated this possibility in the context of a 
dynamic model of AFDC caseloads using state-level monthly data through March
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1998. We interacted the five lags of the unemployment rate with a dummy vari 
able that equaled 1 for any month after September 1996 (the sample began in 
October 1980) and could not reject the null hypothesis of no change in the unem 
ployment rate coefficients after PRWORA. Hence, this suggests that there was no 
structural change in the relationship between unemployment rates and welfare 
caseloads.
12. It might be the case that tests of complementarities between the business cycle 
and welfare reform are better conducted within a state, as opposed to among 
states. The reason for this would be that within-state analyses offer a more natural 
experiment—the welfare reform policy should be relatively uniform within states 
(rather than among states) and other contemporaneous political and social factors 
are more likely to be constant within a state. This suggests that the tests con 
ducted here are likely biased against finding complementarities.
13. Levine and Whitmore (1997) found a statistically insignificant impact on the 
interacted term in their static model. We confirmed their result, but we also found 
that the interaction was strongly statistically significant without weights. This 
again underscores the likely misspecification of a static model.
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What Goes Up Must Come Down?
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University of Michigan
Over the past decade, public assistance caseloads have increased 
rapidly to a historical high point and then decreased with even greater 
speed to their lowest level in decades. Several recent papers have 
focused on the rise in Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) caseloads in the early 1990s and the turn around in the mid 
1990s. This research indicates that both macroeconomic factors and 
program factors appear to be important for these changes. A key ques 
tion is whether these recent declines are permanent and how much they 
might turn around in a more sluggish economy. This paper is focused 
on the relationship between recent caseload changes and the overall 
economy, comparing estimates from a wide variety of models using 
both annual and monthly data. By using monthly data, which is avail 
able through late 1998, we also present several rough estimates of the 
impact of welfare reform after 1996.
The Food Stamp program has also experienced major program 
changes, although it has remained relatively unchanged for single 
mothers and their children who once participated in AFDC. This paper 
also provides a detailed comparative analysis of AFDC/TANF caseload 
changes with food stamp caseload changes.
The welfare reform legislation of 1996 has been cited as a primary 
reason why AFDC/TANF caseloads began a steep decline in the mid 
1990s. This legislation, which states were required by law to imple 
ment by July 1997, abolished the AFDC program and replaced it with 
the TANF block grant, giving states much greater discretion over the
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design of cash assistance and related work programs for low-income 
families. The extent of change in state public assistance programs fol 
lowing this legislation has been enormous. Virtually all states have 
implemented major changes in the way in which they determine eligi 
bility, require and support work effort, and organize their public assis 
tance offices. 1
These program changes occurred in a very strong labor market. At 
the end of 1998, the unemployment rate was at a 30-year low. Among 
workers who lacked a high school diploma, unemployment was near 7 
percent, after being in the double digits for years. This has led many 
observers to suggest that program reform may be less important to the 
decline in caseloads than many states are claiming. The widespread 
availability of jobs should have produced a steep decline in caseloads 
even in the absence of program changes. The question of how much 
caseload decline can be explained by economic factors is particularly 
important in forecasting future caseload changes. If the decline is 
largely due to tight labor markets, it may be more reversible in a future 
economic downturn than if the decline is due to tightened eligibility 
rules or greater "diversion" activities (keeping people off public assis 
tance by providing one-time assistance or requiring participation in job 
search activities).
Figure 1 shows AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads from 1980 
through 1998. Note that food stamp caseloads are consistently about 
twice as high as AFDC/TANF caseloads. 2 This reflects the broader eli 
gibility rules in the Food Stamp program. The unusual trends in the 
past decade are clearly apparent in this figure. AFDC caseloads, which 
were largely flat from the mid 1970s through 1990, rose by 27 percent 
between 1990 and 1994, but between 1994 and mid 1998 they fell by 
40 percent. In June of 1998, they were at their lowest level since 1972.
Food stamp caseloads follow a remarkably similar trend. They 
decline slightly faster than AFDC caseloads in the mid 1990s, in part 
because the legislation that abolished AFDC also cut access to food 
stamps among a number of immigrant groups and limited their avail 
ability to families without children. But they have continued to decline 
even after the implementation of these changes.
The rapidity of these changes is almost unprecedented. Indeed, the 
caseload increases of the early 1990s were one reason behind growing 
support for welfare reform. In turn, the caseload declines that have
Figure 1 AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Caseloads
1980 81 96 97 98
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occurred since the enactment of welfare reform have been unexpect 
edly large in the opinion of most observers. Many of the new state- 
designed programs funded under the TANF block grant involve time 
limits and extensive sanctioning policies, as well as efforts at diversion, 
all of which might be expected to cause caseload declines. These pro 
gram changes, however, lead to an important caveat: estimates that use 
historical evidence on the AFDC program to predict future changes in 
TANF-funded programs are probably unreliable. This is particularly 
true with regard to macroeconomic effects. As more persons reach 
time limits or are sanctioned, or as state dollars are more limited, peo 
ple may be less able to return to the rolls in an economic downturn. 
The long-term effect of current program changes on the responsiveness 
of caseloads to a future economic slowdown is hard to foresee with any 
certainty, although this is a key policy concern.
EXISTING RESEARCH ON CASELOAD CHANGE
Several recent studies have investigated the determinants underly 
ing the caseload changes in AFDC. A host of early studies focus on 
state-specific data or on data from only a few years. 3 More recent stud 
ies have used panel data on caseloads across many years. This includes 
work by the Council of Economic Advisers (1997), Blank (1997b), Zil- 
iak et al. (1998), and Levine and Whitmore (1998). Table 1 provides a 
brief comparison of this research. Except for the Blank study, these 
papers have focused almost entirely on the effect of economic variables 
and of program-related variables on caseloads. The Blank study went 
further in trying to utilize a host of demographic and political variables, 
although these appear to make little difference in her results on the 
impact of the economy or of programs. Blank's was also the only 
study to differentiate between the AFDC-Basic program for single par 
ents and the AFDC-UP (unemployed parents) program, a much more 
limited program for married-couple families. 4
One topic of concern in these studies is to understand the effect of 
AFDC "waivers," which allowed states to run experimental welfare 
programs prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation. These waivers 
differed greatly across states, but typically included some combination
Table 1 Major Research on Caseload Change
Study Data Dependent variable Included variables Results on key variables
Blank 
(1997b)
Annual state panel 
1977-95
Monthly state panel 
1977-96
ln(AFDC caseloads female 
pop. ages 15-44) 
(Also separates this into 
AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP 
caseloads)
VAR model using ln(AFDC 
caseloads) and 
unemployment rates as co- 










Estimated share of caseload 
change due to economic 
factors:
• 23% in 1990-94
•51% in 1994-95
One-point rise in 
unemployment leads to
• 3.5% in AFDC-Basic
•20% rise in AFDC-UP over 
an 18-month period











Estimated caseload change 
due to economic factors:
•24-31% in 1989-93
•31-45% m 1993-96
4.1% estimated change in 
AFDC caseloads due to 
1-pt. increase in 
unemployment.




Study Data Dependent variable Included variables Results on key variables
Levme & Whitmore 
(1998)
Same as CEA study Same as CEA study Same as CEA study, with 
more detailed data on 
waivers
Economic effects of same
size as CEA study. 





Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, 
& Connolly 
(1998)






4.1% estimated change in 
AFDC caseloads due to 
1-pt. increase in 
unemployment.
-9.1% change due to
Monthly state panel 
1987-96
Same as CEA study Same as above No separate estimates of 
economic effects alone. In 
26 states with the largest 
caseload reduction, 78% of 
change due to economic and 
seasonal factors, 1993-96.
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of time limits, expanded work requirements, expanded earnings disre 
gards, strengthened sanctions, and family caps (limiting AFDC bene 
fits to women who have additional children while receiving AFDC). 5
Most of these waivers were approved in 1994 or later; following 
the 1996 legislation, many states with major waivers developed TANF- 
funded programs that were similar to their waiver programs. States 
without waivers often looked to the states with waivers for ideas about 
how to restructure their programs. This suggests that estimates of the 
impact of these waivers on caseload changes might provide a minimal 
estimate of the expected effect of welfare reform. We return to this 
issue below.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the research using annual panel data by 
state and year produces reasonably consistent results. A 1-point 
increase in the unemployment rate appears to produce about a 4 per 
cent increase in the AFDC caseload share, while the implementation of 
a waiver program produced a 5-10 percent decline in caseload share. 
The economic cycle variables appear to explain about one quarter to 
one-third of the total caseload change in the early 1990s. In contrast, 
Ziliak et al. utilized monthly data on caseloads and unemployment 
rates and found far larger effects for the macroeconomy and smaller 
effects for program variables. It is difficult to make direct comparisons 
between their monthly data results and the other studies; this is one 
reason we estimate both annual and monthly models below. The dif 
ference appears to be primarily due to the difference in specifications 
and in how the results are reported. 6
The general conclusion from this research is that a host of vari 
ables appeared to influence caseload changes through the mid 1990s. 
While the macroeconomy was important, there is evidence that pro 
gram changes also had a substantial impact, particularly in states which 
implemented early waivers. The size and the interpretation of the 
effect of waiver implementation remain controversial. The increase in 
caseloads in the early 1990s is only poorly explained in these equa 
tions; neither the macroeconomy nor program changes justify the 
increase that occurred.
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WHY FOOD STAMP CASELOADS ARE ALSO INTERESTING
So far as we know, there has been no equivalent analysis of food 
stamp caseloads to date. This is perhaps surprising, since food stamps 
have historically been as large a program as AFDC in terms of total 
expenditures. From a budget perspective, large changes in food stamp 
caseloads are nearly as costly as large changes in AFDC caseloads, 
although the states do not bear the cost of food stamps. 7
Food stamps have historically served a broader population than 
AFDC and have been available to all low-income persons regardless of 
family composition, including the elderly as well as younger childless 
individuals and couples. Hence, a substantial share of the food stamp 
population does not receive AFDC. 8 On the other hand, most AFDC 
recipients are food stamp recipients. This share of the food stamp 
caseload should move in very similar ways to the AFDC caseload, 9 but 
other food stamp recipients may be less affected by program changes 
directed at the single-parent AFDC population and may respond differ 
ently to changes in the economic environment as well. Some of these 
other food stamp recipients are elderly and may be quite unresponsive 
to macroeconomic fluctuations, while others are single individuals or 
childless couples who might respond more strongly to changes in eco 
nomic opportunities than single mothers.
The Food Stamp program also experienced major program 
changes in the mid 1990s. A one-time reduction in food stamp eligibil 
ity occurred as a result of the 1996 legislation, when most immigrants 
were removed from the rolls. 10 In addition, for many areas of the coun 
try, childless individuals or families were time-limited in their receipt 
of food stamps. For most single-parent families—the group that his 
torically received both AFDC and food stamps—little changed in the 
Food Stamp program, but food stamp receipt has historically been 
closely linked to AFDC receipt, and the major changes in AFDC/ 
TANF programs will affect food stamp eligibility. For instance, if wel 
fare-to-work programs move most people into intermittent or very- 
low-wage jobs, they are likely to retain their food stamp eligibility. On 
the other hand, if these programs move families out of poverty, then 
food stamp caseloads will fall with TANF caseloads.
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As Figure 1 illustrated, food stamp caseloads and AFDC/TANF 
caseloads have moved in similar ways. This is somewhat surprising. 
One might have expected the economic expansion that started in 1991 
would have affected food stamp caseloads sooner than AFDC. Simi 
larly, because food stamp eligibility was not as affected by waivers and 
state reform efforts in the mid 1990s, one might not have expected 
ongoing food stamp caseload declines once food stamp eligibility 
changes were implemented in 1997.
The close historical correlation between food stamp and AFDC 
caseload changes suggests that the behavioral and program changes 
driving AFDC recipiency also affect food stamp recipiency. In this 
case, the biggest uncertainty in the future evolution of the food stamp 
program may be whether the transformation from AFDC to TANF will 
fundamentally change who does or doesn't use food stamps. Histori 
cally, AFDC recipients were categorically eligible for food stamps and 
most states had combined eligibility determination procedures. With 
the implementation of time limits and restricted eligibility in many 
state TANF-funded programs, the number of food stamp eligibles who 
also receive TANF is likely to fall. Whether or not this expected reduc 
tion in the TANF-eligible food stamp population results in a fall in 
food stamp caseloads depends on whether individuals know about their 
continuing food stamp eligibility. 11 Whether food stamp receipt will 
remain as closely linked to TANF receipt as it was to AFDC receipt 
remains to be seen.
ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BOTH 
AFDC/TANF AND FOOD STAMP CASELOADS
In this section, we provide comparative estimates of the determi 
nants of both AFDC and food stamp caseloads based on annual panel 
data. Table 2 presents a set of regression estimates of the determinants 
of AFDC total caseloads based on three different specifications (col 
umns 1 to 3) and compares these with caseload determinants for sev 
eral food stamp caseload specifications (columns 4 to 6). Annual panel 
data on caseloads by state and year are used from 1980 through 1996.
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a Dependent variable is ln(caseloads/total population). All regressions based on data for 49 states and D.C. from 1980-96. (Data on food 
stamps in Vermont are not available for this time period. For consistency we drop this state in the AFDC estimates as well.) Standard 
errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; * at the 5 percent level.
b Specification includes unemployment rate + program variables + state and year effects.
c Specification is that of Col. 1 + control variables (see pp. 62-63).
d Specification is that of Col. 2 + state specific time trends.
e Specification is that of Col. 2.
f Dependent variable is residual food stamp cases, which equals food stamp caseloads minus estimated AFDC recipients who also receive 
food stamps (see p. 64).
g Specification is Col. 4 + AFDC caseload control.
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The dependent variable is the ln(share of caseloads), with caseloads in 
each state and year divided by total state population.
The models in Table 2 include fixed effects for each state and for 
each year. This allows each state to have a different constant level of 
caseloads and controls for any omitted variables in the specification 
that might be largely constant within states over time. This specifica 
tion essentially allows the coefficients to be interpreted as the effect of 
changes in the independent variables over time within a state on a 
state's caseload. We discuss below the impact of also including state- 
specific time trends in these models.
The first column presents a specification similar to that used by the 
CEA (1997), which is quite sparse and includes only unemployment 
rates and a few program variables. The results are estimated over a 
longer time period and include 1996, for which data were not available 
when the CEA report was produced. The second and third columns 
use a much richer specification, originally utilized by Blank (1997b). 
The independent variables include four sets of variables. 12 First, a set 
of economic-related variables are included. The unemployment rate 
(current, lagged one year, and lagged two years) is probably the best 
state-specific measure of economic cyclically. In addition, we have 
calculated the natural logarithms of median wages and of the 20th 
quintile of the wage distribution. 13
Second, a set of state demographic variables are included, consist 
ing of percent elderly, percent black, percent single-female headed 
families, percent non-marital births, average years of education, and 
percent immigrant. The immigrant share is defined as the number of 
newly admitted immigrants in a state divided by the state's total popu 
lation. The immigrant share is lagged by one and two years to allow 
time for increases in immigration to affect public assistance caseloads. 
Third, a set of political variables are included, based on the political 
affiliation of the governor, whether both state legislative houses are 
Republican, and whether both state legislative houses are Democratic.
Finally, we include program-related variables. AFDC benefit lev 
els measure the maximum cash support available to a four-person fam 
ily in the state. A dummy variable for the presence of an AFDC-UP 
program is included where appropriate. We also include a variable for 
the share of the year in which a state has a major program waiver 
approved for implementation in the post-1991 period. 14 As noted
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above, these waivers allowed states to implement major variations to 
the AFDC program and were precursors to the TANF-funded programs 
that flourished after welfare reform.
The coefficients in columns 1 through 3 provide an indication of 
how AFDC caseloads respond to these variables, particularly the eco 
nomic and program variables. Column 1 shows results for a model that 
includes only unemployment rates and program variables, i.e., those 
variables which often receive the most attention from policymakers. 
Although the estimating period and the specification are slightly differ 
ent, the results are very similar to those reported by the CEA (1997). 
Unemployment has a strong relationship to caseloads, although much 
of this effect occurs only over time. Three years after a 1-point rise in 
the unemployment rate, caseloads will have risen by 6.4 percent. Pro 
gram variables also have strong effects. States that raise their AFDC 
maximum benefits levels experience a rise in caseloads; states that 
implemented waivers experienced a decline in caseloads, all else equal.
As earlier researchers indicated, interpreting this waiver coefficient 
is difficult. These effects are almost surely more than just the direct 
program effects of the waivers; they probably also include "demonstra 
tion effects," whereby individuals who were actually unaffected by the 
waivers nonetheless changed their behavior because of the strong mes 
sage states were trying to send that they were going to "get tough" on 
welfare recipients. Evidence of this is in Blank (1997b), who showed 
that states with waivers actually saw significant declines in their case 
load in the year before the waiver was granted.
Even with state fixed effects included, one might worry that the 
model in column 1 excludes a large number of variables that might rea 
sonably affect caseloads within a state over time. Column 2 provides a 
much richer specification. The most striking result in column 2 is that 
the impact of unemployment and of program variables is quite similar, 
even when a very rich set of other control variables is included in the 
model. Although the timing of the unemployment effect is somewhat 
different in column 2, a 1-point rise in unemployment results in a 6.0 
percent rise in caseloads over a three-year period, very similar to col 
umn 1. The coefficients on AFDC benefit levels and waivers are virtu 
ally identical between the two columns; this is true even though the 
additional variables in column 2 are collectively quite important in 
explaining caseload changes over time.
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Changes in median wages, in non-marital birth rates, in years of 
education, and in percent elderly are all important in determining state 
caseload changes. With regard to state political variables, Republican 
governors appear to negatively affect AFDC caseloads. There is an 
additional negative effect on AFDC caseloads if both state legislative 
branches are controlled by Republicans. The magnitude and signifi 
cance of these political effects indicate that even prior to TANF, states 
could affect caseloads, probably through their organization of public 
assistance offices and the messages which case workers were in 
structed to deliver to clients. But these variables must be largely 
uncorrelated with the unemployment and program variables in column
1. since their inclusion has little affect on those coefficients.
Column 3 includes state-specific time trends, in addition to state 
and year effects. On the one hand, this controls more fully for omitted 
variables within states that might be trending up or down over time. 
On the other hand, the effect of the included variables that are validly 
correlated with caseload changes may be reduced by the inclusion of 
state-specific time trends if those variables also trend up or down grad 
ually over time. Our own preference is for the specification in column
2. which does not include these state-specific time trends that we think 
may overcontrol for omitted variables, but the results in column 3 pro 
vide a comparison for those who prefer to include state-specific trends.
Column 3 indicates that including controls for state-specific time 
trends reduces the magnitude of most coefficients, as expected. Yet, 
almost all of the same variables are significant in columns 2 and 3, and 
the general conclusions about what drives caseload changes over time 
within states would be similar regardless of the specification. In col 
umn 3, a 1-percentage-point rise in unemployment results in a 4.7 per 
cent increase in caseloads over a three-year period. We interpret 
column 3 as indicating that state-specific time trends do not change 
most of the larger conclusions about the determinants of caseloads.
Because we prefer the specification in column 2, we use that speci 
fication in analyzing the food stamp data in columns 4 through 6. We 
have repeated the food stamp regressions with state-specific time 
trends included, and the results are similar to those seen in comparing 
columns 2 and 3 (data not shown).
Column 4 estimates total food stamp caseloads using a specifica 
tion identical to column 2. Ideally, given the very diverse populations
64 Wallace and Blank
on food stamps, one would like to look at single-parent food stamp 
recipients separately from other recipients, just as one might separate 
AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP recipients. Unfortunately, there are no 
data available which provide regular information on food stamp receipt 
by family composition by state. Hence, we try two different ap 
proaches in order to separate the AFDC population from the rest of the 
food stamp recipients.
First, we attempt to net out the AFDC population from food stamp 
caseloads. In each year, we know nationally how many AFDC recipi 
ents also receive food stamps. 15 We take this share and multiply it by 
the number of AFDC recipients in each state and subtract this from the 
food stamp caseloads. This should leave us with a dependent variable 
that provides an estimate of non-AFDC food stamp recipients, which 
we refer to as "residual food stamp cases." This number is used as the 
dependent variable in column 5. Note that this dependent variable is 
measured with error; in general, measurement error in the dependent 
variable will not bias the estimates, but it will increase the standard 
errors.
Our second effort to net out the effect of AFDC is seen in column 
6, where we include AFDC caseloads as a control variable in the 
regression for total food stamp caseloads. Since food stamp and AFDC 
recipiency are often jointly determined, there are some endogeneity 
problems with this approach. Thus, we prefer the estimates in column 
5, but we provide the estimates in column 6 as a comparison.
Begin by comparing the determinants of food stamp caseloads in 
column 4 to the AFDC caseload estimates in columns 1 through 3. 
Food stamps are more responsive to the unemployment rate than 
AFDC. A 1-point rise in the unemployment rate will increase the food 
stamp caseload by 6.8 percent over a three-year period. 16 Like AFDC, 
food stamp caseloads are also responsive to median wage levels in the 
state. Food stamps also appear to be more responsive to demographic 
factors than AFDC. The percent black, the percent single female heads 
of household, and the percent of nonmarital births significantly 
increase food stamp caseloads, while years of education and the per 
cent elderly decrease food stamp caseloads.
The political variables have very similar effects on both AFDC and 
food stamp caseloads. This is unexpected, since there are no avenues 
by which states can directly affect food stamp eligibility and payment
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rules through state legislation or regulations. However, to the extent 
that AFDC and food stamp recipiency are jointly determined, discour 
aging AFDC participation may also discourage food stamp participa 
tion. This historical evidence of a tight link between food stamp 
caseloads and variables that can only affect food stamps through 
AFDC receipt is consistent with more recent stories which suggest that 
current food stamp caseloads are being affected by women leaving the 
TANF program.
AFDC benefit levels are not highly correlated with food stamp 
caseloads, although the presence of an AFDC-UP program does cause 
higher food stamp caseloads, perhaps because it provides easy access 
to food stamps for the AFDC-UP population. The implementation of 
waivers appears to have a negative effect on food stamps, although 
smaller than their effect on AFDC. This result further suggests that 
food stamp participation is linked to AFDC utilization, since few of 
these waivers involved changes to food stamp rules, per se. Food 
stamp recipients may also experience some of the same demonstration 
effects as AFDC recipients, hearing the message about "getting tough" 
on welfare recipients without clearly distinguishing that it does not 
apply to the Food Stamp program.
Comparing columns 4 and 5, column 5 provides an (admittedly 
imprecise) measure of food stamp usage among non-AFDC recipients. 
We see somewhat stronger responsiveness to unemployment in column 
5. A 1-point rise in unemployment results in an 8.5 percent rise in 
residual food stamp caseloads over three years. The coefficients on 
wages and on demographic effects are generally similar to those for 
total food stamp caseloads.
The determinants of residual food stamp usage show strong policy 
responsiveness. The presence of a major waiver increases the non- 
AFDC food stamp population, while the increases in the level of 
AFDC benefits decrease the non-AFDC food stamp population. The 
sign of the effect of a major waiver and AFDC benefit levels on resid 
ual food stamp caseloads is consistent with the hypothesis that the peo 
ple who are pushed off AFDC because of waiver implementation or 
falling real benefit levels remain in low-wage employment, thus, 
retaining their food stamp eligibility. Hence, higher AFDC benefits 
result in fewer non-AFDC food stamp cases, and waivers (which
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reduce the AFDC caseload) result in more non-AFDC food stamp 
cases.
There are some difficulties in the interpretation of column 6, which 
includes AFDC caseloads as an independent variable explaining food 
stamp caseloads, because of the endogeneity between AFDC caseloads 
and food stamp caseloads. AFDC caseloads are highly correlated with 
food stamp caseloads, and once AFDC caseloads are included in the 
food stamp regression, other variables generally become much less sig 
nificant.
In general, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that food stamp case 
loads have been quite closely tied to AFDC caseloads, and AFDC pro 
gram variables affect food stamp receipt. The determinants of food 
stamp caseloads appear quite similar to the determinants of AFDC 
caseloads, although food stamp caseloads are somewhat more cyclical 
and more affected by a range of demographic characteristics.
HOW WELL DO THESE ESTIMATES EXPLAIN BOTH THE 
RISE AND FALL OF CASELOADS?
The sharp rise and fall in caseloads in the 1990s raises the question 
of how well these estimates are explaining this pattern. At some level, 
it would be very surprising if they fully explained these changes; such 
dramatic changes in program utilization are rarely well explained by 
smoothly changing economic or demographic variables.
Figure 2 provides a sense of how (in)effectively the rise and fall in 
caseloads is explained by the control variables in Table 2. The figure 
shows the value of the year fixed effects from 1985 through 1996 (with 
1985 normalized to 0) for AFDC and food stamp caseload shares (col 
umns 2 and 4 in Table 2). These fixed effects measure the unexplained 
caseload level in that year (relative to 1985), after the effects of the 
included variables on caseloads are taken into account. If the regres 
sions fully explain all the variation in the data, the year effects should 
be zero in all years. If, however, there is a rise or fall in the dependent 
variable over time which the included variables do not account for, 
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Figure 2 suggests that there was a significant unexplained increase 
in both AFDC and food stamp caseloads during much of the period 
from 1985 to 1996. Interestingly, as Blank (1997b) indicated, this 
unexplained increase starts around 1985, although the actual caseload 
data is flat from 1985 to 1990. This increase in the year fixed effects 
after 1985 suggests that the included variables predict that caseloads 
should have fallen between 1985 and 1990; instead they remained con 
stant. From 1985 to 1989 unemployment fell, median wages rose, and 
AFDC benefits declined. All of these should have led to a decline in 
caseloads during these years, which did not occur. A mild recession in 
1990 and 1991 was followed by an economic expansion and changes in 
the political and policy environment that (by 1994) should have pro 
duced much lower caseloads than were realized. 17
Table 3 provides additional information on how well (or how 
poorly) these regressions predict actual caseload changes over these 
years. Columns 1 through 3 provide information on actual and pre 
dicted changes based on the annual panel data models for AFDC cases, 
food stamp cases, and residual food stamp cases. The table focuses on 
three periods: 1990-94, when caseloads were rising rapidly; 1994-96, 
the period for which we have a complete set of control variables and 
when caseloads began to fall; and 1994-98, the entire recent period of 
caseload decline (for which we have only limited information on other 
variables.)
Between 1990 and 1994, the In of AFDC-Total caseload share rose 
by 0.18 points (row 1, column 1), but our regression forecasts that it 
should have fallen by 0.02 points (row 2). In short, over this time period, 
the model has no predictive power at all; none of the caseload increase 
is explained. This does not mean that none of the variables have predic 
tive power, however. Changes in unemployment alone would have pre 
dicted 50.5 percent of the actual caseload rise (row 3), but these changes 
were offset by strong predicted falls due to movements in demographic 
and program variables. Although only a few states implemented waiv 
ers during this time period, these waivers by themselves would have 
caused a 13 percent decline in caseloads (row 4).
In contrast, the food stamp caseload share prediction (column 2) 
for 1990 and 1994 at least moves in the same direction as the actual 
caseload, but far under-predicts the actual rise that occurs. The regres 
sion predicts a 0.10-point increase, when in reality a 0.30-point
Table 3 Predicted versus Actual Changes in Public Assistance-Caseloads, and Share Explained 
by Economic Factors3
Models from monthly panel data
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a The actual and predicted change in each column are based on the ln(caseload share of the total population). 
b For 1994-98 rows, this column is AFDC/TANF caseload share.
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increase occurs. This suggests that two-thirds of the food stamp case 
load increases between these years is unexplained by the model. 
Changes in the unemployment rates alone would have predicted 34 
percent of the increase that actually occurred. Changes in residual 
food stamp caseloads are better explained by this model (recall that 
they are more affected by demographic and economic factors). Only 
25 percent (0.10/0.397) of the rise in residual food stamp caseloads is 
unexplained.
The model does not do quite so badly for the 1994-96 period when 
caseloads begin to decline. For both food stamps and AFDC, the 
regression predicts a larger decline than actually occurred. For AFDC, 
the regression predicts a 0.17-point decline in the caseload share; the 
actual decline was 0.15 points. Changes in the unemployment rate 
explain just under half of this decline. For food stamps, changes in 
unemployment explained 96 percent of the decline in total caseloads 
and predict a substantially larger decline for residual food stamps than 
actually occurred. The implementation of waivers in a growing num 
ber of states explain another 21 percent (17 percent) of the decline in 
AFDC (food stamps). This suggests that information on unemploy 
ment and waivers would explain 69 percent (112 percent) of the total 
decline in AFDC (food stamp) cases.
At the bottom of Table 3 we include information on TANF case 
loads and explore the decline in caseloads through mid 1998. Because 
we lack information on many of the explanatory variables in the annual 
data model for 1998, we cannot predict an aggregate 1998 caseload 
number; however, we do have actual information on unemployment, 
which we can use to predict the share of caseload change due to unem 
ployment alone. 18 The AFDC/TANF caseload share fell 0.62 points 
from 1994 through mid 1998, with particularly steep declines post- 
1996. The unemployment rate alone explained 19 percent of this 
decline, and 38 percent of the decline in food stamps. This suggests 
that the most recent and rapid decline in TANF and food stamp case 
loads is only partially explained by economic factors.
The results in Table 3 indicate three things. First, changes in case 
loads in the 1990s are only poorly explained by these regressions. 
None of the increase in AFDC and only a small share of the increase in 
food stamps in the early 1990s is predicted by these models. Second, if 
unemployment alone was used to predict caseload change, it would
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explain about half of the increase in caseloads in the early 1990s, but 
only about 20 percent of the decline in caseloads in the mid 1990s. 
The inability of economic factors to explain the dramatic fall in case 
loads after 1994 suggests that other factors have influenced participa 
tion in TANF-funded programs in recent years. This is consistent with 
the argument that welfare reform has caused changes in behavior 
among potential welfare recipients (more leave early or never enter) or 
is limiting the rolls (keeping people off or removing current recipients) 
through tighter sanctioning and eligibility requirements. Third, food 
stamp changes are better predicted by these models than AFDC 
changes. This is particularly true for residual food stamp cases where 
participation in food stamps is not tied to the AFDC program. Like 
AFDC, however, the majority of the change in total food stamp case 
loads is unexplained by economic factors through most of the recent 
time period.
CROSS-CHECKING THESE ESTIMATES WITH 
MONTHLY DATA
In this section, we use monthly data to examine the responsiveness 
of AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads to the monthly state unem 
ployment rate, early implementation of waivers, and program changes 
associated with the 1996 welfare reform legislation. These estimates 
serve two purposes. First, they provide an important robustness check 
of our estimates using annual caseload data. 19 Secondly, use of the 
monthly data allows us to analyze the caseload data after 1996. A 
major drawback of utilizing the annual panel data is that many of the 
dependent variables are only available through 1996, although the 
caseload data is available through June 1998 for AFDC/TANF and for 
food stamps.
With monthly data, we are forced to use a much sparser specifica 
tion: the only variable available monthly by state is the unemployment 
rate. This lack of data limits our ability to interpret the results. For 
instance, if states with more rapidly plummeting unemployment rates 
are also states that move faster and push harder on welfare reform, then 
we will pick up some program effects with the unemployment variable.
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Hence, these regressions provide an alternative estimate of the extent 
to which employment changes are driving caseloads, but it is probably 
a somewhat less reliable estimate than we were able to derive in Table 
2 with annual data. On the other hand, the addition of other variables 
to the model in Table 2 (compare columns 1 and 2) appeared to have 
only minor effects on the unemployment coefficients, and we take this 
as evidence that a sparser specification with monthly data may produce 
reasonably reliable results.
In addition to the unemployment rate, we include the waiver 
dummy variables described above, which "turn on" in states in the 
month when a waiver is approved for implementation, 20 and a dummy 
variable for welfare reform, which equals 1 in all months after Decem 
ber 1996. This latter variable will pick up any shift in the constant (in 
the models described below, this represents a shift in the rate of change 
in caseloads) after the passage of the welfare reform legislation in late 
1996. The coefficient on this dummy variable will describe the aver 
age unexplained caseload change in states post-1996 after controlling 
for unemployment and a host of state and month fixed effects.
There are several difficulties in dealing with the monthly caseload 
data: the data is highly seasonal; seasonal patterns vary significantly 
across states; and the data has a strong trend. Because each state's data 
is very different in terms of seasonal patterns and trend, it is difficult to 
estimate traditional panel data models. What is needed to obtain accu 
rate estimates from the monthly caseload data is an estimation proce 
dure that accounts for the different patterns of seasonality and trending 
between states, while throwing away as little information as possible. 
Figure 3 shows the monthly caseload data from three states: Alaska, 
California, and New York. The diversity of the monthly caseload data 
in terms of trend and seasonal patterns is apparent. The data from 
Alaska is highly seasonal and exhibits a strong upward trend over the 
sample range; the data from California exhibits a strong upward trend 
but is not very seasonal; and the data from New York exhibits neither a 
strong seasonal pattern nor an upward trend.
The usual way of dealing with seasonality in aggregate monthly 
data is to include month fixed effects in the set of regressors. Because 
the seasonal patterns in the caseload data are not consistent across 
states, this approach is not ideal. With one set of monthly dummy vari 
ables each state's caseloads will be adjusted with respect to the average
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state's seasonal pattern. This sort of adjustment is not a problem for 
states in which seasonal fluctuations are close to the average, but it is a 
problem for states in which the seasonal patterns are very different 
from the average. Take, for example, a state without a seasonal pattern 
in the caseload data (like New York in Figure 3). With one set of 
monthly dummy variables for all states, this state's caseloads will be 
adjusted up in months where the average state caseloads are low rela 
tive to the omitted month and will be adjusted down in months where 
the average state caseloads are high relative to the omitted month. The 
net effect of this seasonal adjustment for a state without a seasonal pat 
tern is to add meaningless seasonal variability to the data.
An alternative approach to dealing with seasonality in the 
monthly caseload data is to estimate models with state-specific month 
effects. Dealing with the problem of seasonality in this manner 
requires estimating 612 (51x12) separate state-month effects, but it 
avoids the problem of incorrectly assigning the same month effects to 
all of the states despite their differing seasonal patterns. It should be 
noted that state fixed effects are a linear combination of state-month 
effects, thus the inclusion of state-specific month effects implies that 
the resulting estimator will be directly comparable to the specifica 
tions in Table 2.
There are several plausible approaches to dealing with the trend in 
the monthly caseload data. The simplest approach to dealing with the 
problem of strongly trending caseload data (i.e., nonstationarity) is to 
estimate a model with period fixed effects (i.e., a separate fixed effect 
for each month of data). This is the approach taken with the annual 
data in the Table 2 regressions. The potential drawback of this 
approach is that the combination of period fixed effects and state fixed 
effects is perfectly collinear with state-month effects if there are more 
than 12 years of data. This perfect collinearity means that if state and 
period fixed effects are included in the set of regressors, state-month 
effects cannot be. Since the inclusion of state-month effects is impor 
tant for reasons described above, dealing with the problem of nonsta 
tionarity through the inclusion of period fixed effects is not ideal. 
Indeed, state-month effects provide a more flexible specification and 
constrain the data less than period fixed effects.
Another approach to this problem is to estimate models with state- 
specific time trends. Since much of the pattern in monthly state case-
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load data is composed of a strong upward trend and seasonal compo 
nents, detrending the caseload data may throw out too much variability 
in the data. This is similar to our argument against including state-spe 
cific time trends in Table 2.
We adopt a third approach to address the problem of trending 
dependent variables, by estimating all models in first-difference form. 
While this is not a perfect way to deal with the problem of non-station 
ary monthly caseload data, it is probably the best choice given the con 
straint that the data from all of the states must be treated in a like 
manner. This approach does seem to produce stationary time series for 
most of the states and is probably better than the alternatives of 
detrending or estimating a model with period fixed effects. 21
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to choice of specifi 
cation we estimate models with and without a lagged dependent vari 
able and investigate the effects of different lag lengths within each 
model. Assume that In caseloads in state i during period t are gener 
ated by the process
Eq-1 ln(c|f ,)= I
7 = 0 
12
+ I «"/,* + £/,, 
k= 1
where
q = lag length
ult = the state monthly unemployment rate
wl>t = a binary variable indicating whether a state has a waiver in 
effect
rlt = the welfare reform binary variable that equals 1 after Jan 
uary of 1997
smlk = the month effect associated with state / during month k
elt = a random, mean zero error term.
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Taking first differences and rearranging terms yields the following 
Eq.2 to(c) = $&u
12
q q i 
where P = Z P •, 7 = X 7,» and r| = £ -n.. Note that p, 7, and
7 = 0 ; = 0 ; = 0
r| represent the long-run effects of the unemployment rate, waivers,
and the recent welfare reform legislation on caseloads. Also note that
this model allows for exogenous caseload growth as long as
12
y Asm- , is greater than zero. This offers some control for steady
I, K
k= 1
caseload growth due to changes in omitted variables such as demo 
graphic or political factors.
The first two columns of Table 4 present the estimates of the long- 
run effects of the unemployment rate, waiver implementation, and wel 
fare reform on AFDC/TANF caseloads (part A) and food stamp case 
loads (part B) with the lag length (q) set to 12 and 24 months, 
respectively.22 The estimates of the long-run effect of unemployment 
from the monthly model with the lag length set to 24 months are 
remarkably similar to the estimates from the annual data. The esti 
mates from the model with 24 monthly lags indicate that a one-point 
rise in the state unemployment rate will cause a 4 percent increase in 
AFDC/TANF caseloads. This estimate of the impact of the unemploy 
ment rate on AFDC caseloads is close to the 6 percent increase in case 
loads associated with a one-point increase in the unemployment rate 
estimated using the annual data model. 23 For food stamp caseloads, the 
monthly model with 24 monthly lags and the annual data model both 
imply that the long-run effect of a one-point increase in the state unem 
ployment rate is about a 6 percent increase in caseloads.
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Table 4 Estimates of the Long-Run Determinants of AFDC/TANF and 
Food Stamp Caseloads by Model Specification
No lagged With lagged 
dependent variable dependent variable
Long-run effect of 12 lags 24 lags 12 lags 24 lags

































a Dummy variable equal to 1 from first quarter 1997 onward. 
** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
The estimated long-run effect of waivers implied by the monthly 
data model with a lag length of 24 months is almost twice as high as 
the estimate generated with the annual data models. This result is not 
surprising considering that many of the waivers were not implemented 
until 1995 and 1996. If caseloads take time to adjust to the implemen 
tation of a waiver, the full effect of the waivers will not be realized 
until after 1996. Because the annual data only runs through 1996, it is 
doubtful that the specifications using annual data will pick up the full 
effect of the waiver.
The estimated effect of welfare reform (the post-96 dummy vari 
able) is very large in this model, although interpreting this coefficient 
in any programmatic way is difficult. The model suggests that case 
loads were 28 to 35 percent lower following the 1996 welfare reform 
legislation, all else equal. It is not possible to conclude anything about 
how much of this effect is due to program eligibility changes, behavior 
changes by clients and caseworkers, or other factors occurring at the 
same time. At best, this provides a maximal estimate of the impact of 
welfare reform on caseloads over this time period.
One assumption of the distributed lag models estimated in Table 4 
is that the adjustment period to shocks in unemployment or implemen-
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tation of waivers is limited to the length of the lag in the model. It is 
useful to see how the estimated long-run effects change when this 
restriction is lifted. The restriction that the adjustment period is limited 
to the lag length can be lifted by allowing for lagged values of the 
dependent variable to enter into the right-hand side of eq. 1. Modify 
ing eq. 1 to include lagged values of the dependent variable yields the 
following equation:






Taking first differences and rearranging terms, 
Eq.4 Aln(C(.,)- Aln(C,.,_9 ) = -a- A.n(C. f_ f_
q+ 1
j=Q i,t-q
+T1 .1 Ar. . . - Ar. . I V\ i,t-J i,t-q)
12
Z Asm. , + Ae. 
k=l ' '
where a = 1 - X ay, (3 = £ py, y = I y;-, and T| = X r^..
7-1 7-0 7=0 7=0 
The long-run effects of the state unemployment rate, implementation 
of waivers, and the recent welfare reform legislation on caseloads are 
given by p/a, y/a, and Tj/a.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the estimated long-run effects 
of the unemployment rate, waivers, and welfare reform on AFDC/ 
TANF and food stamp caseloads for lag lengths of 12 and 24 months in 
models with a lagged dependent variable. These estimates are quite 
similar to the estimates in columns 1 and 2, which are without the 
lagged dependent variable. The models that allow for lags of 12 
months imply slightly lower estimates of long-run effects of the unem 
ployment rate, waivers, and welfare reform than the models that allow 
lags of 24 months. While the estimated effects of the state unemploy 
ment rate from the model with 12 lags are lower than those estimated 
from the annual data, the estimated effect of the state unemployment 
rate from the model that allows for 24 lags are very close to the esti 
mates from the annual data. As in columns 1 and 2, with an additional 
two and one-half years of data the estimated long run effects of waiver 
implementation are higher than those implied by the annual data.
Columns 4 though 7 in Table 3 present the predicted versus actual 
changes from the monthly data. 24 Columns 4 and 5 show the estimates 
for AFDC/TANF and for food stamps based on the model with 24 lags 
and no lagged dependent variable; columns 6 and 7 provide the same 
figures for the model with 12 lags and a lagged dependent variable. 
There is no good way to determine which of these models and what lag 
length to use. We show these two specifications to provide a range of 
estimates. The fact that both of these models produce relatively similar 
results suggests that the results are robust to these specification 
choices.
As with the annual data, the models which utilize the monthly data 
do not do a satisfactory job of predicting the changes in caseloads 
between 1990-94, 1994-96 and 1994-98. The models without lagged 
dependent variables account for 14 percent of the growth in log AFDC/ 
TANF caseloads between 1990 and 1994 and about 19 percent of the 
growth in log food stamp caseloads over the same time period. The 
models which allow for lagged values of the dependent variables do a 
better job of accounting for the growth in both AFDC/TANF and food 
stamp caseloads between 1990 and 1994, explaining 33 percent and 22 
percent of the increases in AFDC/TANF and food stamp cases, respec 
tively. The fact that the monthly data models do a better job than the 
annual data models in predicting the caseload increases between 1990 
and 1994 is due to the absence of a full set of demographic, economic,
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and program factors in the monthly specifications; as discussed above, 
many of these variables suggest caseloads should be declining over this 
period, not rising. 25 While the monthly models do a better job than the 
annual models of predicting the change in both AFDC/TANF and food 
stamp caseloads between 1990 and 1994, they imply a smaller percent 
age of the increase in caseloads can be attributed to changes in eco 
nomic factors. 26
Our greatest interest is in how the monthly models handle the case 
load decline between 1994-98, a period over which we could not effec 
tively make predictions from the annual models because many of the 
included variables were unavailable past 1996. The monthly models 
predict a high share of the fall in caseloads between 1994 and 1998. 
These "predictive" models include, however, the dummy variable for 
welfare reform post 1996. A better measure of the predictive power of 
the monthly models is the share of the caseload decline that would 
have been forecast by the changes in unemployment alone. For 1994- 
98, unemployment changes would have forecast between 8 and 12 per 
cent of the AFDC/TANF caseload decline and between 27 and 41 per 
cent of the food stamp decline. These figures are reasonably consistent 
with the prediction from the annual data.
The results in Table 3 for both monthly and annual panel data sug 
gest that economic factors explain only a small share of the changes in 
AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads, (although the models do a 
somewhat better job of explaining food stamp caseload changes than 
AFDC/TANF caseload changes). This is true both for the rise in case 
loads from 1990-94 and for the fall in caseloads from 1994-98.
The results presented in Table 4 show only a small subset of possi 
ble specifications available for obtaining estimates of the effect of 
employment and program changes on caseloads using monthly data. 
Because the models presented in Table 4 deal with the problems of sea- 
sonality and trending in what we think is the most reasonable way, they 
provide what is—in our opinion—the best approach to estimating 
these relationships. It is, however, important to note that alternative 
specifications provide different estimates of the impact of employment 
and program changes on AFDC/TANF and food stamp caseloads. In 
particular, Ziliak and Figlio (1999) come to very different conclusions 
about the relative impact of employment and waiver implementation
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on AFDC caseloads using monthly data and estimate much smaller 
effects of waivers.
Their preferred model for estimating monthly AFDC caseloads 
differs from the models estimated in this section in several ways. First, 
their specification does not contain any lags of the waiver variable. 
Instead, they include a contemporaneous waiver effect as well as a 
binary variable which, in a first-differenced model, is equal to 1 for all 
months between waiver approval and waiver implementation in their 
set of exogenous variables. Secondly, their model incorporates a 
slightly different lag structure. 27 Thirdly, they estimate their models 
with state fixed effects and month fixed effects, while we employ state- 
month effects. Fourth, they include a national quadratic trend to adjust 
for long-run changes in national factors such as the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit or shifting demographic and political fac 
tors. This section would be incomplete without a few comments about 
which of the differences between these models are responsible for the 
differences in results.
We do not have data on the time between waiver approval and 
waiver implementation, so we can not directly test the importance of 
including this variable. We can, however, perform an ad hoc analysis 
of this issue. If all states have the same time between waiver approval 
and waiver implementation, then the combination of a contemporane 
ous waiver effect along with this implementation lag variable is equiv 
alent to restricting the lagged waiver coefficients in our specifications, 
where the waiver lag length is the number of months between waiver 
approval and waiver implementation. For example, suppose all states 
that approved a waiver for implementation waited 18 months before 
they actually implemented that waiver. Then, in a first-difference 
model of monthly caseloads, having a contemporaneous waiver effect, 
and a waiver implementation lag is the same as having a contempora 
neous waiver effect and 18 lags of the, waiver effect, with the coeffi 
cient on all 18 of the lags constrained to be the same. In the case where 
all states implement waivers at the same speed, we can test how impor 
tant Ziliak and Figlio's restriction on the lagged waiver effects are in 
explaining the differences between their results and the results pre 
sented in this paper. It turns out the restrictions implied by their 
approach under the scenario where all states are the same do not make
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a measurable difference in assessing the long-run effects of the unem 
ployment rate and waivers on AFDC caseloads.
How much of the difference between the results in Ziliak and 
Figlio is attributable to differing lag structures? The answer seems to 
be not very much. Estimating specifications equivalent to theirs but 
with our lag structure leads to surprisingly similar results. We do esti 
mate slightly higher long-run effects of unemployment and waiver 
implementation, but the differences are small. Surprisingly, another 
difference that does not matter very much is the treatment of seasonal- 
ity. Whether state fixed effects and month fixed effects or state-month 
effects are used makes very little difference in the estimated long-run 
effects of the unemployment rate and waiver implementation in the 
first-differenced caseload models.
The major factor in explaining the differences between Ziliak and 
Figlio's results and ours is that they include a quadratic time trend in 
their specifications, while we do not. When we include the quadratic 
time trend in our specifications, the long-run effect of unemployment 
remains virtually unchanged while the long-run effect of waiver imple 
mentation decreases by over half. This result is robust across all of the 
Table 4 specifications. What inferences are drawn about the magnitude 
of the effect of waiver implementation on caseloads hinges on whether 
you believe including a quadratic trend in models like the ones 
described in this section is appropriate.
We argue against including quadratic time trends in these specifi 
cations. For most states, the trend in the monthly caseload data is 
removed by first-differencing. After seasonally adjusting this differ 
enced monthly caseload data, we believe that most (if not all) of the 
remaining variability in the data is meaningful and we should let it 
identify the parameters of interest. A simple look at Figure 1 will indi 
cate why a quadratic term is highly significant, but this movement is 
exactly what we want to explain with the dependent variables. In our 
view including a quadratic time trend over adjusts the data and mis 
estimates the actual effects of program changes over time.
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CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the determinants of caseloads for both the 
AFDC and Food Stamp program, with particular attention to the role 
played by the macroeconomy. The results suggest that recent changes 
in caseloads appear to be due to a multitude of factors, many of them 
not readily measurable even with a very rich specification including 
economic, demographic, political, and policy-related variables. 
Although many of these factors are clearly correlated with caseload 
changes within states over time, they do not explain the recent trends 
well. The fact that the sharp increase in caseloads in the early 1990s is 
poorly explained by either our annual or monthly data models suggests 
that the on-going rapid drop in caseloads in the mid to late 1990s is also 
likely to be largely unexplained by these models.
At best, the ongoing decline in unemployment rates can explain 
about 8 to 19 percent of the AFDC caseload declines since 1994 and 
about 28 to 44 percent of the food stamp caseload declines. Based on 
our best estimates from historical data, the expected effect of any 
future one-point increase in unemployment will be to increase TANF 
caseloads by 4 to 6 percent and food stamp caseloads by 6 to 7 percent. 
These estimates indicate that any future recession will surely raise 
caseloads, but is unlikely to bring them back to their mid 1990s level, 
all else equal.
This suggests that the recent caseload decline must be largely due 
to factors other than the strong economy. A minimal estimate of the 
affect of welfare reform is to forecast that welfare reform was the 
equivalent of implementing waivers in all states. Based on annual data, 
this approach indicates that welfare reform explains 8 percent (6 per 
cent) of the caseload decline in AFDC/TANF (food stamp) caseloads 
from 1994-98. In reality, however, many states have implemented 
TANF programs that were quite different and more extensive than 
waivers (most notably, TANF programs typically affect a larger share 
of the recipient population than did many waiver programs.) A maxi 
mal effect of welfare reform from 1996-98 is the unexplained decline 
in caseloads, along with any ongoing effects of state waivers. Using 
this estimate from monthly data, welfare reform can explain up to 75 
percent of the AFDC caseload decline and up to 85 percent of the food
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stamp caseload decline. Of course, these estimates ascribe all unex 
plained effects post-1996 to welfare reform and probably overestimate 
the effect.
The wide range between these minimum and maximum estimates 
indicates the need for further research to look more closely at behav 
ioral changes in take-up, as well as state-specific changes in eligibility 
that might be driving these dramatic changes in caseloads. These 
results are certainly consistent with a story whereby potential welfare 
recipients are strongly influenced by a host of less-measurable factors 
(including their own sense of the "acceptability" of utilizing public 
assistance) when deciding whether or not to participate in public assis 
tance.
The food stamp caseload has historically moved in very similar 
ways to the AFDC caseload. Given that many AFDC recipients also 
receive food stamps, the correlation in historical patterns of AFDC and 
foods stamp caseloads is not surprising. More surprising is the obser 
vation that food stamp caseloads appear to be influenced by political 
and program variables that should have no direct effects on the food 
stamp program but which do affect AFDC receipt. This tight historical 
correlation between food stamps and AFDC receipt raises major ques 
tions about the effect of current welfare reform on food stamp usage. It 
remains to be seen whether food stamp caseloads continue to fall along 
with TANF caseloads, or whether these two programs begin to diverge, 
as food stamp usage remains relatively high among low-wage working 
families even as many of these families leave TANF-funded services. 
Residual food stamps, those food stamps not received by AFDC/ 
TANF-eligible households, are more cyclical than overall food stamps 
and their levels appear to be better explained by economic and demo 
graphic variables than are overall food stamp caseloads.
From a research perspective, we are just beginning to acquire the 
data necessary to begin to understand the impact of the recent welfare 
reform. Future work on caseload changes might involve more detailed 
coding of state-specific program changes, allowing us to identify the 
effect of specific program interventions on caseload changes. As more 
data becomes available, the inclusion of a richer set of control variables 
in the post-1996 period will allow us to better separate out the impact 
of welfare reform from the impact of other changing political and 
demographic factors. Finally, as data on household income, labor
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force behavior, and family composition become available for the post- 
1996 period, this can be used to identify behavioral changes and differ 
entiate how much of the recent caseload decline is due to reductions in 
public assistance participation among eligibles as opposed to changes 
in eligibility.
Notes
Wallace received support from the office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services, for work on this paper. This 
paper reflects only the views of the authors
1. Many of these changes are still underway. The New Fiscal Federalism project of 
the Urban Institute indicates many of the state-specific changes on their Web site 
at <http.//newfederalism.urban.org>. Gais and Nathan (1999) provide a recent 
description of the nature of these state changes, while Blank (1997a) described 
these changes in a broader context.
2. Food stamp and TANF data are currently only available through June 1998. We 
use the average caseload in the first six months as the 1998 observation.
3. For instance, see Congressional Budget Office (1993) or Gabe (1992). Blank 
(1997b) included citations to a number of earlier studies.
4. Monthly cash benefits from AFDC were primarily available to single-parent fami 
lies (known as the AFDC-Basic program), but a small number of two-parent fam 
ilies also received AFDC (known as the AFDC-UP program, "UP" for 
unemployed parents). Blank (1997b) demonstrated that the AFDC-UP program 
caseloads have a very different set of determinants than the AFDC-Basic program, 
and that the program is much more responsive to cyclical indicators. In addition, 
the changes in AFDC-UP caseloads over the 1990s are more readily explained by 
available data than are the changes in AFDC-Basic.
5. The CEA (1997) study put a great deal of effort into coding the point at which 
major state waivers were approved, with the assistance of those within the Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services who approved the waivers. Blank (1997b) 
and Levine and Whitmore (1998) use this coding; Ziliak et al. (1998) used some 
what different coding.
6. Ziliak et al. reported the combined effect of the economic variables and their sea 
sonal factors; it would be interesting to know the effects of the cyclical variables 
alone. The present paper presents a comparison of monthly versus annual data 
estimates and finds little difference in results.
7. In 1996, the average annual cost of food stamps was $1072 per person, while 
average annual cost of AFDC per person was $1865 (U.S. House of Representa 
tives, 1998, Tables 7-11, 15-4, and 15-8). Both numbers include administrative 
costs as well as benefits paid. Historically, the Federal government has paid virtu 
ally all food stamp costs but split AFDC costs with the states through a matching
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grant formula. Under TANF, the Federal payment share is substantial, but it is 
fixed by the block grant amount.
8. In 1996, an estimated 61 percent of food stamp households did not receive AFDC 
benefits.
9. Surprisingly, although virtually all AFDC recipients are eligible for food stamps, 
not all choose to receive them. Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimated that among 
single mothers eligible for both AFDC and food stamps only 54 percent received 
assistance from both programs; 11 percent reported receiving AFDC but not food 
stamps. The remainder did not participate in the AFDC program, despite their 
estimated eligibility.
10. Some of these changes were reversed in 1998.
11. Recent anecdotal stories suggest that, at least in some cases, when families end 
their TANF services, they are not being given information or encouragement to 
remain on food stamps.
12. Data sources and more detailed descriptions of these variables are available in 
Blank (1997b).
13. This data is based on the Outgoing Rotation Group data from the Current Popula 
tion Survey, which provides a large enough sample to estimate annual numbers by 
state.
14. These waiver variables equal the share of the year they were in effect in the year 
in which they were approved and then equal 1 in all following years. In 1996, we 
turn "on" the waiver variable in September for all states, indicating the passage of 
the 1996 welfare reform act.
15. This is based on an annual calculation in the CPS. We actually calculate this 
number separately for New York, California, and the rest of the United States 
These two states have a large enough representation in the CPS to allow state-spe 
cific estimates.
16 The impact of unemployment on food stamp caseloads is even stronger if we use a 
sparser specification as in column 1.
17. Blank (1997b) also indicated that about 40 percent of the AFDC caseload increase 
between 1990 and 1994 is due to a rise in child-only cases, where children collect 
benefits but the adult caretaker is not eligible. She discussed this change at length. 
We do not focus on that issue here, largely because we want to compare aggregate 
AFDC and food stamp caseload trends.
18. In addition, we use projected population information for the total population. All 
other variables are maintained at the 1996 levels.
19. These estimates also provide further information on the claim in Ziliak et al. that 
the monthly panel data provides different answers than the annual panel data.
20. Once a waiver dummy variable is set to 1 within a state, it stays on for the remain 
der of the time period, even after the implementation of welfare reform. This 
allows states that received early waivers to show different caseload changes than 
states that did not and is consistent with the fact that the welfare reform legislation 
allowed states to continue their waiver programs.
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21. The monthly data from some states is not characterized by a strong trend. Exam 
ples of states where In(caseloads) looks to be stationary prior to differencing 
include Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
22. In the context of the distributed lag models in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the 
term "long run" refers to the length of the lag.
23. To see this, compare the coefficients on unemployment and waivers in Table 4 
with the sum of the three unemployment rate coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 2.
24. Note that the estimates in Table 3 for the monthly models are not entirely compa 
rable to the estimates from the annual data models. This inconsistency is due to 
fact that all of the calculations for the annual data are computed in terms of the log 
caseload share while the calculations using the monthly data are computed in 
terms of log caseloads. The other major difference is that the regressions used to 
generate the figures for the annual data are weighted by the state total population, 
while the regressions used to generate the monthly data are not weighted.
25 The annual data models actually predict a decrease in AFDC/TANF caseload 
share between 1990-94, largely because of changes in demographic factors, polit 
ical factors, and AFDC benefit levels.
26 In the context of the annual models, economic factors include unemployment 
rates, log median wages, and the log of the 20th percentile of wages, while in the 
monthly models the economic factors are the unemployment rates.
27. They estimate a autoregressive distributed lag model with three lags of the depen 
dent variable and six lags of the unemployment rate.
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The Effect of Pre-PRWORA
Waivers on AFDC Caseloads and
Female Earnings, Income, and
Labor Force Behavior
Robert A. Moffitt 
Johns Hopkins University
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in September 1996 has led to increased 
interest in the effects of welfare reform on caseloads and on individual 
and family well-being. A number of evaluation efforts of PRWORA 
are underway around the country, but these will not be issuing findings 
for some time. In the meantime, some attention has been directed 
toward analyzing the effects of pre-PRWORA waiver activity, which 
by definition ended in 1996. While there have been some evaluation 
reports of specific waiver demonstrations during this period, another 
approach to evaluation is to conduct a cross-state econometric analysis, 
using the pre-1996 variation in waiver activity among states to estimate 
the effect of waivers on various outcomes. That is the approach dis 
cussed in this paper.
The most widely circulated study taking this approach is the report 
of the Council of Economic Advisers (1997), hereafter called the CEA 
report. The CEA report used aggregate state-level AFDC caseload data 
as the outcome and the state unemployment rate and state waiver activ 
ity as independent variables. Using data from 1976 to 1996, the CEA 
report found that waivers significantly reduced the caseload. However, 
the report also found that the decline in the unemployment rate had a 
large effect, greater in magnitude than that of waivers. The findings of 
the report indicated that the unemployment-rate decline explained from 
31 percent to 44 percent of the caseload decline between 1993 and 
1996 (depending on the model), while the increase in waiver activity 
explained between 14 and 30 percent.
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There has been considerable discussion of the CEA report's meth 
odology and findings (Martini and Wiseman 1997; Ziliak et al. 1997), 
as well as an update and extension of the report (Levine and Whitmore, 
forthcoming). 1 A number of issues have been raised: whether other 
policy developments such as those in Medicaid or the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) could have been alternative or additional contribu 
tors to caseload decline; the coding of the waiver activity in the states 
and the difference between official waiver start dates and genuine 
implementation dates; whether waivers were endogenous and intro 
duced with a higher probability in states whose caseloads were going 
to decline for other reasons; and modeling issues such as the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable, the length of lags used, whether 
monthly or annual data are preferred, estimating in levels vs. first dif 
ferences, and many other issues. Another issue is the question of 
whether the waiver activity was significant enough in the states to have 
plausibly generated the size of effect estimated in the CEA report, and 
exactly what the waiver variables were proxying—a specific policy, or 
a more general set of policies which, together, might have had an 
effect.
Most of these issues will not be joined here, with the exception of 
the business cycle; its contribution to caseload growth is subjected to 
sensitivity testing in the last section below. Aside from this one depar 
ture from the CEA specification, the bulk of the paper takes the CEA 
methodology as given and studies the implications of applying that 
methodology, with all its strengths and weaknesses and all the uncer 
tainty surrounding it, to micro data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS).
Microdata should have an important role to play in econometric 
evaluations of welfare reform. Aggregate data at the state level neces 
sarily gloss over the differences within a state's population and do not 
permit analysis of the groups most likely to be affected by welfare 
reform. Not only should individual data on the most-likely-affected 
groups permit a more precise estimation of the effect of the welfare; 
they should also aid in the detection of spurious effects that might have 
been estimated at the aggregate level (because if effects are detected in 
the microdata even for groups that are credibly unaffected by the 
reform, this suggests that the aggregate estimate might be spuriously 
picking up some more-general trend). In addition, while aggregate
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data are available on the AFDC caseload, none are available for indi 
vidual and family outcomes of interest like earnings, family income, 
and labor force behavior. Consequently, the CPS can contribute to the 
study of welfare reform to outcomes other than the caseload.
The study reported on here applies the CEA methodology to CPS 
microdata. The major distinction made with the microdata is between 
women of higher and lesser education levels, because education is the 
best single proxy for labor market skill and hence for outside opportu 
nities off welfare. It is the best single scale of how well-off a welfare 
recipient is, in general. The analysis here finds that the CEA method 
ology implies that more-educated and less-educated women are 
affected in different ways by welfare reform. For the least-educated 
women, welfare reform decreases AFDC participation and increases 
annual hours of work and annual weeks of work, but it has no statisti 
cally significant effects on earnings, wages, or family income. For 
somewhat more-educated women, on the other hand, welfare reform 
increases earnings as well as hours of work. The findings of the paper 
demonstrate that a recognition of the diversity and heterogeneity of the 
population, as well as the differences in their response to welfare 
reform, is critical to understanding the effects of that reform.
The CEA methodology requires that the effect of the business 
cycle on caseload and other outcomes be estimated in order that the 
effects of welfare reform be estimated, for the latter are estimated after 
implicitly netting out the caseload trends that would have occurred 
from the unemployment rate decline resulted even in the absence of 
those reforms. There were only two significant recessions between 
1977 and 1995, and they had different effects on the caseload. More 
over, cross-state variation in the unemployment rate has had different 
effects over time. The analysis here shows that the caseload has 
become more cyclically sensitive over time; hence forecasting what the 
effects of the decline in the unemployment rate would have been in the 
absence of the waiver activity could be argued to be best conducted 
with the most recent data possible, namely, data in the late 1980s. The 
results here show that when the most recent business cycle is used to 
estimate the model, all aggregate caseload effects of waivers disappear, 
as do the positive effects on earnings of more-educated women. More 
analysis is needed to resolve this issue.
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REPLICATING THE CEA REPORT FINDINGS
The CEA report used annual data from 1976 to 1996 on 1) average 
annual monthly AFDC caseloads per capita, 2) average annual monthly 
unemployment rates, and 3) waiver activity within each year (see 
below), all at the state level. 2 The analysis considers the relative influ 
ences on the caseload of the unemployment rate and of waivers. The 
waivers were coded from Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) information on the approval dates for AFDC waivers; dummy 
variables indicate whether the state had any waiver in effect in the year 
in question (thus the dummy variable goes from 0 to 1 and stays at 1 
for as long as the waiver is in force). 3 Additional dummy variables 
were constructed that indicate whether waivers were in effect for par 
ticular policies—JOBS exemptions, JOBS sanctions, family caps, time 
limits, and other specific types of reforms. Only waivers since 1993 
were coded, on the grounds that waivers before then did not affect a 
sufficient fraction of the caseload. Waivers were also coded only if the 
waiver activity was statewide; of the 43 waivers in effect in the final 
year, only 35 were in this category.4
Figure 1 shows the trends from 1976 to 1996 in the aggregate 
AFDC caseload, the unemployment rate, and waiver activity. The 
AFDC caseload was fairly stable until 1989, when it began to grow sig 
nificantly. The growth peaked in 1993 and declined thereafter. 5 The 
unemployment rate has also gone through considerable gyrations dur 
ing two recessions occurring over the period. The caseload and unem 
ployment cycles have a rough positive correlation in the late 1970s and 
after 1988, but not from 1979 to 1987. The CEA report ascribes the 
latter to the influence of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA), which had a caseload-depressing effect, although this seems 
an inadequate explanation for the long length of the lack of relation 
ship. In any event, the methodology used to estimate waiver effects, as 
shown below, does not make use of this aggregate time-series correla 
tion (or lack of it) because state-level data, not aggregate data, are used.
The third curve in Figure 1 shows the fraction of states with state 
wide waivers and hence demonstrates the rise of waiver activity after 
1991. The figure makes clear that the separation of the effects on the 
caseload of waivers (on the one hand) and the declining unemployment
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rate (on the other) must necessarily be a major challenge, given that 
they both changed course around the same time (1992) and given that 
they continued changing in the same direction thereafter.
The models estimated in the CEA report use the natural logarithm 
of the per capita caseload as the dependent variable, and they include 
year dummies, state dummies, and, in most cases, state dummies mul 
tiplied by a year variable (i.e., a time trend) as independent variables. 
Also included in the equations are variables for the unemployment 
rate, the presence of a welfare waiver, and the state AFDC guarantee. 
With both year dummies and state dummies included, the coefficients 
on the unemployment rate and the waiver variables represent the 
effects of a change in their respective variables on the deviation from a 
state-specific trend in the per capita caseload. As noted above, there 
fore, the analysis does not make use of the relationship between the 
caseload, the unemployment rate, and waivers at the aggregate level, 
but rather the relationship between these variables at the state level, 
and in first-difference, or change, form (i.e., the relationship between 
year-to-year changes in waivers, changes in unemployment rates, and 
changes in caseloads across different states). 6-7
The March Current Population Survey can be brought into the 
analysis only for 1977 and after, for only starting in 1977 were all indi 
vidual states identified (see below). Thus the year 1976 is deleted from 
the analysis of administrative data as well, for comparability. In addi 
tion, the analysis below deletes the year 1996 because it is close to the 
enactment of PRWORA. 8 Some caution is reasonable under these cir 
cumstances, given that the heightened welfare reform activity at the 
federal level just prior to that enactment could have influenced state 
caseload-reducing efforts. However, as will be shown momentarily, 
while some of the tangential findings of the CEA report are sensitive to 
the inclusion of this year, the main ones are not. Nevertheless, the 
1996 year is still excluded from the main analyses to ensure that no 
ambiguities will arise in the interpretation of the findings in this 
respect.
It is worth noting that the caseload modeling strategy of the CEA 
report, like many caseload modeling approaches, captures both the 
entry and exit effects of welfare reform on the caseload. Unlike many 
studies of waivers, which determine the rate at which families who are 
initially on the welfare rolls leave them following the enactment of a
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 97
waiver, studying the caseload as a whole implies that the effects of a 
waiver on entry are also captured. A decline in entry rates can lower 
the caseload just as an increase in exit rates can, and hence the caseload 
can fall for either reason. Thus, the caseload modeling approach has a 
distinct advantage over welfare "leaver" studies and other waiver eval 
uations, which take as their study populations only families initially on 
welfare.9
Replication of CEA Results
Columns 1-4 of Table 1 estimate models whose specification (that 
is, dependent and independent variables) are exactly the same as those 
in the CEA report. 10 As in the CEA report, the dependent variable 
equals the natural logarithm of a ratio whose numerator is the size of 
the AFDC caseload (taken from administrative data) and whose 
denominator is the state population. The independent variables are as 
defined previously. The major difference in the regressions reported in 
Table 1 and those appearing in the CEA report is that the Table 1 
regressions exclude the years 1976 and 1996. 11
The basic specification ("Spec. 1") allows for effects of the current 
and lagged unemployment rate and an overall waiver dummy. The 
lagged unemployment rate and waiver coefficients are significant, as in 
the CEA report, and similar in magnitude. The coefficients in the CEA 
report for this specification imply that the unemployment rate explains 
45 percent of the decline in the per capita caseload between 1993 and 
1996 and that the waiver variable explains 13 percent (Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997), Table 3). The corresponding coefficients in 
Table 1 imply contribution percents of 47 and 15, respectively. 12
The results for specifications 2, 3, and 4 are, however, rather differ 
ent than those in the CEA report, at least for the waiver variable coeffi 
cients. Specification 2 shows a barely significant coefficient on a 
waiver for work requirement time limits and a more significant effect 
of waivers for a family cap, whereas the CEA results showed neither of 
these to be significant; only JOBS sanctions effects were significant in 
the CEA report. This change is entirely the result of excluding year 
1996, when several states added new waivers. The sensitivity of these 
coefficients to the years included and excluded is unfortunate and com 
pounds the already existing suspicion that the separate effects of the
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(4.207)
ln(Max AFDC benefit for 14.352* 12.831* 14.345* 14.123* 4.148 1.948 
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individual waivers are not being correctly picked up by these variables. 
The results for specification 3 show significant effects for neither the 
any-waiver variable nor the JOBS-sanctions variable, the latter of 
which was significant in the CEA report; again, the exclusion of 1996 
is responsible for this result. Specification 4 was tested in the CEA 
report to determine whether there was an advance response to waivers, 
by including a one-year lead variable for both the any-waiver and sanc 
tions variables. 13 The CEA report found significantly negative effects 
of both, whereas neither is significant in Table 1; again, the exclusion 
of 1996 is the reason for the difference. 14
Given that specifications 2-4 test tangential hypotheses and that 
the simple specification in column 1 is robust to inclusion of different 
years—and because the exclusion of 1996 is a conservative strategy, as 
argued above—the rest of the analysis in this paper will use specifica 
tion I. 15
EXTENDING THE MODEL TO THE CPS
The Current Population Survey is a relatively large monthly 
household survey which is representative of the U.S. population. For 
most of the analysis we use only the March survey in each year, which 
gathers information on AFDC receipt, employment and labor force 
behavior, and annual earnings and income at both the family and indi 
vidual level. Identifiers for all states are available beginning in 1977, 
and we therefore use the March CPS files from 1977 to 1995. The 
means of all the CPS variables used in the analysis are shown in 
Appendix Table 1 (p. 118).
We begin by replicating the CEA results just reported to the closest 
degree they can be, using information in the CPS. Rather than admin 
istrative counts of AFDC recipients in each year, we use the number of 
women aged 16-54 reporting AFDC receipt in each state. In addition, 
rather than dividing by total population, we divide by the number of 
women aged 16-54. Since women in this age range are the primary 
population group from which AFDC recipients are drawn, this should 
provide a more precise measure of the rate of receipt than that out of 
the entire population. 16 With the dependent variable defined in this
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way for each state in each year 1977-1995, we can use for regressors 
the exact same set used in the CEA analysis: state and year dummies 
and state-level variables for waiver activity, the unemployment rate, 
and the state benefit level. 17
The right-most two columns in Table 1 show estimates using spec 
ification 1. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
AFDC participation rate in the state and year in question, as defined 
above. One column shows the results when the simple unweighted 
mean is used, and the second column shows the results when weighted 
least squares is applied, using as weights the ratio of the mean adminis 
tratively defined caseload per capita in the state to the mean CPS- 
defined AFDC participation rate in the state, the weights are normal 
ized to one. These weights adjust for the sampling error in the CPS 
which arises from small sample size by raising each of the CPS means 
to its proper population proportion as represented in the administrative 
data. The small samples in some states in some years is the main 
obstacle to using the CPS for state-specific policy analysis in general, 
and the use of weights in this way reduces the impact of that problem. 18
As the results show, the CPS generates remarkably similar esti 
mates for the effects of the state unemployment rate on the caseload as 
those which use administrative caseload data. The effects of waiver 
policy are also highly significant, and considerably larger in magnitude 
than in the equations using the administrative caseload data. Thus the 
CPS is clearly consistent with the finding of significant waiver effects 
on caseloads. 19
Disaggregating and Using Other Outcomes with the CPS
As noted in the introduction, the CPS data afford the opportunity 
of examining effects of waivers on subcomponents of the caseload and 
on the within-state population, thereby permitting a more disaggregate 
analysis than is allowed with state-level administrative data. For sim 
plicity, only two demographic dimensions are examined here, educa 
tion and age. Education is classified into four categories: less than 12 
years of schooling, 12 exactly, 13-15, and 16 or more years. Age is 
classified into four categories: 16-25, 26-34, 35-44, and 45-54. 
Within each state and each year, these four education and age catego 
ries are used to form 16 age-education cells, for each of which a mean
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AFDC participation rate is calculated. 20 The resulting sample has 
15,504 observations (51 states, 19 years, 16 demographic groups per 
state and year). The AFDC participation-rate models already estimated 
can be reestimated on this larger sample, using the same state-level 
regressors as used in the previous analysis. However, age and educa 
tion effects can now also be allowed, and waiver effects can be esti 
mated separately for different age and education groups as well. Some 
of the age-education cells in some states have very few observations, 
so we shall conduct sensitivity analysis to the exclusion of small 
cells. 21
There is relatively little formal evidence upon which to generate 
hypotheses regarding the differential effect of waiver policies by age 
and education. The strongest dimension upon which generally 
accepted knowledge of waiver policies can be applied is education, for 
education is generally regarded as the best proxy for labor market skill 
and hence potential earnings off the welfare rolls. All available evi 
dence, which is admittedly anecdotal, suggests that the caseload-reduc 
ing effects of waiver policy have had their greatest impact on those 
women on the rolls who were in a better position, i.e., the better edu 
cated. There is widespread agreement that those with greater labor 
market opportunities have been disproportionately represented among 
those leaving the rolls, thereby increasingly leaving the welfare case 
load composed of the worse-off cases, those with the fewest outside 
opportunities.
However, much of this consensus is based upon the presumed 
effects of the decline in the unemployment rate, which is almost surely 
likely to have drawn off the rolls those with higher labor market skills. 
The effects of welfare reform are to some extent more ambiguous. 
While it should be presumed that the increased emphasis on work 
(which is the central feature of most welfare reform programs) would 
be most easily accommodated by those with more labor market skill, it 
is simultaneously the case that those with less labor market skill may 
be less able or willing to comply with work requirements while on the 
rolls and hence may be more likely to be sanctioned or otherwise leave 
because of an inability to cope with the requirements. Evidence on this 
issue is thus far lacking.
A second potential of the CPS is to permit the examination of out 
comes other than AFDC participation. For this purpose, we construct,
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for each of the age-education cells in each state in each year, the means 
of annual weeks worked, annual hours worked, and real annual earn 
ings of the woman in question, and also real family income of the fam 
ily in which she resides. 22 Welfare reform and waiver activity may, on 
the one hand, improve these outcomes if such policies are successful in 
stimulating former welfare recipients to improve their labor market 
position, while they may, on the other hand, leave women worse off if 
they are not able to do so.
The problem of small samples in some of the age-education cells 
in some states will be addressed in two ways. First, some of the equa 
tions will be estimated only on state-demographic cells with more than 
some minimum number of observations. Second, equations will also 
be estimated using the outgoing rotation group (ORG) data from the 
CPS. Every month, about one-quarter of the CPS sample is asked 
questions about weekly earnings. Taking the samples of individuals 
asked these questions over all 12 months in a year yields a sample that 
is approximately three times the size of the single-month March CPS. 
Models identical to those estimated with the March CPS can be esti 
mated with these data, thereby implicitly gauging the importance of 
sample size to the results.
Results
Table 2 presents results of models for the AFDC participation rate 
using the March CPS data. Because about a quarter of all the educa 
tion-age cells have a zero participation rate, the absolute level of the 
participation rate is used rather than its logarithm. The first column of 
Table 2 shows an aggregate-state level regression for comparability. 
The results indicate that the signs and significance levels of the coeffi 
cients are similar to those in the last column of Table 1, implying that 
the waivers reduced the fraction of women aged 16-54 who were on 
AFDC by about 0.8 of a percentage point. The second and third col 
umns use the within-state education-age demographic cell data. The 
first "No interactions" column simply includes education and age dum 
mies but continues to estimate an average, state-level welfare effect. 
The coefficients on the education and age dummies are usually signifi 
cant and in the expected direction, with higher education groups hav 
ing a lower probability of being on AFDC and with participation rates
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a The dependent variable is the AFDC participation rate. All regressions are estimated 
on years 1977-1995. The omitted education category is "less than 12 years" and the 
omitted age category is "16-25 years old." All regressions use administrative CPS 
weights. Standard errors are in parentheses; *denotes significance at the 10% level.
b Other variables included in this regression include the AFDC maximum benefit, year 
dummies, state dummies, and state x trend variables.
c Other variables included in these regressions are all those in the "state-level aggre 
gates" specification plus interactions between the education dummies and year dum 
mies and interactions between the education dummies and the current and lagged 
unemployment rate.
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highest among women aged 26-34. The waiver coefficient is signifi 
cant and of approximately the same magnitude as that in the state-level 
regression, indirectly indicating that the education and age composi 
tions of waiver and nonwaiver states were not very different.
The more important results are those in the right-most column, 
which gives separate waiver effects by education category. The results 
indicate that the largest effects of waivers on AFDC participation rates 
occurred among women with less than 12 years of education, for 
whom waivers reduced participation by 1.7 percentage points; (recall 
that the base is all women in this education category). This is in accord 
with expectations, for the impact of welfare reform should be expected 
to occur among the most disadvantaged and most welfare-prone. It 
also suggests that the state-level results are not spuriously picking up 
effects that were occurring across the education distribution, thus pro 
viding some support for the credibility of those results. 23
Table 3 shows the results for the other outcomes taken from the 
CPS, when state aggregates are used as well as with the demographic 
cell data are used. All of the estimated effects at the state level are 
insignificant except for annual earnings, which is significantly positive 
and implies that waivers increased earnings by $274 per year. 24 The 
results are somewhat different when the results are disaggregated by 
education group, however. Both the weeks worked and annual hours 
worked of those with the least education increased from waivers, but 
neither their annual earnings nor weekly earnings increased. The 
aggregate annual earnings effects occurred instead among those with 
12 years of education only. For that group, there was a significant 
increase in hours of work, although of somewhat smaller magnitude 
than that for the least educated group.
These findings, therefore, suggest that waivers had a major impact 
on very low-skilled women by reducing their rates of participation in 
AFDC (through both entry and exit, presumably) and increasing their 
labor force attachment and levels of connection to the workforce 
(again, possibly through non-entry as well as exit). However, there 
was little effect on their annual or weekly earnings, indirectly indicat 
ing that the wage rates of the jobs they obtained were very low. Some 
what more educated women—those with 12 years of education, to be 
exact—whose participation rates also fell, experienced both increases 
in workforce attachment as well as increases in earnings. This sug-













































































a All regressions are unweighted. All data are from the March CPS (1977-1995) except for real weekly earnings,
which is from the CPS ORG (1970-1995). Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
b The other variables included in the "State aggregates" regressions are those in column 1 of Table 1. 
c Other variables in "Demog. cell" regressions are those in the regressions reported in the last two columns of Table 2.
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gests that it was the better-educated, presumably more-skilled, women 
who did better off the rolls and were able to better replace their lost 
welfare benefits with earnings.
The final column in the table shows the effects on family income, 
where the findings indicate no significant effects for any education 
group. Indirectly, therefore, this implies that the least educated women 
must have replaced their welfare benefits from some other source, 
either through income from others in the family or from other govern 
ment programs. This bears more investigation in the future.
The standard errors on many of the coefficients in Table 3 are rela 
tively high and suggest that small sample sizes in the CPS may be 
weakening the results. The results for weekly earnings (which come 
from the much larger ORG data set) are, however, no more significant 
than the March CPS coefficients and, in fact, generally less so. Of 
course, the less significant coefficients in the ORG data could be a 
reflection of a lack of increase in wage rates as a result of waivers; the 
positive effects on annual earnings of the 12-years-of-education group 
could be entirely a result of their increases in hours worked. Table 4 
reports results when small cell sizes are excluded from the regressions, 
as an additional check on this aspect of the findings. Virtually all 
results in the table are of the same general magnitude as those in Tables 
2 and 3, with the exception that welfare participation and annual earn 
ings effects are stronger for those with 13-15 years of education, a 
moderately implausible result (at least in the magnitude implied by the 
coefficients). The ORG data, when restricted to even larger cell sizes 
than those in the CPS, however, reveals significantly positive effects on 
weekly earnings of those with 12 and those with 13-15 years of educa 
tion. These effects corroborate the March CPS results for annual earn 
ings to some extent and increase our confidence in those findings.
BUSINESS CYCLE SENSITIVITY
The separation of waiver effects from business cycle (i.e., unem 
ployment) effects on caseloads and other outcomes implicitly requires 
a judgement on what the course of those outcomes would have been in 
the absence of the decline in the unemployment rate that accompanied















































































a All other variables in regressions are identical to those in the last column of Table 2. All regressions impose a minimum of 20 observa 
tions per cell except the last column, which imposes a minimum of 50 observations per cell. Standard errors are in parentheses; the * 
denotes significance at the 10% level.
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the growth of waiver activity. Waiver effects are necessarily estimated 
from the implicit residual change in the caseload and other outcomes 
after the effect of the unemployment rate has been netted out. 
Although there is some variation in unemployment rates in each state 
after waivers are introduced, the unemployment rate effect for waiver 
states is largely determined from the data on the cyclical relationship 
over the years prior to 1992. For the estimates of waiver effects to be 
correct, therefore, it must be the case that the cyclical relationship 
between unemployment rates and caseload and other outcomes be the 
same in 1992 and after as it was before 1992. While there is a sense in 
which this can never be known with certainty, for we will never know 
what would have happened over the 1992-1995 period if waiver activ 
ity had not increased, we can determine what the historical experience 
of the cyclical relationship was and can make estimates of waiver 
effects conditional upon assumptions about whether that historical 
experience was maintained over the 1992-1995 period.
The regression specifications reported thus far implicitly make 
such an assumption, by assuming that the average unemployment rate 
relationship over the 1977-1991 period, estimated in the same way that 
waiver effects are estimated—namely, from the relationship between 
year-to-year changes in caseload and other outcomes and year-to-year 
changes in the unemployment rate across different states—would have 
persisted over the 1992-1995 period. One issue is whether the 1977- 
1991 period is long enough to have estimated that relationship reliably, 
for there were only two major recessions at the national level during 
those years. On the other hand, there was considerable cross-state vari 
ation in the magnitude of those recessions, and this reduces this prob 
lem to some extent. Another issue is whether the cyclical relationships 
were stable over the 1977-1991 period itself. This issue is more easily 
addressed with the data at hand, for one can simply estimate different 
cyclical sensitivities for different periods.
Table 5 shows results of models which test whether cyclical 
effects have been stable and, if not, whether estimated waiver effects 
are sensitive to them. The regressions reported are comparable to 
those in Table 1 and are run at the state level using the administra 
tively defined AFDC caseload variable used in the CEA report. Thus, 
these regressions return to the CEA data and aggregate caseload 
model. "1977-92 Observations" include only pre-waiver observations
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1 All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Population weights are not used. The depen 
dent variable is ln(AFDC per capita caseload) and the specification of regressions is 
identical to that in Table 1, column 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; the * 
indicates significance at the 10% level.
and allows the unemployment-rate coefficient to vary with three dis 
tinct time periods (based on Figure 1): 1977-1980, before the early 
1980s recession and recovery; 1981-1986, which includes one full 
cycle; and 1987-1992, which covers the slight decline and rise of 
unemployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the second cycle in 
the pre-waiver data. As the results show, the cyclical sensitivity of the 
caseload has risen drastically over time. In the late 1970s, the case 
load was, oddly, procyclical, and during the 1980s and through 1992 it 
was countercyclical but increasing in sensitivity. 25
Given this instability, a natural hypothesis is that cyclical sensitiv 
ity during the post-1992 period, the period of interest, would have 
been, in the absence of PRWORA, closest to the cyclical sensitivity 
exhibited in the pre-1992 period closest to it in calendar time, namely, 
the period in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The right-most two col 
umns in Table 5 show the estimates of waiver effects when, respec 
tively, the 1977-1980 observations are deleted and the 1977-1986 
observations are deleted, thus gradually deleting more of the more his-
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torically distant observations from 1992. As the table shows, the 
waiver coefficients lose significance when pre-1981 observations are 
excluded, and they even become significant and positive when the pre- 
1987 observations are included. This should not be surprising given 
the results in column 1, for since the more recent periods have greater 
cyclical sensitivity, excluding the more distant years results in a larger 
expected post-1992 caseload decline from the unemployment rate 
alone. Hence the role of waivers in explaining caseload decline is cor 
respondingly reduced.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating the CPS-based models on 
the 1987+ period only. The results in this case are, interestingly, very 
similar to those reported earlier, with the notable exception of a lack of 
significant increase in annual earnings for those with 12 years of edu 
cation. The disaggregation thus appears to be important here, for the 
reduced impact of waivers on the caseload reported in Table 5 appear 
to be masking continued declines among the least-educated women. 
On the other hand, these results suggest that the positive earnings 
impacts reported earlier may be sensitive to the implicit cyclical 
assumption, for Table 6 has the implication that there were, in the pop 
ulation, no significant increases in earnings or wages for any group 
despite reductions in caseloads and increases in hours worked and 
weeks worked. This is a somewhat different conclusion than was 
reached previously.
It is worth emphasizing that it cannot be known with certainty that 
the most recent recession prior to the waiver activity is the best for 
forecasting cyclical effects after 1992. Indeed, the true cyclical sensi 
tivity post-1992 could be different than that exhibited in any historical 
experience in the years of these data. One could argue that the best 
way to proceed is to average over the cycles that are available in the 
data, on the assumption that the post-1992 period should be expected, 
on average, to be like all those in the past, not the most recent one. 
Some other source of information needs to be brought to bear on this 
issue to make further progress.


































































a All other variables in the regressions are identical to the last column of Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses; * denotes signifi 
cance at the 10% level.
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CONCLUSIONS
A recent report of the Council of Economic Advisers (1997) exam 
ined the effect of pre-PRWORA waiver activity in the early 1990s on 
the AFDC caseload and found that waivers made a substantial contri 
bution to the reduction in the AFDC caseload although less than that of 
the declining unemployment rate. The CEA study used an aggregate 
state-level caseload model estimated over the period 1976-1996. This 
paper uses the CEA methodology but applies it to microdata from the 
Current Population Survey, where information is available on labor 
force activity, earnings, and income, as well as on demographic charac 
teristics such as age, sex, and education. The results from the CPS data 
show that less educated women had gains in labor force attachment in 
the form of increased weeks worked and hours of work as a result of 
waivers, but no statistically significant increases in earnings or wages. 
The only statistically significant earnings or wage increases occurred 
among better-educated women, generally those with at least 12 years 
of education. The latter result is, however, somewhat sensitive to 
which historical recession is used to forecast the effect of the business 
cycle. The findings of the paper demonstrate that a recognition of the 
diversity and heterogeneity of the population, and the differences in 
their response to welfare reform, is critical to understanding the effects 
of that reform.
Notes
A previous version of this paper was presented at the ASSA meetings in New York in 
January 1999. The author thanks Phillip Levine for providing the data used in the CEA 
Report and for helpful discussions and comments, and Gary Burtless and Sheldon Dan- 
ziger for additional comments. Cristian deRitis provided able research assistance.
1. See Blank (1997) and Stapleton, Livermore, and Tucker (1997) for other caseload 
models, but these two papers focused more on the origins of the increase in the 
caseload in the late 1980s and early 1990s than on its later decline.
2. Thus, with 51 states for 21 years, a total of 1071 observations were used in the 
estimation All caseload, unemployment, and waiver data are on a fiscal year 
basis. Thus the variables for year t are calculated as averages of the months from 
October of year (t - 1) to September of year t.
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3. In the year in which the waiver first appears, the variable is coded as the fraction 
of the year that the waiver was in effect.
4. An appendix in the CEA report shows the exact waiver dates and provides more 
discussion of the nature of the different types of waivers
5. The caseload has continued to decline markedly since 1995.
6. The CEA model does not include some of the main variables posited in the eco 
nomic model of welfare participation to affect the takeup decision—for example, 
potential wage rates and exogenous nonlabor income. The implicit assumption is 
that these variables do not vary in their trends in waiver and nonwaiver states.
7. The major danger in this method is that those states who adopted waivers may 
have had different changes in their caseloads than nonwaiver states even in the 
absence of adopting a waiver. For example, Appendix Table 1, which reports 
caseloads for waiver and nonwaiver states, shows that waiver states had higher 
caseloads. If those caseloads were higher in the pre-waiver period, then they may 
have declined even in the absence of waivers. We will not address these types of 
specification issues but will maintain the CEA model throughout.
8. As noted in a prior footnote, all data are in fiscal year form, so the 1996 data end 
in September 1996. Thus, the amount of actual overlap is trivial.
9. See Moffitt (1996) for a discussion of entry effects in the context of education and 
training programs for welfare recipients.
10. To be precise, these models appear in columns 3-6 of Table 2, in Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997).
11. The Table 1 regressions do not use state population weights, unlike those in the 
CEA report. However, this difference is responsible for only a small portion of 
the difference in results. Estimates using population weights and the years 1976- 
1996 exactly replicate the results in Table 2 of the CEA report.
12. A specification was also estimated which replaced the waiver dummy by dummy 
variables for the number of years since the waiver was approved in order to test 
whether the effects were growing, declining, or constant. The coefficients 
revealed a growing effect (i.e., a more negative coefficient) with each passing 
year.
13. The coefficients on the lead variables are open to multiple interpretation. One 
interpretation, that preferred by the CEA report, interprets the coefficients as rep 
resenting advance, or anticipatory, behavior on the part of the states, given the 
publicity surrounding the submission of waiver requests to the federal govern 
ment. An alternative interpretation is that the coefficients of the lead variables are 
measuring endogenous policy responses, with causality running from a declining 
caseload to a later waiver introduction. The latter interpretation is the basis, in 
fact, for econometric tests for unobserved heterogeneity in panel data which use 
the inclusion of a future value of the dependent variable as a regressor. On the 
assumption that future variables cannot be true causal influences on contempora 
neous outcomes, the coefficients can be interpreted as measuring persistent unob 
served individual effects. See Heckman (1981) and Heckman and Borjas (1980). 
Without further analysis, these and other interpretations cannot be distinguished.
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14. The lead variables also present a special problem if the year 1996 is included 
because in that case their use requires an assumption of what would have hap 
pened in 1997 had PRWORA not passed. The CEA report coded the lead vari 
ables in 1996 as equal to their 1996 values, under the assumption that states did 
not expect further waiver activity in 1997. Excluding 1996 allows us to avoid 
having to make an assumption about expectations in that year.
15. The CEA report (Table 2) also included two simpler specifications, one without 
the lagged unemployment rate and one without state x trend variables. Estimation 
of those models on the 1977-1995 data also show, as in the CEA report, signifi 
cant effects of the any-waiver variable.
16. It could be argued that an even more precise population on which to measure 
AFDC receipt is the population of female heads of family. However, there is 
some evidence that female headship itself responds to AFDC policy. Therefore, 
as a conservative strategy to avoid missing some of the policy effects, we examine 
only women as a whole.
17. Appendix Table 1 shows the means of the CPS participation rates. The sample 
sizes in the CPS are an issue whenever the data are used for state-level analysis. 
The minimum number of observations for any state (averaged over the number of 
observations in each of the 1977-1995 years for that state) is 387. The average is 
847. These samples are adequate for the state-level analysis reported in Table 1.
18. Using WLS with weights of this kind is an application of the weighted maximum 
likelihood methods developed in choice-based sampling, most particularly that of 
Manski and Lerman (1977). The Manski-Lerman estimator was developed for a 
case in which a binary outcome equation is to be estimated (e.g., transportation 
mode choice, denoted as y) where the data are composed of two samples, one 
composed of individuals with y = 1 and one composed of individuals with y = 0, 
but not from a random sample and hence not in correct population proportions. 
Manski and Lerman showed that reweighting the sample to blow it up to popula 
tion proportions results in consistent estimates of the coefficients. For studies 
from a related literature, that concerning the use of aggregate totals and outside 
data in microdata equation estimation, see Imbens and Lancaster (1994) and 
Imbens and Hellerstein (1999).
19. These results are somewhat sensitive to the treatment of the retrospective nature 
of the CPS welfare receipt questions, which ask the respondent for such informa 
tion for the pnor calendar year. The CEA data pertain to the fiscal year, so it is not 
possible to align the CPS data to the CEA time frame. The results shown in Table 
1 align the CEA fiscal year with the year of the March survey date; the results are, 
for reasons we cannot discern, weaker when the CEA fiscal year is aligned with 
the CPS year pnor to the March survey date.
20. Thus, the analysis here still uses grouped data, even if using 16 times as many 
groups as used in the aggregate state-level analysis. It may be reasonably asked if 
it would not be preferable to use the individual micro data rather than the means 
of the 16 cells in each state and year. The answer is that a micro regression with 
16 dummies for the age-education cells would have no advantage over using the
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group means of those 16 cells except for efficiency. Efficiency gains could be had 
because the standard errors of the means could be used in the estimation. Of 
course, the use of variables in addition to age and education could result in a more 
meaningful extension of what we have done here, but that extension could also be 
conducted either with group means over more variables, or at the micro data level. 
In the limit, if every micro observation has a unique set of regressors, a microdata 
regression is equivalent to a grouped regression because each individual repre 
sents a single "group."
21. Small cell sizes are not a problem if the waiver variable is kept at the state level 
and not interacted with age and education. In that case, using age-education 
means instead of aggregate state means can only increase efficiency. However, 
when the waiver effect is allowed to be different for some of the 16 cells, as it will 
be here, these effects will be less precisely estimated than the average effect at the 
state aggregate level because the effective sample size going into each waiver 
coefficient is smaller. The average cell size taken over the 51 states at this disag 
gregated level is 55 and ranges from 1 to 564. We will continue to reduce these 
efficiency losses by weighting the observations by the state-level administrative 
weights, however.
22. Zeros are included for all the variables.
23. On the other hand, the waiver coefficients for the four education categories are not 
statistically significant from one another because the standard errors are relatively 
large. It should also be noted that the coefficients in these regressions on the vari 
ables which interact 1) education level and the unemployment rate and 2) educa 
tion level and year dummies are significant and are needed as controls, for the 
waiver coefficients change when they are not included (not shown in Table 2). 
The unemployment effects are consistently less negative for more educated 
women, for example.
24. These and all other dollar figures in the paper are in real 1992 dollars.
25. It is worth emphasizing that these estimates are based upon cross-state variation in 
unemployment changes. Since unemployment rates change quite differently from 
state to state, there is considerable variation in the data even in periods when the 
overall unemployment rate is not changing very much.
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a Standard errors in parentheses. Sample consists of all women aged 16-54.
b "Early waiver states" are those with waivers in 1992 or 1993; "late waiver states" are
those with waivers in 1994 or 1995; and "no waiver states" are those which never had
a waiver approved by the end of 1995. 
c This variable is taken from the administrative data rather than the CPS. Included for
comparison with CPS participation rate.
Examining the Effect of Industry 




W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Welfare caseloads have dropped dramatically in recent years, 
prompting many policymakers to declare an end to welfare as we have 
known it. The recent decline in caseloads has occurred concurrently 
with two distinct events. First, most states have restructured their wel 
fare programs to place greater emphasis on getting welfare recipients 
into jobs. Second, the economy has exhibited strong employment 
growth with historically low unemployment rates throughout this 
period, providing unprecedented opportunities for welfare recipients to 
find employment. Determining the relative importance of these two 
effects in explaining past changes in welfare caseloads is essential in 
assessing future caseload trends.
Two recent studies, one by the Council of Economic Advisers 
(1997) and the other by Ziliak et al. (1997), have found that economic 
conditions dominate in explaining caseload reductions, but they differ 
widely in the estimated size of the effect. The Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) attributes 40 percent of caseload decline to economic 
conditions measured by unemployment rates, whereas Ziliak et al. 
attribute 78 percent to such conditions. With economic conditions 
accounting for a substantial portion of the downward trend in welfare 
caseloads, the question confronting many policymakers is what might 
happen to the number of welfare cases when the inevitable downturn in 
the economy occurs. This question has far-reaching ramifications not 
only for those who turn to welfare programs for income support, but 
also for the financing of state and federal welfare programs, for the 
funding of other programs that have benefitted from the reduction in 
welfare expenditures, and for the remaining income maintenance pro 
grams such as unemployment insurance and disability insurance.
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Several studies have addressed the effect of business cycles on 
welfare caseloads. The approaches taken by these studies range from 
national time-series analyses to state-level pooled cross-section, time- 
series studies. Some micro-level studies of individual welfare recipi 
ents, while not directly addressing the effect of business cycles on 
caseloads, are pertinent to this issue as well. Our proposed study 
relates most closely to four recent analyses of the effect of economic 
conditions on welfare caseloads by Blank (1997), Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997), and the Lewin Group 
(1997). The Lewin Group study is representative of the general meth 
odology employed to estimate this relationship and to simulate the 
effects of various scenarios of business cycle trends on caseloads. Spe 
cifically, they regress the number of cases (and other measures of pro 
gram participation) on demographic, programmatic, and economic 
variables. By using pooled cross-section, time-series data, they control 
more fully for state and time effects than is possible with only time- 
series data or cross-sectional data. They find that changes in the unem 
ployment rate have substantial effects on program participation and 
that these effects are more persistent than previously found.
Although these studies show the relationship between welfare 
caseloads and economic conditions, models such as these, which use 
unemployment rates as the only measure of economic conditions, have 
been unable to explain the dramatic reduction in caseloads in recent 
years. Nor has this genre of models been able to explain the large run 
up in caseloads during the latter part of the 1980s, when the economic 
conditions were quite robust.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the current models to include 
additional measures of labor market conditions that may affect the 
variation in welfare caseloads. We believe the unemployment rate by 
itself may be a woefully incomplete measure of economic conditions 
affecting potential welfare recipients. The measures we develop are 
intended to reflect the availability of attractive jobs to welfare recipi 
ents. The paper is exploratory, in that the variables we develop have 
not previously been used to model welfare caseloads. Some of these 
variables have been used in the regional economics literature, but not 
as much in labor economics; others are newly developed for this paper. 
These variables are all meant to measure aspects of the structure of 
local labor demand that might affect welfare recipients, and all can rea-
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sonably be viewed as exogenous to the welfare caseload and to the 
labor supply behavior of potential welfare recipients. For example, we 
eschew variables that simply measure the economic status of potential 
welfare recipients, such as the unemployment rate of female household 
heads with lower levels of education. The economic status of potential 
welfare recipients is clearly endogenous (in that it will be determined 
by unobserved welfare policies that affect welfare caseloads), and the 
economic status of potential welfare recipients is clearly affected by 
labor supply behavior as much as labor demand. Our focus is on labor 
demand factors affecting welfare caseloads. 1
In one set of models, we attempt to explain welfare caseloads at 
the state level by not only unemployment, but also state employment 
growth and three measures of the industrial mix of the state. State 
employment growth has been shown in the regional economics litera 
ture to have powerful effects on labor market outcomes, particularly 
for less-skilled groups (Bartik 1991, 1996; Blanchard and Katz 1992). 
Local employment growth may also affect exit rates from welfare 
(Hoynes 1997). One of the industrial mix measures, the average wage 
premium implied by the area's industry mix, has also been found in the 
regional economics literature to affect labor market outcomes (Bartik 
1993a, 1996). Finally, we include two other industrial-mix measures, 
one that measures the extent to which the state's industries are likely to 
hire only those with high school degrees, and the other measuring how 
likely the state's industries are to hire welfare recipients. These mea 
sures are new, but they have some logical relationship to whether wel 
fare recipients are likely to find jobs.
In another set of models, at the metropolitan level, we go beyond 
net employment growth to examine how welfare caseloads are related 
to gross job flows. Studies such as Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) have 
shown that the gross flows of employment change capture the dynam 
ics of labor markets better than aggregate measures (such as net 
employment change or unemployment rates). It may be the case that 
welfare recipients in labor markets with high job turnover have a diffi 
cult time finding and retaining jobs. Using a unique data set that con 
tains estimates of the components of employment change at the 
metropolitan level, we examine the effects of gross job flows and its 
components on welfare caseloads for metropolitan areas during the 
early 1990s.
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Our finding from both sets of models is that welfare caseloads are 
explained not only by unemployment but also by many other aspects of 
the structure of local labor demand. At the national level, we are able 
to explain the run-up in caseloads during the later 1980s as largely due 
to decreasing demand for less-skilled workers. On the other hand, the 
recent reductions in welfare caseloads cannot be explained by our 
labor-demand indicators and are most plausibly explained by a variety 
of welfare policies; this supports previous results using unemployment 
only. However, with an expanded set of labor-demand indicators, the 
conclusion that welfare reform policies are lowering caseloads is 
strengthened. For prediction purposes, our results suggest an expanded 
set of economic variables that might improve prediction, whether at a 
national, state, or local level. Our results also suggest some policies 
that might help to lower welfare caseloads, including measures to 
reduce the extent of job destruction or job instability in the labor mar 
ket and measures to improve the educational credentials of welfare 
recipients.
EXTENSION OF STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES
Most studies, including those of Blank (1997), Council of Eco 
nomic Advisers (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997), and the Lewin Group 
(1997), use the total unemployment rate (TUR) to characterize labor 
market conditions. The TUR is intended to reflect the job vacancies for 
low-skilled workers. However, the TUR has been a poor predictor of 
the number of cases during certain time periods. Consider Michigan's 
experience. If the TUR accurately reflected the job opportunities for 
low-skilled workers, one would have expected the rapid rundown in the 
state's total unemployment rate during the 1980s to be accompanied by 
a significant decline in AFDC cases. As illustrated in Figure 1, the 
caseloads remained stubbornly high during this period. Only after 
Michigan's AFDC waiver went into effect (August 1992) did the num 
ber of cases start to follow the decline in the unemployment rate, which 
had already been falling for two years prior to the waiver.
As shown in Table 1, a simple model (Model A) of the monthly 
change in the logarithm of cases regressed on unemployment rates of 
various lags shows that the unemployment rate does little to explain the 
differences in caseloads. However, a dummy variable denoting the
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Figure 1 Michigan's AFDC Caseload and Unemployment Rate, 1980-98
300
Time (months)
month in which Michigan was granted a waiver is statistically signifi 
cant as related to AFDC caseloads. The waiver affects the intercept of 
the regression but does not affect the slope at any of the lags (Model 
B). This brief exercise is presented only to illustrate that, at least for 
the state of Michigan, additional macroeconomic variables must be 
introduced in order to explain caseload reduction.
Model Specification: Additional Variables
Reflecting Job Opportunities for Low-Skilled Workers
We add to the typical welfare model, estimated using pooled data 
on states, several variables that will more fully reflect the labor demand 
conditions facing potential welfare recipients. Our first labor-demand 
variable is the employment growth rate of the state. A higher state 
employment growth rate presumably implies more job vacancies, as 
well as fewer jobs being lost through business closings and contrac 
tions. It is arguable that job vacancies and job loss may be at least as 
important in determining welfare caseload growth as the percentage of 
the labor force that happens to be unemployed at a point in time.
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Table 1 Estimates of the Effect of Unemployment Rates on AFDC 
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Source: State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, Family Independence
Agency, selected years.
a *** _ statistical significance at the 0.01 confidence level. 
* = statistical significance at the 0.10 confidence level.
In regional economics research, local employment growth has fre 
quently been used to explain labor market outcomes of individuals in 
local labor markets (Bartik 1991; Blanchard and Katz 1992). This 
research suggests that local employment growth can plausibly be 
viewed as exogenous shocks to local labor demand in the short run and 
medium run, based on using instrumental variables that attempt to 
measure shifts in national demand for an area's export industries. 2
The second local labor-demand variable we add is the average 
wage premium implied by the area's industrial mix. We use the wage 
premiums estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988) for each of 40
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industries at the national level. The wage premium represents esti 
mated industry effects from regressing wages (including fringe bene 
fits) on worker characteristics, occupation dummies, and dummies for 
each industry. The resulting industry effects reflect the level of com 
pensation that a worker in a specific industry receives that is different 
from what the market would dictate based on personal characteristics, 
including education and experience. 3 These industry wage premiums, 
which do not vary over time, are multiplied for each state/year by the 
proportion of employment in each SIC two-digit industry, and this 
product is then summed over all industries for that state/year cell to get 
the "average wage premium" variable that we use. Although the esti 
mated wage premiums are taken from a particular year, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) suggest that these pre 
miums are remarkably stable over time. If the wage premium entices 
welfare recipients into the labor force by exceeding their reservation 
wage, then states with higher wage premiums would be expected to 
have fewer welfare cases per capita. On the other hand, if a higher 
wage premium entices more higher-skilled workers into the labor force 
as well, and employers use these premiums to be more selective about 
hiring and retaining workers, then the premium might damage job 
prospects for lower-skilled workers and thus increase welfare cases.
The average wage premium (or similar variables measuring 
whether an area has a high proportion of "good" jobs) has frequently 
been used to explain labor market outcomes in regional economics 
research. A number of studies have used the percentage of employ 
ment in manufacturing (or some set of manufacturing industries) to 
explain local labor market outcomes (Borjas and Ramey 1994; Bound 
and Holzer 1993; Juhn 1994; Karoly and Klerman 1994). Research by 
Bartik (1996) suggested that the average wage premium variable domi 
nates manufacturing-related variables in explaining labor market out 
comes. All these studies show significant effects of some aspect of job 
quality on local labor market outcomes. Most of the studies suggest 
that local job quality has progressive effects, for example, helping less- 
educated workers more than more-educated workers (Borjas and 
Ramey 1994; Bartik 1993a, Bound and Holzer 1993), and blacks more 
than whites (Bound and Holzer 1993; Bartik 1993a). However, Bartik 
(1996) found that the wage premium variable tends to help more mid 
dle-income groups rather than low- or high-income groups. Several
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studies have found that the wage premium or other local job-quality 
variables tend to affect labor market outcomes for women as much as 
for men (Karoly and Klerman 1994; Bartik 1993a, 1996), which sug 
gests that these variables will be relevant to welfare caseloads.
The other two measures of local labor demand are also based on 
the mix of industries in the state. Specifically, we include one variable 
measuring the educational requirements implied by the state's industry 
mix; the other variable is the percentage of welfare recipients 
employed implied by the state's industry mix. These two industry-mix 
variables do not have extensive previous use in research, but they do 
seem logically related to labor demand for potential welfare recipients.
For the educational requirements variable, we calculated—for the 
nation as a whole and for each year separately—the percentage of 
employees in each two-digit industry that were high school graduates, 
using data from the March CPS from March 1983 to March 1997. 
These data were then combined with data from each state and year on 
the proportion of employment in each two-digit industry in order to 
calculate a variable measuring the proportion of employees in each 
state/year cell that would be high school graduates if each industry 
hired in a pattern similar to that of its national counterpart for that year. 
We regard this variable as a rough measure of the extent to which a 
state's demand is skewed by industrial composition toward more 
highly educated workers. This variable for a state will increase relative 
to that for other states if the state's industrial composition becomes 
more concentrated than the national average in industries that have a 
high percentage of employees with a high school education. Because 
the characteristics of industries for this variable are measured sepa 
rately for each year, this variable will also increase relative to that of 
other states if a state's industrial mix stays the same, but that mix hap 
pens to show a greater-than-average gain in percentage of employees 
with a high school education. The hypothesis is that welfare recipients 
may qualify for fewer jobs in states that have a higher-than-average 
concentration of jobs requiring high school degrees. As a result, we 
would expect this variable to be positively correlated with caseloads.
The second variable was measured in a similar manner: the per 
centage of welfare recipients employed in each two-digit industry at 
the national level was calculated using March CPS data, but for this 
variable we used only March 1996 data to define industry characteris-
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tics for all years. As will be seen later, we want to determine if our 
variables can explain recent national trends in caseloads, and we do not 
want them to be spuriously correlated with national trends in welfare 
caseloads. The March 1996 percentage employed who are welfare 
recipients in each industry was multiplied times the state's proportion 
of employment in that year in each respective two-digit industry to cre 
ate a weighted variable for each state/year cell. This weighted variable 
tells us what proportion of employees would be welfare recipients in 
each state/year cell if each industry in that state and year had employed 
welfare recipients in the same proportion that its national counterpart 
did in 1996. Our first intuition was that this variable should be nega 
tively correlated with caseloads, because one might expect that states 
whose industries tend to employ welfare recipients would be easier 
labor markets for welfare recipients to obtain jobs in. A second expla 
nation, and one that comports with the results, is that industries that 
hire a great many welfare recipients may also be the same industries 
with high turnover rates and other characteristics that create more wel 
fare recipients, thus increasing welfare caseloads.
One obvious alternative to our industry-mix variables is simply 
including variables for the proportion of state employment in each of 
the two-digit industries used in constructing these industry-mix mea 
sures. We rejected this alternative because of our expectation, based on 
previous research projects, that such estimation would lead to hopeless 
problems with multicollinearity.4 Even if multicollinearity were not a 
problem, there would be some serious problems with trying to interpret 
the large numbers of resulting coefficients on individual industries. 
Using these industry-mix variables at least provides a manageable 
number of coefficients and some idea about what the underlying vari 
ables are measuring.
Descriptive Statistics
To get a better sense of the nature of these local labor-demand vari 
ables, we report a variety of descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports, for 
each of the three industry-mix variables, the "top six" and "bottom six" 
industries in the calculations used to generate these indices. The pat 
tern is what one would expect. The education variable tends to be high 
for various white-collar-dominated industries and low for various low-
Table 2 Top and Bottom Six Industries for the Three Industry-Mix Variables3 (%)
High- school-graduates variable
Top six industries:








Lumber and wood products
Textile mill products
Leather and leather products
Agriculture
















Leather and leather products
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Social services
Personal services, excluding 
private household services
Retail trade

























Retail trade, other than eating and 
drinking places
Personal services, excluding 
private household services
Education services















1 The high-school-graduates variable is the percentage of the industry's employees with a high school degree as of 1996 (taken from the 
March 1997 CPS). The welfare-recipient vanable is the percentage of the industry's employees who also received welfare the previous 
year (taken from the March 1996 CPS). The wage-premium number for each industry is actually 100 times the differential of each 
industry from the all-industry average for In(wage).
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skill manufacturing and service industries and agriculture. The wel 
fare-employment variable is high for various service-oriented indus 
tries and lower-skill manufacturing. The wage-premium variables are 
high for some high-wage manufacturing and other heavy industries, as 
well as more unionized industries, and lower for service-oriented 
industries.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for all five of 
the local-labor-demand variables. Because the eventual estimation 
includes a complete set of state and year dummies, it is the variation in 
these variables after controlling for unobserved state and year effects 
that is really crucial. Therefore, we also report the standard deviation 
of the residuals from regressing these variables on a set of state and 
year dummies. As the table shows, the standard deviations of the three 
industry-mix variables are dramatically reduced after controlling for 
state and year effects, meaning that these variables show some pro 
nounced national time trends and persistent patterns of variation across 
states.
Table 4 presents the correlation of the five labor-demand variables, 
again after controlling for state and year effects. Although many of the 
correlations are statistically significant and of moderately large size, 
considerable independent variation in these five variables remains. For 
example, the largest absolute value of any correlation in the table is 
0.554. The R2 in regressing a variable on another variable will be the 
square of its correlation. Hence, the largest amount of variance that 
one variable explains of another is (0.554)2 , or 0.307, less than one- 
third.
The pattern of correlations is as one might expect. Employment 
growth and unemployment are strongly negatively correlated, although 
considerable independent variation remains; i.e., there are states in 
which unemployment remains low even though employment growth 
declines. The welfare variable is negatively correlated, as one would 
expect, with the high-school-graduates variable and the wage-premium 
variable. States that have an increasing proportion of industries that 
employ welfare recipients also tend to have an increasing proportion of 
industries that pay poorly and have lower educational requirements. 
However, the variables are not close to perfectly correlated. Finally, 
the wage-premium variable is positively correlated with employment 
growth and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. This is
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' All means and standard deviations are weighted by the 1996 population of the state. 
Means and standard deviations are calculated based on data for 51 states (including 
D.C.) and 15 years (1982-96). The adjusted standard deviation is the weighted stan 
dard deviation of the residual from a preliminary regression of the variable on year 
and state dummies. This preliminary regression was also weighted.






































a These are weighted correlations using 1996 population weights for all states. Corre 
lations are for residuals from weighted regression of each of five variables on year 
and state dummies. Underlying observations are for 51 states (including D.C.) and 15 
years (1982-96). The number in parentheses is the probability of correlation of this 
size occurring by chance if the true correlation was zero.
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consistent with previous research that found, using causality tests, that 
trends in employment growth and the wage-premium variable at the 
local level tend to mutually cause each other (Bartik 1993a). This pat 
tern of mutual causation is sensible. A state which gains higher-wage 
industries will tend to experience some growth in labor demand from 
higher personal income. A state which experiences tightening labor 
markets may find it easier to attract higher-wage-premium industries, 
which may be less sensitive to the wage rate paid for labor.
Table 5 explores the spatial pattern of these local demand vari 
ables, showing, for 1996, the six states with the highest and lowest val 
ues of each. Unemployment tends to be low in rural states but high in a 
diverse group of states having probably quite diverse economic prob 
lems. Employment growth tends to be high in some western and south 
ern states, and low in the diverse group. The spatial pattern of these 
two variables is far from perfectly matched; for example, California 
was fourth in unemployment in 1996 even though it was twelfth in 
employment growth. The high-school-graduates variable tends to be 
high in northeastern states with many white-collar industries and low 
in southern and western states. The wage-premium variable is high in 
heavily unionized, manufacturing-dominated states and low in states 
with a great deal of retail trade and service businesses. The welfare 
variable varies high and low in a diverse collection of states that are 
difficult to generalize about.
Figure 2 shows the national time trends in these labor-demand 
variables. The unemployment rate and employment growth (Fig. 2A) 
have the pattern one would expect, with employment growth trends 
seeming to lead unemployment rate trends slightly. The three industry- 
mix variables (Figs. 2B-D) show pronounced national time trends. 
The wage-premium variable has dramatically declined over time as 
higher-paying manufacturing industries have declined. The high- 
school-graduate variable has increased as the proportion of educated 
workers employed has increased in many industries. The welfare- 
employment variable has increased as service-oriented industries have 
increased. Some additional work (not reported here) shows that the 
increase in the high-school-graduate variable is totally due to changes 
in the educational composition of individual industries and not to 
changes in industry mix in favor of higher-education industries. If the


















































































































































1 The wage-premium variable is 100 x (In wage differential) for state predicted by its industrial mix. This number is negative for all states 
in 1996 because the original wage premiums were calculated so that weighted national average was zero in 1984, and the industry mix 
has shifted towards lower-wage industries since then.
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Figure 2 National Time Trends in Five Labor Demand Variables
11 - •Unemployment rate
• Employment growth
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Note: All national averages are calculated using 1996 population weighted for each 
state. The three industry mix variables all predict a particular vanable based on mix 
of industries and some industry characteristic.
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same industry variables are used for all years in calculating the high- 
school-graduate variable, the national time line is flat.
RESULTS
Our models are extensions of those used by Blank (1997) and the 
Council of Economic Advisers (1997). The data used are pooled time- 
series, cross-section data at the annual level for all 50 states (plus the 
District of Columbia), for 1984 to 1996. The dependent variable in our 
preferred models is the natural logarithm of AFDC cases per capita in 
each state/year cell. All regressions include a complete set of dummy 
variables for states and years in order to control for unobserved fixed 
state characteristics and for unobserved national trends that might 
affect caseloads. 5 The specifications include various combinations of 
the five economic characteristics discussed above. In addition, the pre 
ferred specifications include the logarithm of the AFDC benefit level 
and whether or not the state has by that year received a waiver for wel 
fare experimentation from the federal government. 6 The specifications 
differ in the dynamic specification describing the time pattern by 
which state economic characteristics affect welfare caseloads.
We began by estimating specifications that matched, as closely as 
possible given our data, the empirical models used by the CEA, Blank, 
and some of the annual models used by Ziliak et al. (These results are 
not fully reported here, but are available upon request.) Specifically, 
we tried to match the specifications used by the CEA (their Table 2, 
column 1), Blank (her Table 2, column 1), and Ziliak et al. (their Table 
4, column 4). For Blank's model, this involved switching the denomi 
nator of the dependent variable from total state population to the num 
ber of female household heads, with other relatives present, ages 16- 
44, with less than 16 years of education. It turns out that the choice of 
denominators does not significantly affect the coefficients on the eco 
nomic variables that we focus on, so the remainder of this paper con 
tinues to focus on welfare caseloads per capita. In general, we were 
able to replicate their results fairly closely for the economic variable 
we have in common—the unemployment rate—despite some inevita 
ble differences in the precise data used.
Our detailed presentation stresses three models. The first model 
(Table 6, Model I) is similar to those of the CEA and of Blank in sim-
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ply having the level of the ln(caseloads per capita) as a dependent vari 
able, without allowing for any lagged effects of caseloads. All five 
economic characteristics are included. In deciding on an optimal lag 
structure, we first tested from zero to two lags in unemployment in a 
model with only unemployment as a state economic characteristic. 
The optimal lag length in unemployment was then chosen based on the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We then added employment 
growth to this optimal model and tested from zero to two lags in 
employment growth, choosing the optimal lag length in employment 
growth based on the AIC. Finally, we added the three industry-mix 
variables to the regressors and tested the optimal lag length (from zero 
to two lags) using the AIC while restricting these three variables to the 
same lag length. We include lags in all the local-labor-demand vari 
ables to allow for the possibility that wages, labor force participation 
rates, and other labor market outcomes that affect welfare caseloads 
will take some time to respond to labor demand shocks, and that this 
response may change over time as the local labor market adjusts. 7
Our second model adds the lagged level of the ln(caseloads per 
capita) as a regressor, inspired by Ziliak et al.'s findings that state wel 
fare caseloads appear to be quite persistent from year to year. We also 
find great persistence, with a coefficient on the lagged dependent vari 
able of 0.913 (standard error = 0.014; see Table 6, Model II). This sec 
ond model uses the same sequential testing procedure to separately 
determine the optimal lag length for each of the economic-characteris 
tics variables.
Finally, our third model drops the lagged dependent variable and 
uses the change in the ln(caseloads per capita) as a dependent variable. 
As noted by Ziliak et ah, the coefficient close to 1 on the lagged case 
load-dependent variable suggests the possibility that the caseload vari 
able is nonstationary. Research by Nickell (1981) suggested that 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in panels with short time 
series and fixed cross-sectional effects may be biased towards zero, so 
it is possible that the true coefficient on the lagged caseload variable is 
1. Again, the optimal lag length for the economic-characteristics vari 
ables in this "changes" model is determined by sequential testing of 
various lag lengths. Despite the possibility that the caseload variable is 
nonstationary, we regard this possibility as theoretically implausible, 
because it implies that caseloads per capita are a random walk, with any
138 Bartik and Eberts









Log of maximum 
AFDC benefit





























































































































































Significance level: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
a Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions use pooled time-series cross-sec 
tion data of observations on state/year cells, with data on the dependent variable for 
all years from 1984 to 1996 (because of the two lags in some vanables, data for 1982 
and 1983 are also used), and for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. All regres 
sions are weighted by 1996 values for state population. All regressions, in addition to 
including vanables for which coefficients are reported in the table, include complete 
sets of state dummies and year dummies to control for unobserved state or national 
influences on welfare receipt rates. F-tests reveal that for each group of current and 
lagged variables for a particular state economic climate variable (e.g., unemploy 
ment), the group is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all cases except the 
unemployment vanable for Model III and the welfare vanable for Model III.
b Change in log of employment.
c Percentage of employees that would be high school graduates based on industry mix. 
Calculated as differential of average In(wage) based on industry mix
e Percentage of employees that would be welfare recipients based on industry mix.
random factor that happens to push caseloads up or down persisting 
indefinitely into the future. It seems more plausible that caseloads are 
merely highly sluggish in adjusting to shocks and that the true coeffi 
cient on lagged coefficients is less than 1. Hence, we regard model II 
as the most intuitively plausible of the three models.
We wish to note several features of these models that already are 
apparent in this Table 6. First, it is clear that much more than unem 
ployment in a state's economic environment matters to caseloads. 
Employment growth and the three industrial-mix variables also appear 
to be highly statistically significant in explaining state caseloads, and 
this occurs holding constant any fixed state characteristics and national
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trends. Second, lags matter a great deal in explaining caseloads, with 
the lagged value of state economic characteristics in many cases mat 
tering more than current characteristics. Third, in the case of employ 
ment growth, controlling for lagged caseloads makes a major 
difference in the estimated effects of this variable. Without such con 
trol, employment growth is estimated to have positive effects on case 
loads, whereas controlling for lagged caseloads, employment growth 
has negative effects. One explanation for this pattern of results is that 
states which in the past have had recessions and employment declines, 
and as a result have had high caseloads, may tend on average to have 
higher employment growth as they recover from the downturn. The 
omission of lagged caseloads may bias the coefficient on employment 
growth because higher employment growth may proxy for poor growth 
and high caseloads in the past, and past caseloads tend to persist.
Table 7 shows simulations of the effects of state economic vari 
ables, reporting the estimated effects of a 1 percent change in the eco 
nomic variable four years after the shock, which helps make the effects 
more comparable between the static and the more dynamic specifica 
tions. The standard deviations shown in the column heads are those for 
each variable after controlling for state and year effects, that is, the 
standard deviation of the residual from regressing that state's economic 
characteristics on state and year dummies. This number gives some 
sense of how much each economic variable varies independently over 
time for different states. Both unemployment and employment growth 
show a similar percentage variation, while the high-school-graduate 
and wage-premium variables vary only one-fifth as much, and the wel 
fare variable varies one-hundredth as much.
In addition to reporting results for the state economic characteris 
tics in our models I, II, and III, we report effects of unemployment in 
identical models that only include unemployment as a state economic 
characteristic. We also report effects of unemployment in three models 
similar to those estimated by the CEA (1997), Blank (1997), and Ziliak 
et al. (1997). The CEA model mainly differs from our Model I with 
just unemployment in not including lags in the unemployment rate. 
The Blank model mainly differs in having a different dependent vari 
able, the logarithm of caseloads per female-headed household with rel 
atives present. The Ziliak model uses as a dependent variable the 
"change" in ln(caseloads per capita), as in our model III, but also first
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differences all the other right-side variables, including the unemploy 
ment rate.
The simulation results in Table 7 also show a great sensitivity to 
the exact dynamic specification. For example, the effects of employ 
ment growth and the state economic characteristics vary greatly from 
Model I through Model III. Even if only the unemployment rate is 
included, the exact dynamics of the specification make a great deal of 
difference. Including lagged unemployment rates increases the esti 
mated effects of unemployment on caseloads, as is evident from com 
paring a CEA-type model (no lags in unemployment) to Model I with 
unemployment only. In addition, the Ziliak type of model, which first- 
differences all variables, shows a very small effect of unemployment, 
perhaps because in this model all effects of unemployment must occur 
immediately and the changes in the unemployment rate variable on the 
right side cannot proxy for past lags in the level of unemployment.
In our preferred model (Model II), the effects of unemployment are 
considerably reduced (by more than half) when one adds employment 
growth and the three industrial-mix effects to the specification. A per 
manent shock to employment growth of 1 percent has effects similar to 
a permanent shock to the unemployment rate of 1 percent, and the vari 
ation in these variables over time and states is fairly similar. A one- 
standard-deviation change in the high school graduates variable or in 
the welfare recipient variable also yields roughly similar effects in 
magnitude to the employment-growth or unemployment-rate effects, 
while the effects of the wage premium are considerably smaller and are 
statistically insignificant. The point estimates suggest, as one would 
expect, that faster employment growth lowers welfare rolls. A shift in 
industrial mix toward industries that tend to employ high school gradu 
ates increases welfare rolls, while the point estimates suggest that an 
increase in high-wage-premium industries in an area tends to reduce 
welfare rolls. These effects are as expected.
A surprising finding is that a shift in the industrial mix toward 
industries that tend to employ welfare recipients is estimated to 
increase welfare rolls. This finding appears to be somewhat sensitive 
to the specification. As mentioned above, perhaps this finding can be 
explained if industries that employ welfare recipients are also those 
that tend to have less-stable jobs, which might contribute to increasing 
welfare rolls. Welfare rolls might function as a type of substitute for





Model I w/only 
unemployment
Model II w/only 
unemployment



































































a Numbers in parentheses are pseudo ^-statistics, equal to mean effect divided by standard deviation from 1000 Monte Carlo repetition of 
simulation. All estimates report effect on ln(caseloads per capita) after four years of a 1% increase in the variable in that column. The 
estimated standard deviation of the residual, in percentage terms, after regressing the variable on a set of year dummies and state dum 
mies is reported below that variable at the top of columns. Models I, II and HI with just unemployment are identical to their original 
counterparts but drop other four state economic characteristic variables. For both the Blank and Ziliak models, original estimates in the 
author's paper are reported in brackets below the estimates we obtained with a similar (but not identical) model. For example, Blank's 
model includes many more control variables than we included in Blank-style model, which may explain why she found slightly lower 
effects of unemployment.
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unemployment insurance for some of these industries. We explore the 
effect of gross job flows on welfare caseloads in the next section.
A key policy issue is the effects of national or local recessions on 
welfare caseloads. Because our preferred specification, with other 
local-labor-demand variables, estimates a smaller coefficient on unem 
ployment, does our preferred specification imply that a recession with 
high unemployment has less effect than is believed by other research 
ers? Our answer is that the effect of a recession depends upon whether 
increases in unemployment are accompanied by similar changes in 
other local-demand variables, as have typically occurred in the past. 
One could argue that the specifications with only unemployment as a 
local-demand variable already show the effects of unemployment, with 
other local-labor-demand variables allowed to endogenously adjust 
along with unemployment in whatever pattern of correlation has char 
acterized their past joint behavior. In other words, one could view the 
specifications with only unemployment as a local-demand variable as a 
"reduced form" of the fuller specification.
To explore this point further, we estimated several auxiliary regres 
sions in which each of the four labor-demand variables (other than 
unemployment) are regressed on unemployment and a complete set of 
state and year dummies. These auxiliary regressions are used, along 
with the specification with five labor-demand variables and a lagged 
dependent variable that we call "Full Model II," to simulate the effect 
on welfare caseloads after four years of a one-point rise in the unem 
ployment rate. As can be seen in Table 8, the effects of unemployment 
in this multiequation simulation approximate that of Model II with 
only unemployment included. We then experiment with dropping each 
one of the four auxiliary regressions, one at a time, from the multi- 
equation simulation. Dropping an auxiliary regression from the simu 
lation implies that we are holding that variable constant (not allowing it 
to change as it does on average when unemployment goes up). As the 
table makes clear, it is largely the employment growth variable that is 
generating the smaller coefficient on unemployment in Full Model II.
Therefore, the correct answer to the effects of unemployment on 
caseloads is that the results of previous authors are fine as long as 
employment growth increases (as it has in the past) when unemploy 
ment goes up. However, if the nation's (or a state's) unemployment 
were to go up without the usual slowing of employment growth, then
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Table 8 Simulated Effects of a 1% Increase in
Unemployment on ln(caseload per capita)8
Effect on 
Model ln(caseload per capita)
Full Model II (from Table 7) 0.0337
(3.73)
Model II with only unemployment 0.0793 
(from Table 7) (13.95)
Full Model II, with auxiliary regressions 0.0649
(10.02)
Employment growth held constant 0.0424
(4.52)
High school graduates held constant 0 0618
(9.78)
Wage premium held constant 0.0601
(8.15)
Welfare recipients held constant 0.0637 
____________________________(10.01)______
a Numbers in parentheses are pseudo f-statistics from 1000 Monte 
Carlo repetitions of simulations. There are four auxiliary regres 
sions, regressing the four local-demand variables (other than unem 
ployment) on unemployment and year and state dummies Full 
model n with auxiliary regressions uses these four additional equa 
tions to simulate effect of 1% increase in unemployment, with the 
four other demand variables allowed to change. Remaining models 
drop one of four auxiliary equations, thus implicitly holding that 
variable constant
the effects of that unemployment rise on welfare caseloads will be 
smaller than some researchers have predicted. Conversely, if the 
nation or a state were to experience slower employment growth with 
out a rise in unemployment, our model would predict a possibly signif 
icant rise in welfare caseloads. For example, one could imagine a state 
with economic problems that lead to slow employment growth or 
employment declines but with sufficient out-migration and labor force 
dropouts that unemployment does not increase.
One key issue is whether the models estimated here, with addi 
tional labor-demand variables, can explain the national trends in case 
loads in the 1980s and 1990s. We explore this issue in two ways. First, 
we consider the year dummies estimated by the model (Figure 3).
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(The 1996 dummy is the omitted dummy, so all year effects are relative 
to what occurs nationally on average in 1996). Figure 3A compares 
our preferred model, Full Model II, with an alternative model, Model II 
with only unemployment as a labor-demand variable. Analyzing the 
year dummies here is complicated because these models include a 
lagged dependent variable; hence, if a year dummy is high relative to 
another year's dummy, this will push up caseloads in subsequent years 
as well. In any event, this graph indicates that with only unemployment 
as a labor-demand variable, caseloads were pushed up by national year 
trends throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. With the other local- 
labor-demand variables, the year dummies have a fairly consistent 
effect throughout the 1980s, followed by some decline in the early to 
mid 1990s. Figure 3B shows that for the models without a lagged 
dependent variable (Full Model I and Model I with only unemploy 
ment) there is a more dramatic contrast. Model I with just unemploy 
ment shows a huge, unexplained run-up in caseloads in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, whereas the full Model I shows, if anything, some unex 
plained decline in caseloads, particularly in the early 1990s.
Analyzing how different variables contribute to these national 
trends is complicated in our preferred specification, Full Model II, 
because of a lagged dependent variable. With such a variable, case 
loads at any point in time can be considered as a function of caseloads 
at any lagged past point in time and of trends in between that past time 
and the present in other variables (including the year dummies). It 
happens that in 1984 and 1989, caseloads per capita were virtually the 
same; so in this case the rise in caseloads over some subsequent period 
is totally a function of all the other variables in the model. Table 9 uses 
this fortunate coincidence to consider whether the model can explain 
the rise in caseloads that occurred in the 1990s. Previous research by 
Blank (1997) suggested that economic variables cannot explain the rise 
in caseloads that occurred during this period. As Table 9, Panel A 
shows, caseloads per capita rose in "In percentage points" by 25.4 per 
cent from 1989 to 1994. In model II, which includes only unemploy 
ment as a state economic characteristic, most of this increase is due to 
unexplained trends in the national time dummies over the 1989 to 1994 
time period; but when other state economic characteristics are 
included, we actually find that unexplained time dummies show a drop 
in the caseload compared with what we would expect.
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Table 9 Why Caseloads Increased from 1989 to 1994a
Panel A: Difference Between 1989 and 1994 Caseloads and Time Effects
Difference between ln(caseloads per capita), 1994 vs. 1989 + 0 254
Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model + 0.275 
with only unemployment included as state economic characteristic
Difference explained by time dummies in previous five years, model -0.096 
with all five state economic characteristics included
Panel B: Breakdown of contribution of different variables to 1994 minus 
1989 difference in caseloads, model with all five state economic 
characteristics included





Industry mix: proportion of high school graduates 0.339
Industry mix: average wage premium 0.020
Industry mix: proportion of welfare recipients 0.026 
Unobserved national time period effects over previous five years -0.096
Total change in In(caseloads) to be explained 0.254
a These calculations try to explain 1994 and 1989 caseloads as function of previous five 
year's variables, plus caseloads as of five years ago. As of five years ago (1989 for 
1994, 1984 for 1989), caseloads per capita were virtually identical. These calcula 
tions simulate what happens to caseloads due to values of independent variables, 
allowing for lagged effects that occur due to including lags of some variables, and due 
to effects via lagged dependent variables. Because the model is linear, these effects 
should approximately add up.
Panel B breaks down how national variables explain these differ 
ences in caseload during the previous five years. Most of the increase 
in caseloads from 1989 to 1994 appears to be explained by the increase 
in the "high school graduate" industrial-mix variable. This variable 
increased from an average of 82.9 percent over the 1983-1989 period 
to an average of 85.7 percent over the 1988-1994 period, an increase 
of 2.8 percent. 8 The point estimates reported in Table 7 suggest that 
each 1 percent increase in this variable is associated with about a 0.124 
change in the ln(caseloads per capita) variable, so an increase of 2.8
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percent in this variable would be expected to increase the ln(caseloads 
per capita) by more than 0.30, or over 30 "In percentage points."
How much should we believe this finding? It should be recognized 
that this finding extrapolates the effects of relatively small differences 
in trends among states to relatively large changes over time for the 
nation. As shown in Table 7, the standard deviation of this variable, 
controlling for state and year dummies, is only about one-fifth of 1 per 
cent. It may be perilous to extrapolate the estimated effects of differ 
ences among states of one-fifth of 1 percent to differences in the nation 
of 2 percent or more. On the other hand, the estimated effect is not 
inherently unreasonable. Welfare rolls are only 3 or 4 percent of the 
labor force in the United States; a change in welfare rolls of 30 percent 
is not a large percentage of the U.S. labor force. Changes of 2 or 3 in 
the percentage of high school graduates demanded in the workforce 
loom very large compared with welfare-roll changes.
Gross Job Flows
In the previous section, we found an increase in caseload in areas 
having a high concentration of industries that employ welfare recipi 
ents. One interpretation of this result is that jobs in these industries 
turn over more often and provide a less-stable employment base for 
welfare recipients. Gross flows, the summation of job creation and job 
destruction, are typically used to measure job turnover. The purpose of 
this section is to take a closer look at the relationship between gross job 
flows and the number of cases to see if such information lends addi 
tional insight into the effect of labor market conditions on the welfare 
caseload.
Gross job flows are obtained by linking establishments longitudi 
nally over a specific time period. The Census Bureau has embarked on 
a relatively new project to construct gross employment flows by link 
ing all establishments, including the service sector, which employs a 
large percentage of low-skilled workers. Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992) have linked manufacturing establishments using the Census 
Bureau's Longitudinal Data File (LRD), but manufacturing employs 
only a small percentage of low-skilled workers. Therefore, we 
requested that the Census Bureau create a special tabulation of the 
employment components for all metropolitan areas between 1989 and
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1992. We use these data to examine the relationship between caseload 
and labor market conditions among metropolitan areas.
Since the employment components span only the 1989-1992 
period, the analysis is basically a cross-sectional estimation. However, 
specification of a limited lag structure is possible, because caseload 
data for several years around the 1989-1992 period are available. Fur 
thermore, specification tests of the lagged structure using state-level 
data reported in the previous section reveal that either first-differencing 
the caseloads or controlling for lagged caseloads is a plausible specifi 
cation. Additional analysis reveals that caseloads at the metropolitan 
level are also quite stable. Rank-order correlations of the caseloads for 
various time differences across metropolitan areas reveal that the 
ordering of MSAs according to the number of caseloads is persistent 
over time. The correlation for caseloads one year apart is about the 
same as the correlation for caseloads six years apart; the correlations 
average between 0.90 and 0.99.
These specifications are shown in Table 10. Column A includes 
the change in caseloads per capita between 1990 and 1993 as a depen 
dent variable; columns B, C, and D use the 1993 level of caseloads per 
capita as a dependent variable, and the 1990 level of caseloads is 
included as a control variable. These variables are regressed against 
various labor market characteristics, including gross job flows. Since 
gross flows are estimated for the 1989-1992 period, this variable and 
the net employment change variable are in essence lagged one period. 
As can be seen in the table, using the change in caseloads per capita 
between 1990 and 1993 (column A) yields similar results for the gross 
flows and net change variables when the lagged dependent variable 
specification is used (column B).
The persistence of caseloads per capita is evident in the large coef 
ficient on the lagged dependent variable and its high statistical signifi 
cance. The lagged unemployment rate variable is positive and 
statistically significant, while the contemporaneous unemployment 
variable is negative but not statistically significant. Taken together, the 
sum of the coefficients for these two lags are positive and statistically 
significant. Net employment change is relatively large and of high sta 
tistical significance. The negative coefficient suggests that areas with 
higher rates of net job growth have lower caseloads, as one would 
expect.
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Table 10 The Effects of Economic Conditions on the Change in 
Metropolitan Caseloads, 1990-19933
In per capita income, 
1990
% Poverty MSA 
1990
Log max benefits 
1990














































































































a Standard errors are in parentheses. (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels, respectively. 
b Dependent variable: change in caseloads per capita 1990-1993. 
c Dependent variable: caseloads per capita, 1994.
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The gross-job-flow variable is also statistically significant and is 
positively correlated with caseloads per capita. Thus, areas with a high 
degree of job turnover have a larger percentage of the population on 
welfare, holding constant the area's unemployment rate and its rate of 
net job creation. This result is consistent with the finding in the previ 
ous section that areas with more industries that employ welfare recipi 
ents will have higher caseloads (because employment in these 
industries is less stable). These estimates suggest that the dynamics of 
local labor markets that go beyond the typical measures of net employ 
ment change and unemployment rate are associated with changes in 
caseload. Unfortunately, longer time series of gross job flows are not 
available for all industries at any level of aggregation—national, state, 
or metropolitan. It is not possible to estimate the contribution of gross 
job flows to the change in caseloads from the late 1980s to the present, 
as we did for the industry-mix variables in the previous section.
We also entered the components of gross flows, i.e., job creation 
and job destruction, as separate variables in the model. Column D of 
Table 10 shows that job destruction has a much larger effect than job 
creation on welfare caseloads. The coefficient on job destruction is 
statistically significantly different from zero, but the coefficient on job 
creation is not statistically significant. Areas with higher job destruc 
tion are associated with a faster growth in caseloads per capita. 
Employment growth was a key variable in explaining changes in wel 
fare caseloads in the previous section; obviously, employment growth 
is related to jobs created and destroyed. Our results here suggest an 
asymmetry in jobs created and destroyed as they relate to welfare 
recipients. The jobs lost in an area are those that are more likely to be 
held by welfare recipients, while the jobs created may be those that are 
less likely to be filled by welfare recipients. The asymmetry does not 
necessarily occur across broad sectors, with one sector experiencing 
primarily job gains while another experiences primarily job losses. On 
the contrary, most sectors experience relatively equal shares of job 
losses and job gains. Even manufacturing, which has suffered steady 
net job loss for the past two decades, experiences a large number of job 
gains. Rather, the asymmetry more than likely lies within the same, 
even narrow, sectors and is characterized by differences in accessibility 
and qualifications. This interpretation is supported by results from the
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previous section related to wage premiums and high school qualifica 
tions.
A few states were granted waivers to include a work requirement 
before 1993. These states included Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Utah, and Vermont, according to Ziliak et al. (1997). We included a 
dummy variable for metropolitan areas in these states. As shown in 
column C, the growth in caseloads per capita was somewhat slower in 
metropolitan areas with waivers than in metropolitan areas without 
waivers.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies of the macroeconomic determinants of welfare 
caseloads have had difficulty in explaining changes in caseloads during 
the last decade or so using the simple macroeconomic measure of 
unemployment. Because welfare recipients will typically get 
entry-level jobs, employment variables that are closely related to job 
vacancies (such as employment growth) are also important in deter 
mining welfare caseloads, as we show empirically in this study. Rec 
ognizing that welfare recipients face more substantial barriers to 
employment than those who typically have more education and skills, 
we constructed several macroeconomic variables that reflect the educa 
tion requirement of industries and the predominance of low-skilled 
workers hired by various two-digit sectors. Estimates based on a data 
set of annual time-series observations aggregated to the state level sug 
gest that these variables help in explaining welfare caseloads. More 
specifically, areas with higher concentrations of industries that hire 
welfare recipients and demand workers with higher education levels 
have higher caseloads. Based on a separate set of metropolitan-based 
estimates, we also found that gross job flows are positively correlated 
with welfare caseloads, with job destruction dominating the effects. 
While the two sets of results come from different types of estimation 
and for areas with different levels of aggregation, the results suggest 
that skill levels required of industries and the dynamics of the local 
labor market (which go beyond the typical measures of unemployment 
rate) help to explain the anomalies in changes in welfare caseloads dur-
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ing the past decade. The findings underscore that welfare recipients 
have barriers to employment that are different from the rest of the labor 
force, and thus variables that more closely reflect their circumstances 
should be considered in explaining welfare caseloads.
These findings are relevant to those attempting to predict caseloads 
at the national, state, or local level, in that it suggests that economic 
factors other than unemployment could be used to forecast welfare 
caseloads. In addition, the findings suggest that policies that can 
enhance net employment growth, reduce job volatility, and increase the 
educational credentials of welfare recipients may all help to reduce 
welfare caseloads.
Notes
The authors acknowledge the able assistance of Wei-Jang Huang, Kristine Kracker, and 
Phyllis Molhoek. Helpful comments on a previous version were provided by Sheldon 
Danziger, Joyce Zickler, and Greg Duncan. The findings and opinions of this paper are 
those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Upjohn Institute, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, or any of the reviewers of the paper.
1. Thus, we have not implemented a suggestion by Joyce Zickler that we use the 
wage and unemployment rates of various groups of low-skilled workers as 
explanatory variables. It might be useful to include such variables in a structural 
model, in which such variables are treated as endogenous and other demand and 
supply shock variables that might affect these wage and unemployment rates are 
also included. Our focus here is on a simpler, reduced form specification that 
focuses on labor demand factors affecting welfare caseloads.
2. This is one advantage that employment growth has over the unemployment rate, 
which is plausibly as much due to labor supply behavior as labor demand behav 
ior. Regional economics research shows that employment-growth shocks con 
tinue to affect labor force participation rates, wage rates, and per capita earnings 
in a local labor market for many years, while the effects on local unemployment 
rates tend to dissipate quickly (Bartik 1993b). This suggests that employment 
growth measures aspects of local labor demand that will not be completely cap 
tured by local unemployment rates. In addition, the effects of employment 
growth appear to be greater for less skilled persons than for others (Bartik 1996), 
suggesting that local employment growth may be particularly important in deter 
mining welfare caseloads. Hoynes (1997) suggests that local employment growth 
is more important in determining exit from welfare and re-entry into welfare than 
is the local unemployment rate. Other recent research (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 
1998) on the spatial mismatch hypothesis suggests that the employment growth 
rate in the suburbs versus the city is more important than the level of employment
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in affecting the labor market outcomes of minorities, perhaps because job vacan 
cies and job losses are particularly important to entry-level workers.
3. We extended the Krueger and Summers (1988) results for private industries to 
cover the government sector in a previous project that focused on the wages and 
employment of single mothers; the data used were data on all single mothers from 
the March CPS from March 1983 to March 1995. We estimated wage equations 
using these data, regressing the natural log of the real wage on vanous worker 
characteristics, year dummies, state dummies, and industry dummies. We 
included dummies for all of Krueger and Summers' two-digit private industries, 
plus dummies for federal employment and for state and local employment. We 
regressed Krueger and Summers' estimated wage premium for each private indus 
try on the estimated wage premium we obtained from the same industry. This 
regression was then used to predict wage premiums for the federal sector and for 
state and local employment that are comparable to the private wage premium 
numbers generated by Krueger and Summers.
4. Bartik experimented with using unrestricted variables for the proportion of 
employment in each two-digit industry in the research leading to the studies 
reported in Bartik (1993a) and Bartik (1996). The basic problem is that nothing is 
significant when so many industry variables are included in the estimation.
5. State and year effects are in general strongly statistically significant. Therefore, 
we do not explore dropping these variables, because this might lead to omitted- 
variable bias.
6. We use a rather simple specification of the waiver variable, because our focus is 
on the effects of local-labor-demand conditions.
7. Note that the wage-premium and welfare-employment variables will vary quite a 
bit over time for a particular state even though the industry-specific measures used 
to construct these variables will not vary over time. These industry-mix variables 
will vary as the industry mix changes over time for a particular state. As shown in 
the section on descriptive statistics, even though a great deal of variation in these 
industry-mix variables is explained by fixed state effects and year effects, there 
remains much variation across time for a given state that differs from the national 
variation over time for the same variable.
8. For each year, the value of this variable is calculated as a weighted mean over all 
50 states and D.C., using 1996 state population as weights for all years. The aver 
ages reported here are simple averages of these averages for the previous seven 
years, which are the years involved in these calculations given that the model 
includes two lags in the high-school-graduate variable.
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Work, Earnings, and Well-Being 
after Welfare
What Do We Know?
Maria Cancian, Robert Haveman, Thomas Kaplan, 
Daniel Meyer, and Barbara Wolfe 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
The rapid reduction in Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) caseloads during its last two years and the continued decline 
of participation following its replacement by Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) raise the question of how families who no 
longer receive cash assistance are faring. What are their economic cir 
cumstances? Are they better off after leaving the program than they 
were as recipients? How many of the mothers are working, and how 
much do they earn? Do they and their families continue to rely on 
other, in-kind assistance programs? If so, which ones?
In this paper, we present evidence on the economic fate of single 
mothers who have left the welfare rolls. We summarize the results of 
earlier studies and then present findings from three approaches to this 
topic, one using national survey data, another using administrative 
data, and a few recent studies that use geographically targeted surveys. 
We conclude that reliance on administrative data provides the best 
option for evaluating the impacts of reform in the near future. We also 
recognize the limitations of these data and the need for survey data to 
supplement their findings.
An analysis of postwelfare economic well-being requires informa 
tion on both pre-exit welfare use (to determine when a woman left wel 
fare) and later measures of economic well-being. State administrative 
records have two main advantages: information on welfare use is accu 
rate, and the data are often quite current. There are serious disadvan 
tages, however. First, data on postwelfare economic well-being is 
limited. Administrative records typically do not reveal the hourly wage
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rates of those working, the family status of those who leave the rolls, or 
sources of income other than public benefits and earnings reported to 
public agencies. Important components of well-being, such as total 
child care costs, the number of children in the postwelfare family, non- 
public child care subsidies, and nonreported child support or earned 
income, are likely to be unavailable. 1
A second approach is to use national longitudinal survey data that 
provide detailed information on family status, the extent of work (e.g., 
hours worked or weeks worked), and broader measures of economic 
well-being on all former recipients, including those who move across 
jurisdictions. However, some items of information are less accurately 
reported (e.g., information on welfare participation and benefits is self- 
reported), and the information takes longer to gather and process.
A third approach is to use a targeted survey, collecting data from a 
particular population that is expected to have been affected by welfare 
reform. This approach can gather detailed information on both the pre- 
and postwelfare experiences of the family. Problems with current 
examples of this approach include small samples that may not be rep 
resentative, in addition to the information accuracy problems of sur 
veys in general.
In the next section, we summarize some of the early studies of the 
economic status of women who left welfare. The two sections that fol 
low summarize the results of the two studies of postwelfare economic 
patterns undertaken at the Institute for Research on Poverty, one using 
survey data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 
(Cancian and Meyer 1998; Meyer and Cancian 1996, 1998) and the 
other using administrative data from Wisconsin (Cancian et al. 1998b, 
1999). We then briefly summarize the methods and findings of a num 
ber of studies of postwelfare experiences in other states, comparing 
their findings with those of the Wisconsin study. The final section of 
this paper presents our conclusions.
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PREVIOUS STUDIES OF POSTWELFARE ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS
Previous studies have analyzed the postwelfare economic status of 
former welfare recipients and how a variety of factors influence both 
exit from recipiency and the return to welfare having once left it. Some 
studies (e.g., Gritz and MaCurdy 1991; Cheng 1995) have found that 
the average earnings of former AFDC recipients grow over time 
(although they remain fairly low) but others have found that hourly 
earnings do not increase much over time (Burtless 1995; Harris 1996). 
Pavetti and Acs (1997) found that only 13 percent of young women 
who ever received AFDC are in steady employment in a "good job" by 
age 26-27. Burtless (1995) and Pavetti and Acs (1997) found that 
many former recipients have somewhat sporadic work patterns, with a 
low probability of maintaining full-time, full-year work.
A few quantitative studies have analyzed broader indicators of 
postwelfare economic well-being. Bane and Ellwood (1983) found 
that nearly 40 percent of those who exited were poor in the year after 
exit, and a similar number were poor in the following year. Harris 
(1996), who examined only those who left welfare and stayed off, 
found that the likelihood of being poor varied substantially with the 
type of exit. Of those who left through marriage or cohabitation, 28 
percent were poor one year after exit, compared with 46 percent of 
those who left through work and 75 percent of those who left for some 
other reason.
This research can be briefly summarized as follows: a substantial 
proportion of women who exited AFDC returned to the rolls, some 
quite quickly. Even among those who did not return, continued use of 
food stamps or other means-tested programs is fairly common. The 
hourly wage rate of the leavers was (or is likely to be) in the $5-7 
range, and slow growth in wage rates is experienced. The income that 
these leavers obtain is generally insufficient to remove them from pov 
erty, even if they marry. There has been little research on the actual 
economic well-being of the leavers, perhaps reflecting a view that 
dependency is a more important issue than poverty or overall well- 
being.
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THE POSTWELFARE EXPERIENCE OF AFDC 
RECIPIENTS—NATIONAL SURVEY DATA
Longitudinal survey data sets such as the NLSY identify entry and 
exit from the welfare rolls, and they measure a variety of aspects of the 
lives and living conditions of recipients during and after they have left 
welfare. Because the NLSY oversamples the economically disadvan- 
taged and has many years of data, it is possible to draw sufficiently 
large samples for measuring long-term economic well-being following 
an exit from AFDC.
The NLSY includes over 5,000 women who were age 14 to 21 in 
1979; in 1992, these women were 28 to 35. Hence, five years of post- 
exit economic status can be observed for AFDC recipients who exited 
by 1987, when they were 24 to 31 years old. 2 This sample (see Meyer 
and Cancian 1996, 1998; Cancian and Meyer 1998) includes women 
who enter and exit AFDC at a fairly young age (and thus have rela 
tively young children) and is not representative of the full AFDC-reli- 
ant population.
We summarize the Cancian and Meyer findings for 984 women 
who exited AFDC before 1987, presenting information for the first five 
postwelfare calendar years for three measures of well-being: the use of 
means-tested benefits (AFDC and any other cash or near-cash means- 
tested benefit, including food stamps, Supplemental Security Income 
[SSI], and other public assistance); earnings and wages; and family 
income and poverty. 3
Welfare Use following Exit
Many women who leave AFDC ("leavers") continue to receive 
some cash or near-cash means-tested benefit, but this percentage 
declines over time; for example, 60 percent of leavers receive a means- 
tested benefit in the first year, compared to 45 percent in the fifth year. 
Food stamps are the most common benefit, received by about half of 
leavers in the first year, declining to 40 percent in the fifth year. AFDC 
itself is less common: in each of the first five years post-exit, 28-38 
percent of women returned to the program and received some AFDC 
benefit, with a slight trend toward decreased use between year 2 and 
year 5.4
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Looking across the whole five-year period, only 21 percent of leav 
ers never received means-tested benefits and another 17 percent 
received benefits in only one of the five years, but 27 percent received 
some benefit in each year. Examining AFDC alone, 39 percent of 
women never received AFDC, and 16 percent received it in only one 
year, but 10 percent received some AFDC income in each year.
In sum, there is substantial diversity in welfare use after leaving 
welfare. About 20-40 percent effectively avoid reliance on welfare 
benefits, and about one-half of the women continue receiving benefits 
of some form for several years after leaving AFDC.
Hours of Work, Wages, and Earnings following Exit
In each of the five years after exit, about two-thirds of women 
work. But while the proportion not working stays about the same over 
this period, there is an increase over time in the intensity of work effort 
among those who work at all. For example, the proportion working 
full-time, full-year increases from 13 percent in the first year following 
an exit to 25 percent in year 5. Over the same period, the proportion 
working in the lowest-intensity category (part-time, part-year) falls 
from 21 to 13 percent.
There is also substantial variation in an individual woman's work 
effort over time. Less than 5 percent of women work full-time, full- 
year in all 5 years, while 60 percent never work full-time, full-year. On 
the other hand, only 14 percent never work over the first 5 years after 
an exit, more than one-half work at least four of the five years, and 
more than one-third worked in all five years. These patterns suggest 
that while consistent full-time work is uncommon, so too is consistent 
joblessness.
Even consistent work may not suffice for self-support if wages are 
low. Figure 1 shows the trend of average wages in the five years after 
exit, as well as the quartile cutoffs. Real wages rise over the period, 
though not for all groups. Median wages grow from $6.36 to $6.73 
between years 1 and 5 (1996 dollars), an annual rate of 1.5 percent. 5 
Wages for women at the 25th percentile show virtually no change, 
remaining close to $5.30 throughout the period. 6 The relatively modest 
growth in wages for this sample is inconsistent with the suggestion that 
even if former welfare recipients start in low-paying jobs, they will
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soon move on to jobs that pay wages that can support a family above 
the poverty line.
A combination of increased work effort and modest increases in 
hourly wages, however, results in significant growth in annual earnings 
over the five years. Figure 2 shows the trend in earnings among those 
who had earnings. Earnings grow substantially across the distribution. 
Median earnings among earners rise from $6,059 to $9,947 over the 
five-year period, and even those at the 25th percentile experience 
increases in own earnings from $2,276 to $3,601, or about 12 percent 
per year.
Income and Poverty following Exit
Among the leavers, median family income (not shown in the fig 
ures) grows from about $12,000 to $16,000-$ 17,000 from years 1 to 
5.7 Income increases across the distribution, with the 25th percentile 
increasing from about $6,500 to about $9,800.
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Two of the main sources of family income are means-tested trans 
fers and own earnings. While both sources are received by substantial 
numbers of leavers, the pattern differs: in year 1, each source is 
received by about 60 percent of the leavers; by year 5, the proportion 
with earnings is still about 60 percent, while the proportion with 
means-tested benefits has dropped to about 45 percent.
Income from a spouse or partner is a third important component of 
family income. Spousal income is received by about 40 percent of 
women in each of the five years. Income from a spouse or partner, 
when available, is fairly high, with medians of about $16,000 in the 
first year, rising to about $21,000 in the fifth year. Finally, child sup 
port is received by less than one-fifth of the sample, with median 
annual amounts among recipients around $1,500.
These estimates make it clear that measures of income that include 
only the income from a woman's own earnings and means-tested bene 
fits may substantially understate family income, especially for those 
who have a spouse or partner. This has important implications for the 
interpretation of the results of the administrative data analysis dis 
cussed below.
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Does the income received by the families of these leavers allow 
them to escape poverty? Fifty-five percent of all women are poor in 
the first year following an exit; by the fifth year, this has fallen to 42 
percent. Especially in the early years, most of the remainder of leavers 
have incomes that are near the poverty level; for example, only 15 per 
cent have income above 200 percent of the poverty line in the first year. 
However, by the third year after exit, 22 percent of women have 
incomes more than twice the poverty line. The NLSY allows us to 
consider both total family income and a woman's own income (not 
including the earnings and benefits of any spouse or partner). If we 
compare a woman's own income to the poverty line, a much higher 
proportion of women are poor: 79 percent in the first year, decreasing 
to 64 percent in the fifth.
When we examine family income poverty over the whole period, 
we find that only 19 percent are poor during all of the first five years. 
On the other hand, whereas during each of the first five years 45-59 
percent are above the poverty level, only 22 percent are able to escape 
poverty during all five years. Only about 5-10 percent have own 
income high enough to be above the poverty line during all years.
In sum, the patterns we have described show great diversity in the 
economic outcomes for former recipients. Moreover, while "success" 
is recorded in terms of reductions in dependence on AFDC (about two- 
thirds of the women do not receive benefits each year), poverty-ori 
ented measures and measures that require consistently positive out 
comes over the whole period indicate less progress.
Discussion
We have also examined the factors that seem to be related to sev 
eral of these measures of postwelfare economic success using multi- 
variate statistical methods. Our results indicate that there are several 
paths to economic "success." Having more education and fewer chil 
dren, getting and staying married, landing a "good" job and keeping it, 
or changing jobs several times (perhaps in order to progress) all seem 
to be avenues to success.
Interestingly, these statistical analyses have not found a strong 
effect of macroeconomic conditions on success. For example, the 
unemployment rate in the county of residence at the time of AFDC exit
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has little effect on later family income. While there is a negative rela 
tionship between unemployment rates at the time of exit and later 
wages, it is weak. Perhaps economic conditions are more related to 
whether a woman exits from AFDC and the type of exit she makes than 
to how she fares after leaving. 8 Alternatively, measures of overall 
county unemployment rates may not provide a very accurate picture of 
job prospects for low-skilled women (Hoynes 1996).
THE POSTWELFARE EXPERIENCE IN 
WISCONSIN—ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
A second research strategy is to employ administrative data on 
welfare recipients both while they are on the rolls and in the years after 
they have left. The most extensive of such studies (Cancian et al. 
1998b, 1999) make use of Wisconsin administrative data to analyze the 
benefit use, income, and employment of women who left AFDC.
These data follow all recipients, not just a random sample. 
Because they are linked longitudinally, the recipients can be studied 
over a relatively long period of time. 9 Moreover, the data allow the 
postwelfare circumstances of those who leave welfare to be compared 
to the circumstances of those who remain recipients.
We use Wisconsin administrative data for single women with chil 
dren who received AFDC-Regular benefits in July 1995. We define 
"leavers" as those who received no AFDC benefits for two consecutive 
months over the next year (from August 1995 to July 1996). The sam 
ple includes 26,047 leavers and 28,471 who stayed on AFDC. 10 We 
tracked those who left for a period of 15 months from the date they left 
and those who stayed from August 1996 to December 1997.
The state's data system provides much information on these 
55,000 cases while they were receiving AFDC: the mother's age, edu 
cational level, and race; the number of children in the household and 
the age of the youngest child; whether or not other adults were also in 
the household; whether the mother or a child received SSI; the 
mother's AFDC status and whether or not she was an immigrant; and 
the county of residence. The state's unemployment insurance (UI) sys-
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tern provides information on the mother's quarterly earnings and 
employer.
Although these data provide much information on economic and 
social outcomes, they reflect only public assistance and covered earn 
ings received in Wisconsin. We have no measures for individuals who 
moved out of state, no measures of earnings for those who remained in 
the state but were self-employed or in other employment not covered 
by UI, and no measures of a spouse or partner's earnings or other 
income. Furthermore, because we cannot accurately trace individuals 
who leave the state for all or part of the period, we cannot distinguish 
those who have income from benefits or earnings outside Wisconsin 
from those who receive no such income."
Welfare Use following Exit
The use of public assistance steadily declined among all groups of 
leavers. Table 1 shows the use of means-tested benefits by leavers, 
continuous leavers (those leavers who did not return within 15 
months), and stayers (those cases active in July 1995 who did not have 
two consecutive months without benefits in the next year). In the quar 
ter immediately following exit, 11 percent of leavers and 14 percent of 
continuous leavers had ceased receiving public assistance (food 
stamps, Medicaid, or AFDC). Fifteen months after exit, these figures 
had more than doubled: about 30 percent of all leavers and 41 percent 
of the continuous leavers were receiving no public assistance. How 
ever, the majority of leavers continued to be enrolled in some form of 
public assistance over the entire period, mainly Medicaid. By defini 
tion, all stayers received some assistance in the first quarter measured 
(July-September 1996). Even a year later, only 7 percent received no 
benefits.
In general, we found that AFDC leavers who had greater human 
capital, fewer and older children, and who lived in an area where 
unemployment was lower were more likely to have ceased the receipt 
of public assistance than those without these advantages (see Cancian 
et al. 1999, Table 7).
These results are not dissimilar to those in the previous section 
based on the NLSY data. Those data indicated that during the first year 
after exit, about 60 percent of the women continued to receive some













































a Not receiving AFDC, food stamps, or Medicaid.
b The sample in each quarter includes all cases which appear in at least one administrative database during that quarter.
c For stayers, first quarter after exit is the third quarter of 1996.
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means-tested benefit (although the NLSY analysis did not include 
Medicaid).
Hours of Work, Wages, and Earnings following Exit
Most women who left the AFDC rolls worked. 12 During the first 
year after leaving, about two-thirds of leavers worked, a figure that is 
nearly identical to the proportion of leavers who worked in the first 
year in the NLSY data. 13 Women whose youngest child was older than 
12 years and women who had earnings in the two years before they left 
welfare were significantly more likely to work and earn. However, 
neither education nor the number of children had a statistically discern- 
able impact on the probability of employment in this model (though 
earnings did increase with education, as discussed below). Women on 
SSI, women who had been sanctioned, minority women, and (surpris 
ingly) women who had shorter welfare spells were significantly less 
likely to be employed.
The average county unemployment rate over the quarters during the 
year after exit has a marginally significant (t = 1.8) but quantitatively 
small negative effect on employment. Each 1-percentage-point 
increase in the local unemployment rate decreased by less than 1 per 
cent the probability of working in the year after exiting welfare. The 
modest impact of the county unemployment rate parallels the results for 
the NLSY. As mentioned above in those results, the limited impact of 
unemployment may be due to the inadequacy of this measure as an indi 
cator of local labor market conditions for this population.
About 86 percent of those leavers who were working earned more 
than $2,000 during the year after exit. Median annual earnings were 
about $7,800. 14 Women who had greater human capital (i.e., more edu 
cation and prior work experience) and who were living in a county 
with a low unemployment rate tended to have higher earnings, as did 
legal immigrants and women with older children. Women who had 
been sanctioned, received SSI, or had a child on SSI had lower earn 
ings.
The average county unemployment rate over the quarters during 
the year after exit has a statistically significant negative effect on earn 
ings. Each 1-percentage-point increase in the local unemployment rate 
decreased annual earnings by about $250 in the year after exiting wel-
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fare. Again, the modest impact of the county unemployment rate may 
be due to its limitations as a measure of local labor market opportuni 
ties for this population.
For all leavers, in all of the socioeconomic categories, median earn 
ings among workers increased with the length of time off welfare. For 
leavers working in a given quarter, earnings increased from less than 
$2,400 to more than $2,600 over this period, an annual growth rate of 
about 10.4 percent. 15 We also had information on the industry in which 
these women who worked found employment and hence could calcu 
late earnings growth by industrial categories as well. 16 From the first to 
the fifth quarters, median earnings for leavers rose in all industrial clas 
sifications except one. Indeed, in more than half of the classifications, 
leavers in their fifth quarter after exit had earnings over 10 percent 
higher than leavers in their first quarter after exit. The only exception 
was leavers who were employed in temporary agencies, where fifth- 
quarter earnings were 12 percent lower than first-quarter earnings.
Income and Poverty following Exit
Using our administrative data, we are able to measure two con 
cepts of income: own earnings and income, defined as the sum of own 
earnings, AFDC, and the cash value of food stamps. Table 2 indicates 
that leavers were twice as likely to have incomes above the poverty 
level as stayers. 17 For all groups, the percentages with income above 
the poverty level are not high; even those who left AFDC and did not 
return had only about a 27 percent probability of success in escaping 
poverty by this measure. 18
Few former recipients were able to achieve an income 150 percent 
or more above the poverty line; even among the continuous leavers, 
less than 8 percent had cash incomes (including food stamps) sufficient 
to meet this standard. Larger families were especially unlikely to reach 
this level: among families with three children, only 1.9 percent of con 
tinuous leavers and 1.5 percent of all leavers reached this level.
Table 2 also shows that only about one-third of all leavers obtained 
the income level they received just before they left AFDC. Only among 
the groups with the highest postwelfare incomes (continuous leavers 
and those with fewer children) did more than 40 percent have income in 
excess of what they received immediately before leaving welfare.
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Table 2 Percentage of the AFDC-Regular Caseload at Various Income 
Levels during Year after Exit3
Income as cash
Income as income plus 
earnings only food stamps
All leavers (#=24,020)
More than the poverty line 19.5 24.0 
More than 150% of the poverty line 5.4 5.8 
More than same measure in qtr. before exit 69.3b 36.0 
More than maximum AFDC benefit 48.8 -
Continuous leavers'5 (N= 16,325)
More than the poverty line 25.1 27.3 
More than 150% of the poverty line 7.4 7.7 
More than same measure in qtr. before exit 75.9C 37.5 
More than maximum AFDC benefit 54.6 -
All stayers (#=28,471)
More than the poverty line 4.1 11.7 
More than 150% of the poverty line 0.8 1.6 
More than maximum AFDC benefit 19.0 -
a For stayers, the year is the 12 months from 7/96 through 6/97. This table excludes 
"disappearers," as denned in endnote 11.
b Continuous leavers are those who remained off AFDC for at least one year after exit. 
All reported measures are the average quarterly receipt during the year after exit cal 
culated over the quarters in which the case appears in at least one administrative data 
base.
c Calculated only for those with earnings in the quarter before exit. For example, the 
number in the earnings column represents the percentage of households in each cate 
gory whose average quarterly earnings in the year after exit were higher than its earn 
ings in the quarter before exit.
Summary and Comparison with NLSY
Most states have recently experienced substantial welfare caseload 
declines just before, and especially after, passage of the 1996 TANF 
legislation. The implications of these declines depend to a large degree 
on the ability of families who have left welfare to remain independent 
and move to self-sustaining employment. The Wisconsin study, while 
limited by the administrative data used, provides an initial indication of
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the economic well-being of individuals who left AFDC during the time 
of early work-based reforms. 19 It also provides information about the 
extent of employment and level of earnings, and how this evolves over 
the first 15 months after leaving assistance.
Compared with those who stayed on AFDC (some of whom also 
left the rolls in subsequent quarters), the leavers (especially the contin 
uous leavers) were better educated, had fewer children, and were more 
likely to have had earnings during the two years before they left 
AFDC.20 For some low-income single parents, work appears to have 
been fairly constant, even if not always full-time, and their earnings 
rose or fell in ways that made them sometimes eligible and sometimes 
ineligible for AFDC. 21 While employment rates remained stable 
among all leavers, the proportion of continuous leavers who had any 
earnings grew substantially over the quarters. Moreover, for all leav 
ers, median earnings (calculated over those who worked in a given 
quarter) grew at a rate of about 2.5 percent per quarter.
A key question concerns the economic well-being of those who 
left the AFDC rolls, but as with the NLSY results reported above, there 
is no unambiguous answer to this question. While some of the ambi 
guity derives from data limitations, the picture is complex even for 
those success indicators (earnings and public assistance) that we mea 
sure with accuracy. A large majority of women who left AFDC worked 
in the first year after exit; the median annual earnings for workers were 
about $7,800. Those who did not return to AFDC for a 15-month 
period (or more) had median earnings of $9,100.
These figures conceal, however, a great deal of variation among 
groups of recipients. For example, women who lived in counties with 
an above-average rate of unemployment, who had limited education, 
who had been sanctioned, or who were on SSI tended to work and/or 
earn less than other groups of leavers. Indeed, fewer than half of the 
leavers achieved incomes greater than their income in the last AFDC 
quarter. And only about 37 percent of those with one child and who 
remained off the AFDC rolls—and only 17 percent of those with three 
children—generated incomes that exceeded the poverty line in the first 
year after they left welfare.
The NLSY and Wisconsin results complement each other in dem 
onstrating the importance of women's own earnings in providing for 
their postwelfare well-being. In the earlier NLSY data, the average
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leaver with any earnings earned about $6,000-$7,000 during the first 
year after exit. There are reasons to anticipate that current leavers will 
not fare as well; in particular, current reforms may force women with 
fewer employment prospects to leave welfare. On the other hand, cur 
rent leavers may do better, given the robust economy, pressures for job 
search, and the changed "welfare culture." The Wisconsin leavers had 
somewhat higher earnings (median about $7,800 in the first year) after 
leaving than did the NLSY leavers. It appears that, to a greater extent 
than in earlier years, most women are working and earning a nontrivial 
income after leaving welfare. The reasons for this increase in the level 
of working and earnings after leaving welfare are difficult to discern; it 
may be that welfare policy changes and a favorable labor market have 
more than offset any decline in the labor market skills of leavers as 
more women have been moved off assistance. Another possibility is 
that because grant amounts are higher in Wisconsin than in much of the 
rest of the country, it takes a higher level of earnings to exit.
The analyses of NLSY and administrative data suggest that earn 
ings play an important role in post-exit income. The potential role of 
macroeconomic conditions in accounting for the relative success of 
recent leavers is important. Erosion of employment opportunities 
could result in a substantially reduced level of earnings and income 
from that reported here. Families may be particularly vulnerable to 
fluctuations in earnings given the more limited access of families to 
cash assistance.
STUDIES OF THE POSTWELFARE EXPERIENCE IN 
OTHER STATES
The number of AFDC/TANF cases has declined sharply across the 
nation, from nearly 5.1 million cases in January 1994 to just over 3 mil 
lion in June 1998. With this steep decline, many states in addition to 
Wisconsin have sought information on the condition (and sometimes the 
motivation) of those who have left their AFDC and TANF rolls. Cancian 
et al. (1998a) discussed recent studies of leavers in nine states: Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennes 
see, Texas, and Washington. We summarize that discussion here.
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These studies share common features but also differ on several 
dimensions. Most of the studies were performed either by university 
research centers within the respective state or by the state administra 
tive agency responsible for public assistance; the exceptions were 
Texas (by the Texas Legislative Council) and Iowa (by Mathematica 
Policy Research). Most are based primarily on surveys (mail, tele 
phone, in-home, or some combination), but the study in Maryland, like 
the Wisconsin study, relied on administrative data. In most of the stud 
ies, leavers include both families headed by a lone parent and two-par 
ent families. Only the study of leavers in Washington, which focused 
on single-parent households, and the Wisconsin study, which consid 
ered just families headed by single adult women, were more restrictive. 
Moreover, in most of the states, the samples studied included leavers 
who exited for any reason.
The length of time off AFDC or TANF to reach "leaver" status dif 
fered among the studies. In most studies, nonreceipt of benefits for one 
month sufficed to create leaver status, although two consecutive 
months off AFDC was used in one study and six consecutive months in 
another. Some of the survey-based studies had fairly low response 
rates, by our calculations: 22 response rates ranged from a low of 12 per 
cent (for a mail survey in New Mexico) to a high of 85 percent in the 
Iowa study. For the projects relying on administrative data in Mary 
land and Wisconsin, response rates were not, of course, an issue. The 
following paragraphs briefly describe key findings of the state studies 
of leavers.
Use of Means-Tested Programs
Only the studies in Maryland and Wisconsin considered the rate of 
return of leavers to AFDC or TANF, and those rates in the two states 
were quite close: about 20 percent returned in the first few months and 
much smaller percentages returned in subsequent months.
In all states which reported on use of food stamps and Medicaid, 
more leavers appeared to participate in Medicaid than in food stamps. 23 
With the exceptions of Kentucky and Washington, at least two-thirds of 
leavers in each state reported participation in Medicaid, at least for the 
children in the case. With the exception of Washington, about one-half 
of leavers received food stamps.
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Hours of Work, Wages, and Earnings following Exit
Percentage of Leavers Reported Working at Least Part-Time
In the three states that sampled only leavers whose cases had been 
closed for noncompliance, the percentage of leavers who were working 
at least part-time ranged from 42 percent to 53 percent. In states that 
surveyed all leavers, the percentage working at the time of the survey 
was generally higher, ranging from 49 percent to 70 percent. The two 
states that used unemployment insurance records to determine whether 
someone was working showed quite different findings: 55 percent had 
earnings in Maryland, compared with 72-75 percent in Wisconsin.
Hours of Work among Leavers Who Reported Working
The studies in Maryland and Wisconsin, which relied on adminis 
trative data from state unemployment insurance programs, could report 
only quarterly earnings, not the number of hours worked. The other 
states reported hours of work in different ways, which make compari 
sons among the states difficult. Overall, though, it appears that well 
over half the respondents who were working were doing so approxi 
mately full-time.
Reported Earnings and Wage Rates among Leavers 
Who Reported Working
States reported earnings in different formats, again making com 
parisons difficult. Among states reporting earnings, Iowa reported 
mean weekly earnings of $170, which would total $2,210 in quarterly 
earnings, about 7.5 percent less than the mean quarterly earnings 
reported in Maryland and some 15 percent less than the quarterly earn 
ings reported in Wisconsin. The lower reported earnings for Iowa may 
not be surprising, since the sample in Iowa was of cases sanctioned for 
noncompliance, whereas Maryland and Wisconsin included voluntary 
leavers, some of whom probably left because they had found a job. 
The Iowa results are consistent with the Wisconsin results for sanc 
tioned leavers, whose earnings were about 23 percent below the aver 
age of all leavers. Three of the states reporting hourly wages based on 
surveys seemed to cluster around $6.40 to $6.60 in mean hourly wages. 
The study in Washington showed significantly higher mean hourly 
wages among leavers, at $8.42.
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Type of Employment among Leavers Who Reported Working
Most of the studies made an effort to assess the kinds of jobs leav 
ers found. In classifying jobs, the investigators appeared generally to 
start with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, but the ten 
dency of leavers to cluster in certain industries led all the investigators 
to use more detailed codes for some industries than others, and to do so 
in ways that probably made sense for that state but do not promote 
comparisons with other states.
Not surprisingly, most of the state studies reported heavy concen 
trations of leavers in food service and retail trade. The Washington 
study, which reported the highest mean wages, showed somewhat 
higher percentages of leavers who had found clerical/office and general 
labor/construction jobs (although, again, the different ways states com 
bined SIC codes makes even this comparison conjectural).
CONCLUSION
We have presented a summary of what is known regarding the eco 
nomic circumstances, employment, and patterns of benefit use among 
welfare recipients who have left the rolls in recent years. This analysis 
has drawn upon studies that used a wide variety of techniques for 
assessing these postwelfare economic circumstances: national longitu 
dinal survey data, state administrative records, and state-based sample 
surveys. All of these efforts have limitations, and we have attempted to 
identify these. The various approaches chosen to assess the potential 
consequences of the 1996 welfare reform legislation are of necessity ad 
hoc, given the absence of a reliable national research effort for evaluat 
ing this policy change.
The primary dimensions on which these research approaches differ 
include 1) limitations in the variables measured, 2) limited response 
rates (and hence, potential selection biases), 3) attrition problems (and 
again, potential selection biases), 4) problems of limited sample sizes, 
and 5) the unreliability of some of the data collected. While national 
longitudinal survey data have extensive data on each family, there are 
difficulties in identifying "leavers," the responses regarding the receipt 
and value of benefits is often questionable, and the sample sizes are
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often quite small. Administrative data from states have the most reli 
able information on benefits received, working, and earnings in 
reported jobs; however, they lack information on family structure, 
mobility, hours worked, and income sources apart from the earnings 
and benefits of the leavers themselves. The administrative data are 
accurate and available on a very timely basis, however. The state-level 
sample surveys often have low response rates, and in some cases, the 
samples selected are not representative of the general population of 
those who have exited welfare.
In spite of the differences in approach and reliability, it is possible 
to roughly summarize the findings regarding several important post- 
welfare economic effects across these studies.
To what extent do leavers continue to use means-tested 
benefits?
• About two-thirds of the leavers receive some type of welfare 
benefit (e.g., food stamps, Medicaid) after exiting AFDC in the 
first year after leaving. Medicaid is the most common type of 
noncash benefit received, but food stamp receipt is also com 
mon. Food stamp and Medicaid use decline as the time since 
exiting increases.
What proportion of the leavers work after exiting AFDC?
• About two-thirds of the women work after exiting AFDC, but 
most of them do not work full-time, full-year. In most of the 
studies, less than one-half of the leavers are full-time workers, 
although some of the state studies based on survey data suggest 
higher percentages of full-time workers. The "intensity" of 
work (hours worked per year) increases over time, as the share 
working full-time, full-year increases at the expense of part- 
time or part-year work.
How much do the leavers earn?
• Although the wage rates of leavers differ across states, they gen 
erally lie in the range of $6.50 to $7.50 per hour. The average 
wage rates increase with time, although not at rates substantially 
higher than the rates of increase for women's wage rates gener-
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ally. Given these wage rates, the majority of leavers do not earn 
enough to support their families above the poverty line. Annual 
earnings average about $8,000 to $9,500, depending on the 
study; because of the growth in wage rates and especially in the 
intensity of work, the rate of growth of earnings is 6-10 percent 
per year.
How much family income do leavers have; are they able to 
escape poverty?
• Poverty rates were more than 50 percent for the leavers. How 
ever, because earnings rise over time and the number of leavers 
with partners increases over time, the poverty rate also falls over 
time. A few years after exiting, about 40 percent of the leavers 
remain poor. If one counts only the income (sum of earnings, 
cash benefits, and food stamps) of the leavers themselves, the 
poverty rate would be about 75 percent.
The research we have summarized gives a number of clues, but no 
definitive answers, about the effect of macroeconomic conditions on 
post-exit well-being. While higher unemployment is associated with 
less work and earnings, the coefficients are not always statistically sig 
nificant and they are often small in magnitude. We speculate that these 
modest results are due to the inadequacy of county unemployment 
rates as a measure of the labor market conditions for women leaving 
welfare.
However, apart from the relationship between local unemployment 
rates and the economic performance of women who have exited wel 
fare, the most important finding concerns the central role of own earn 
ings in contributing to post-exit well-being. Because women's 
earnings are typically their most important post-exit income source, 
any downturn that limits earnings is likely to have a significant nega 
tive effect on their already-modest economic well-being.
Our findings underscore the challenges facing those who will leave 
cash assistance in the coming years. Many leavers remain poor, and 
many return to means-tested benefits after having attempted to leave. 
While average earnings grow over time, available evidence suggests 
this is largely due to increases in work hours rather than substantial
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growth in wages. If families are to move from welfare to self-suffi 
ciency, their own earnings are likely to be insufficient.
The research findings that we have reviewed suggests substantial 
diversity among families leaving welfare in terms of economic perfor 
mance and well-being. This suggests that high priority be given to 
expanding both data collection and evaluation; only with reliable 
cross-state and cross-time information will we be able to ultimately 
judge the success of current reform efforts and make informed deci 
sions about future policy. Our review suggests that administrative data 
supplemented by survey findings is the best option for reliable research 
on post-exit outcomes. Over the next few years, a successful strategy 
for assessing the well-being of those who leave state TANF programs 
could combine analyses of state administrative data with improved 
state survey efforts designed to provide information not available from 
administrative systems. Some states have undertaken substantive sur 
vey efforts designed to enable the assessment of post-exit well-being 
and have been successful in raising their survey response rates to 
acceptable levels, at least for interviews of 15-20 minutes. 24 If this 
strategy can be successfully implemented more generally, it should be 
possible to generate a set of standard questions that have been vali 
dated in prior surveys to encourage assessment that is uniform across 
the states. Such questions could supplement what is generally avail 
able in administrative data and be sufficiently parsimonious as to 
enable the inclusion of other questions of special interest in a 20- 
minute interview.
Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Sandra Barone and 
Catherine O'Neill.
1. For example, in the Wisconsin results reported below, information on own quar 
terly earnings, but not on hourly wages, is reported. There is no information on 
whether the individual is married, and thus measures of family income are quite 
limited. Further, state databases do not include information on those who move 
out of state.
2 In this study, we define "exit" from welfare as not receiving APDC for three con 
secutive months after a month of receipt.
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3. Our definition of "family income" includes the income attributable to a woman, 
her husband/partner, and related children. For the definition of poverty, we have 
selected the official poverty threshold, despite its limitations (Citro and Michael 
1995), because it is widely used in other research and hence facilitates a compari 
son of our results to those of others.
4. Another way to measure welfare use is to examine the percentage of family 
income derived from means-tested benefits: in the first year after exit, 28 percent 
of women received at least half their family income from means-tested benefits; in 
the fifth year, the percentage was identical.
5. Mean wages are, as expected, higher than median wages: they grow from $7.13 to 
$7.80 over the five years. This growth in real wages, it should be noted, contrasts 
with the stagnant wages faced by most men with low levels of education and 
experience during this period (Acs and Danziger 1993).
6. The figure uses average wages, the average of all wages earned in the year, 
weighted by hours worked in each job. The pattern is quite similar if we use 
wages in the most common job (the job in which the woman worked the greatest 
number of hours in the year). If we use the highest wage, the level is higher but 
the trend is remarkably similar.
7. Again, median values are lower than mean values. Mean family income grows 
from about $15,000 to $21,000-$22,000. We present a range of estimates because 
figures differ depending on the sample used. For example, median income among 
all those for whom we have income in the first year is $12,045; among those for 
whom we have income in all five years post-exit, it is about $11,742.
8. Recent studies of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the probability of 
leaving welfare are reviewed in papers by Figlio and Ziliak and by Blank and 
Wallace in this volume.
9. In addition, the large sample can be used to analyze the impact of less common 
(but potentially important) types of recipients, such as women with children on 
SSI (Supplemental Security Income) and those with a foster child in the home.
10. Families who live in rural areas (66.8 percent) were the most likely to leave, while 
those in the largest urban area, Milwaukee, were least likely to leave AFDC (36.6 
percent). Similarly, families that leave AFDC are likely to be those with the best 
work and marriage prospects. Throughout the state, women were more likely to 
leave AFDC if they 1) had higher levels of education; 2) were white, or to a lesser 
extent, Hispanic, and were U.S. citizens; 3) had fewer children, and there were 
other adults in the household; 4) did not receive SSI (neither the mother nor any 
child); and 5) had more work experience and higher total earnings in the two years 
(July 1993 to June 1995) prior to the July 1995 date when our sample was identi 
fied. Mothers who had been "sanctioned" for some failure to comply with the 
AFDC program were also more likely to leave, while those with a longer current 
spell of AFDC receipt were less likely to leave. (Sanction status is measured in 
July 1995 and refers to sanctions on the mother only.)
11. Seventy-three percent of our sample appeared in the data in each of the five quar 
ters after they left AFDC, and about 8 percent never appeared in the database dur-
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ing the entire 15 months after they left These "disappearers" may have left 
Wisconsin. They also may still live in the state but may, for instance, have mar 
ried and be relying on a husband's earnings or support from family and friends, or 
be in noncovered employment and not using public assistance. Nineteen percent 
of the sample are "partial disappearers," those who appear in the administrative 
data in some, but not all, of the quarters. The disappearers have been excluded 
from the findings we present here; the partial disappearers have been included 
only in the quarters for which we have data on them. Excluding cases that do not 
appear in any data set substantially increases the proportion employed (since dis 
appearers, by definition, would otherwise enter as cases with no employment). 
Participation rates for AFDC, food stamps, and Medicare would also be higher 
were disappearers included. For a more detailed discussion of the sensitivity of 
results to these exclusions see Cancian et al. (1999).
12. "Work" is defined as having earnings that were reported to the Wisconsin Unem 
ployment Insurance system.
13. Eighty-two percent of leavers who did not "disappear" worked in the first year 
post-exit.
14. Again, mean values are somewhat higher, in this case about $8,500.
15. Note that these growth rates are not the same as an average of individual rates of 
earnings growth, since the composition of leavers may be different in each quarter 
after exit. For some groups, moreover, rates start from a very low base. For exam 
ple, women on SSI have a very high average quarterly growth rate of 12.4 percent, 
but start at $1,053, or about 44 percent of the median overall.
16. The categories are Nondurable Manufacturing; Wholesale Trade, Construction; 
Durable Manufacturing; Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate; Social Services, 
Public Administration, and Education; Health Services; Personal Services; Other 
Services; Agriculture, Forestry, and Mining, Retail Trade; Transportation, Com 
munications, and Public Utilities; Restaurants; Hotels and Lodging; Business Ser 
vices, and Temporary Agencies.
17. Note that this measure of income does not include income from spouses or cohab 
itants.
18. Family size matters considerably. Thirty-three percent of all leavers with one 
child (both those who returned to AFDC and those who did not) had cash incomes 
above the poverty level, compared with 15 percent of families with three children.
19. The period that we studied was one of substantial change in the Wisconsin AFDC 
program. From July 1995 to July 1996, single-parent AFDC caseloads in Wis 
consin declined sharply, by 23 percent.
20. The best predictor of earnings after exit from AFDC was consistent employment 
in the two years before exit Some groups of recipients—those on SSI, those 
sanctioned, and legal immigrants, for example—were less likely to work; how 
ever, the earnings of the immigrants who did work were significantly higher than 
those of native-born leavers. Those with more than three children were less likely 
to work than those with fewer children but, among those who worked, their earn-
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ings were no lower. Earnings were lowest for the youngest mothers (18-24), and, 
to a lesser extent, for the oldest (over 40).
21. Even the one-third of all leavers who returned to AFDC worked a substantial 
amount after their return.
22. The response rates discussed here are based on our calculations from reports pro 
vided by the studies, and sometimes differ from response rates reported in the 
studies themselves. See Cancian et al. (1998a) for details.
23. A possible reason for this is that administrative records record eligibility for, 
rather than use of, Medicaid.
24. South Carolina, for example, achieved a 73 percent survey response rate for a 
sample that had been continuously off its TANF program for at least six months; 
regionally based employees of the state welfare department checked Medicaid 
and food stamp administrative records to obtain current phone numbers and 
addresses and went to the homes of sample members who had not responded after 
repeated telephone calls.
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Employer Demand for Welfare 
Recipients and the Business Cycle
Evidence from Recent Employer Surveys
Harry J. Holzer 
Michigan State University
The extent to which the business cycle affects the labor market for 
welfare recipients has recently become an issue of major concern. A 
number of studies have tried to estimate the effect of the business cycle 
or local labor market conditions on welfare caseloads over the 1980s 
and 1990s (e.g., Hoynes 1996; Wallace and Blank 1999; Ziliak and 
Figlio 1999), but less evidence has been brought to bear directly on the 
question of how recipients' labor market outcomes are (or will be) 
affected. Ultimately, the labor market performance of welfare recipi 
ents should be our primary concern, since most welfare programs are 
now being viewed as transitional assistance for those who need help 
getting into the market rather than as permanent income support for 
those who are disengaged.
It is, of course, well-known that minorities and less-educated 
workers face relatively improved employment prospects in tighter 
labor markets (e.g., Freeman 1991; Bound and Holzer 1996), but we 
cannot necessarily infer from these studies the magnitudes of the wage 
or employment declines that welfare recipients will experience over 
the next cycle. What has been observed over the cycle for other disad- 
vantaged groups might differ considerably from what welfare recipi 
ents will experience. Even among the recipients themselves, the 
declines in demand should vary according to their own personal char 
acteristics and work histories.
Direct evidence on the labor market experiences of welfare recipi 
ents to date is quite limited (e.g., Burtless 1995; Pavetti 1997), and 
offers little insight into changes over the business cycle. Furthermore, 
earlier evidence on welfare recipients reflects those who "self-
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selected" into the labor market under a very different set of rules and 
incentives than the ones which current and future recipients will face, 
rendering the earlier evidence much less useful. 1 Recent efforts to ana 
lyze labor market changes for low-income or single mothers, many of 
whom may have been on welfare, are too indirect or reflect too many 
simultaneous labor market changes to be able to sort out cyclical from 
other causes. 2 And very little of the work to date considers the extent 
to which policy instruments might influence the demand for welfare 
recipients, or their earnings and employment, over the cycle.
In this paper, I hope to address some of these issues by analyzing 
recent data from employer surveys on the labor market demand for 
welfare recipients under a variety of conditions. My earlier work on 
employers (Holzer 1996, 1998b; Holzer and Danziger 1998) focused 
on how employer skill needs, geographic locations, recruiting/screen 
ing behavior, and attitudes influence the employment opportunities of 
minorities and disadvantaged workers more generally. But these 
efforts did not deal explicitly with demand for welfare recipients or 
how recipients might be affected by the business cycle. Likewise, 
some other recent surveys of employers deal with issues of skill needs, 
training, work organization, etc., and how these affect worker compen 
sation and establishment productivity (e.g., Department of Employ 
ment, City of New York 1994; Osterman 1994; Cappelli 1996; Black 
and Lynch 1997), but they provide little evidence on disadvantaged 
workers or effects of the cycle and aggregate demand. 3
Therefore, in this paper I focus on data from a new survey of 
employers that I administered in Michigan during the fall of 1997. The 
data focus specifically on the hiring of welfare recipients and include 
several measures of establishment-level labor demand (such as the job 
vacancy rate) that reflect the business cycle. I provide estimates of how 
these measures of demand affect the willingness of employers to hire 
welfare recipients and I use them to infer how their employment is 
likely to change over the cycle. The effects of certain policy measures, 
such as the activities of labor market intermediaries or employment 
subsidies/tax credits for welfare recipients, and how these effects might 
also vary over the cycle can be inferred from these data as well.
While I draw some very limited inferences about changes in the 
demand for disadvantaged workers over the cycle from comparisons of 
different surveys over time, the estimates presented below (and the
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resulting predictions regarding business cycle effects) are from a single 
cross-section of establishments.4 While this procedure seems to gener 
ate quite plausible estimates of business cycle effects, some potential 
biases from using cross-sectional estimates to infer these effects over 
time are acknowledged and discussed below. I also analyze the self- 
reported willingness of employers to hire welfare recipients currently 
or in the future, as well as their having done so in the recent past. 
Thus, both prospective and actual employer demands for welfare recip 
ients are considered here.
In the following sections of this paper, I describe the new employer 
data, particularly those presented below, in somewhat greater detail; 
present the empirical results; and then present the conclusions and 
some discussion of policy implications.
THE NEW EMPLOYER DATA
In the fall of 1997,1 administered a new telephone survey to 900 
establishments located in three metropolitan areas of Michigan: 
Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids. The survey was administered to the 
individual at each establishment who was responsible for entry-level 
hiring and to all establishments that had hired someone within the past 
two years. The response rate to the survey was over 70 percent.
The questions on the survey gauged a wide range of establishment 
characteristics, especially regarding their workforces. For instance, 
questions were included on the numbers of jobs in the establishment 
that require very few cognitive skills or credentials, overall hiring and 
employment growth rates, numbers of current job vacancies, and any 
difficulties they have recently had finding qualified workers (all dis 
cussed in greater detail below). A series of questions was also asked 
about the last worker hired into a job that didn't require a college 
degree.
Regarding welfare recipients, respondents were asked whether or 
not they had hired anyone in the previous two years who had been a 
welfare recipient; if so, they were asked a series of questions about the 
job filled and the workers' characteristics and performance. The 
respondent was asked whether or not they have had any contact with an
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agency trying to place welfare recipients, particularly a "Michigan 
Works!" agency; if so, they were asked whether or not they had hired 
any referrals from these agencies. 5 Finally, a series of questions was 
asked about their prospective willingness to hire welfare recipients, 
even if they had no high school diploma or recent work experience, 
either currently or over the next year. 6 If respondents indicated that 
they were willing to hire some, they were asked how many. These 
were converted into percentages of the total number of current jobs in 
each establishment (either filled or vacant) that were potentially avail 
able to unskilled welfare recipients. A series of questions was then 
asked about the chracteristics of the jobs most likely to be filled that 
way, about whether or not the employer would provide supports (such 
as training, child care, or transportation), and whether or not govern 
ment policies (such as subsidies/tax credits or technical assistance) 
would make them any more likely to do so.
Below we provide summary data on these measures of potential 
job availability to welfare recipients, based on actual past hiring as 
well as prospective willingness to do so in the future. Summary mea 
sures are also provided on some measures of labor market tightness at 
the establishment level and of their employment of very unskilled 
workers. The extent to which these latter characteristics of establish 
ments help to account for the observed availability of employment are 
then explored through a series of regressions that are described below.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary Findings
Table 1 contains data on the demand for welfare recipients at the 
establishment level. We present three measures of both actual and 
prospective demand for recipients: whether or not a welfare recipient 
has been hired at some point during the previous two years; whether 
the establishment would do so either now or over the next year; and, if 
so, how many they would hire in each case. Results are presented for 
all establishments; for three large industry groups (manufacturing, 
retail trade and service industries); for four establishment size catego-
Table 1 Demand for Welfare Recipients in 1997: Summary Results (%)
By industry By establishment size By location
Demand measure All_________________________Mfga RTb Service 1-20 21-50 51-100 101+ CCC Subd
Percent of jobs in which welfare 
recipients could be hired
Currently 
Over next year
Percent of establishments that 























a Mfg = manufacturing 
b RT = retail trade 
c CC = central city 
d Sub = suburb
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ries (1-20, 21-50, 51-100, and over 100); and by location within the 
metropolitan area, i.e., central city versus suburbs. 7
Employers report that they would be willing to fill over 3 percent of 
the jobs in their establishments with welfare recipients currently, and 
over 9 percent of the course of the next year. Also, over 40 percent of 
employers indicate that they have hired someone over the past two 
years whom they believe to be a welfare recipient. 8 By all three mea 
sures, demand seems highest in retail trade and lowest in manufactur 
ing. 9
The results in Table 1 also indicate some variation among estab 
lishments in their demand for welfare recipients by industry and estab 
lishment size. Establishments that are very small (20 or fewer 
employees) have much higher demand for recipients in percentage 
terms than do larger establishments. 10 Finally, demand for recipients 
seems a bit higher among establishments located in the suburbs than 
the central city, though this is not consistently true among metropolitan 
areas."
Relative to the total number of welfare recipients who are pro 
jected to enter the labor force over the next few years (e.g., McMurrer, 
Sawhill, and Lerman 1997), these data suggest a fairly high degree of 
job availability. This is consistent with other evidence that the employ 
ment of welfare recipients to date (and single mothers more generally) 
has improved markedly since welfare reform legislation was imple 
mented at the state and federal levels during the 1990s (e.g., Bishop 
1998).
On the other hand, there are some reasons to be cautious about our 
interpretation of these numbers. The first two measures presented 
clearly represent prospective rather than actual demand and are based 
on subjective responses to hypothetical questions; these variables 
might therefore be measured with considerable error. Some employers 
might consider it more socially acceptable to answer such questions 
affirmatively, implying an upward bias in average estimates of such 
demand. And even our measure of the actual hiring of recipients in the 
recent past might be quite imperfect if employers are uncertain about 
who really has or has not been on welfare. On the other hand, the fact 
that the actual and prospective measures are correlated fairly highly 
with each other and with the establishment characteristics listed in
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Table 1 gives us somewhat greater confidence that they are meaningful 
measures, with reasonably high ratios of signal to noise. 12
Even if employer responses are accurate, competition for available 
job slots from other groups of unskilled workers would limit the actual 
availability of jobs for welfare recipients (Holzer and Danziger 1998). 
Given that most establishments and jobs are currently located in the 
suburbs, while long-term welfare recipients are disproportionately 
found in the poorest neighborhoods of central cities, the data suggest 
some potential mismatch between the locations of welfare recipients 
and the employers who would hire them; gaps between expected and 
actual skill levels and work performance are likely to materialize as 
well. 13 Thus, the extent to which these potential employment opportu 
nities for welfare recipients will become realized remains uncertain.
Summary statistics on some likely determinants of employer 
demand for welfare recipients appear in Table 2, including measures of 
the extent to which establishments experience tight labor markets and 
unmet demand for labor. These measures include the current job 
vacancy rate for the etablishment (defined as the number of current 
vacancies divided by the total number of jobs, both filled and vacant); 
the percentage of establishments that have hired workers in the past 
two years with lower-than-usual qualifications and the percentage of 
all jobs filled by such workers; and the ease with which qualified appli 
cants can currently be found to fill vacant jobs—in other words, 
whether it is very easy, somewhat difficult, or very difficult to do so. 
Also presented are measures of establishment-wide relative demand 
for unskilled labor.
By our measure, roughly 6 percent of jobs in these establishments 
are currently vacant, while unemployment rates in Michigan during 
this period have averaged just 3^ percent. Even allowing for the fact 
that our measure of job vacancies differs slightly from those generally 
used in the past, this is an extremely high vacancy rate on jobs. 14 This 
portrait of a very tight labor market is confirmed by the other measures 
of market tightness, which show that over 40 percent of establishments 
have hired workers with lower-than-usual qualifications in the past two 
years; these workers account for about 7 percent of all filled jobs in 
these establishments. Also, we find that roughly 80 percent of estab 
lishments report some current difficulty finding qualified applicants, 
with almost 40 percent reporting great difficulty.
Table 2 Labor Market Tightness and Employment of Unskilled Workers in 1997: Summary Results (%)
By industry
Demand measure




































usual in past 2 yr.
Percent of jobs filled 6.8 3.4 10.5 6.1 12.1 7.1 7.3 2.2 6.3 7.2 
by workers with lower 
qualifications in the 
past 2 yr.






Percent of currently 
filled jobs that:

































Also no reading, 12.5 14.3 15.9 10.3 12.8 11.6 11.8 13.3 12.7 12.5
writing, or
arithmetic
Also filled by 6.2 5.9 8.7 6.2 5.7 5.5 6.1 7.0 6.6 5.9 
women
a Mfg = manufacturing 
b RT = retail trade 
c CC = central city 
d Sub = suburb
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The data in Table 2 also indicate that 37 percent of currently filled 
jobs do not require workers with any particular levels of education or 
experience. Roughly a third of these also require no reading, writing, 
or arithmetic on a daily basis, and roughly half of the latter (or about 6 
percent of jobs overall) are filled by women. Since these data refer to 
all current employment in these establishments (rather than the most 
recently filled jobs there) and since demand for skills among employ 
ers appear to be rising over time, these data appear to considerably 
overstate the current demand for unskilled workers in these establish 
ments. 15
By industry, small and/or retail trade establishments have the high 
est vacancy rates, the greatest difficulty finding qualified workers, and 
the lowest skill requirements for current employees. The difficulties 
that small establishments have finding qualified applicants, despite 
their relatively low formal skill requirements, reflect the smaller pool 
of applicants that they appear to draw, and perhaps their relatively 
greater use of informal hiring procedures as well (Holzer, Katz, and 
Krueger 1991; Holzer 1998a). All of these findings are also consistent 
with the relatively greater demand for welfare recipients, both actual 
and prospective, that we observe for these establishments in Table 1.
On the other hand, Table 2 indicates more mixed results for the 
manufacturing sector: vacancy rates are below average, but employers 
in that sector are experiencing somewhat greater difficulty finding 
qualified applicants than are other sectors. Somewhat mixed results 
are also found regarding relative demand for unskilled workers in man 
ufacturing compared with the other sectors: the percentages of all 
employees in jobs that require no credentials or cognitive skills are 
somewhat high, but relatively few of these workers are women. These 
data, along with their relatively low implied demand for welfare recipi 
ents, suggest a rapid growth in skill demand among recent hires in 
manufacturing (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994). The data also 
indicate comparable or slightly higher levels of unmet demand in the 
suburbs than the cities, with relatively comparable demands for 
unskilled workers there.
Overall, these data imply very tight labor markets in Michigan 
with significant current demand for unskilled labor, particularly in 
small establishments and in the retail trade sector.
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Regression Results: Determinants of Demand for 
Welfare Recipients
Comparisons among industries and establishment size categories 
in Table 2 suggest that the very tight labor markets that we have 
recently experienced in Michigan help to account for at least some of 
the employer demand for welfare recipients that we observe in Table 1. 
The estimates presented in this section test this idea more formally.
In Table 3, we present results of estimated regression equations in 
which the dependent variable is the percentage of jobs that are cur 
rently available to welfare recipients in each establishment. The sub 
jective nature of this variable, and any resulting measurement error, 
generally implies inefficient but consistent estimates when it is used as 
a dependent variable. 16 Independent variables include the current job 
vacancy rate at the establishment; the percentage of jobs that do not 
require education or previous training; and dummies for establishment 
size, industry, and location. 17
The vacancy rate alone is used to capture the effects of labor mar 
ket tightness on the establishment in these equations. The current 
vacancy rate should capture both the frequency with which firms have 
new vacancies as well as their average duration. The former should be 
a function of gross hiring activity at the establishment, reflecting both 
turnover and net employment growth, as well as the percentage of hires 
at each establishment that are at least temporarily vacant before they 
are filled. The duration of any given vacancy should then depend on 
the relative supply of applicants and their quality, as well as the costs 
of recruiting and screening them. 18 While at least some of these deter 
minants of vacancy rates are separately measured in our data, their 
effects on demand for welfare recipients appear to be captured prima 
rily by the vacancy rate, which therefore appears exclusively in these 
equations. 19 Likewise, the relative demand for unskilled labor at an 
establishment appears to be fully captured by the percentage of jobs 
with no formal education or experience requirements. 20
Separate results are presented for the entire sample, for small 
establishments (50 or fewer employees), and for retail trade establish 
ments. Results are also presented for equations estimated by OLS and 
by tobit, where the latter functional form is used to deal with the large
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1 f-Statistics are in parentheses. Regression equations also include dummies for other one-digit industries (construction is omitted); 
MSA, central-city locations, and their interactions; and a constant term.
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numbers of zero values that are found in the dependent variable and the 
potential "censoring" that these values might imply. 21
Table 3 shows that the job vacancy rate and the percentage of 
unskilled employees currently working at an establishment have strong 
positive effect on the employers' stated willingness to hire unskilled 
welfare recipients. These estimates are significant in both the OLS and 
tobit cases, but the tobit estimates are about twice as large for the 
vacancy rate and almost five times as large for skill levels of current 
employees. Establishment size, in contrast, has a significant effect 
only in the OLS equations. Interestingly, manufacturing establish 
ments have lower demands for welfare recipients that are marginally 
significant, but the positive effect of being in retail trade disappears 
once we control for vacancy rates and skill needs. When separate 
equations are estimated for samples of small establishments or those in 
retail trade, the estimated effects of vacancy rates are larger, especially 
in the retail trade establishments.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients for job vacancy rates 
at the establishment level imply large effects of labor market tightness 
on employer demand for welfare recipients. For instance, a 1-percent 
age-point increase in the job vacancy rate at any establishment implies 
that demand for welfare recipients will rise by 0.3-0.6 percentage 
points, and by 0.6-0.8 percentage points in the retail trade sector.
The results also imply possibly large effects of the business cycle 
on aggregate labor demand for welfare recipients. Most frequently, job 
vacancy rates during recessions average 1.2-1.3 percent (Abraham 
1983; Holzer 1989), which might be anywhere from 2.8 to 4.8 percent 
age points lower than comparably measured current rates. 22 Using our 
cross-sectional OLS estimates, the results imply declines in demand 
for welfare recipients during the next recession of 0.8-1.3 percentage 
points (i.e., 0.276 x 2.8 = 0.8), or 25-40 percent of all current demand 
for recipients. The tobit estimates imply effects roughly twice as large, 
though these are mostly relevant for the subset of establishments that 
have higher demand for welfare recipients at the outset. 23 The OLS 
estimates for the retail trade sector also imply business-cycle effects 
that are more than twice as large as those for the overall economy, rela 
tive to a starting level of demand (5.0) that is higher by 56 percent than 
the economy-wide mean (3.2; values found in Table 1).
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Of course, there is some question as to whether the estimates gen 
erated from a cross-section of data are appropriate for inferring aggre 
gate effects over time. For instance, job vacancy rates among estab 
lishments are likely to reflect relatively fixed firm-specific components 
(perhaps related most strongly to their job turnover rates) as well as 
more cyclical components. While only the latter is really relevant for 
the business cycle, our estimated effects of vacancies on employer 
demand for welfare recipients will confound the effects of both compo 
nents, and it is possible that this could generate either an upward or 
downward bias in these estimates. 24 However, the estimates generated 
here are generally unaffected by the inclusion of additional controls for 
gross hiring or turnover (for the limited number of establishments 
where these responses are provided), and the estimates are fairly con 
sistent with others that appear in the recent literature on how business 
cycle effects on employment vary by demographic group. 25 Thus, the 
estimates provided here are certainly plausible and possibly quite accu 
rate.
Table 4 presents results from similar regression equations, in 
which the dependent variables are employers' prospective willingness 
to hire recipients over the next year and whether or not the employer 
has hired any welfare recipients during the past two years. The former 
equations are again estimated by both OLS and tobit, while the latter 
are estimated by OLS (and therefore represent linear probability mod 
els). Both equations represent demand for welfare recipients that is 
measured over a somewhat longer time period, and at least the latter 
measures actual hiring (as opposed to that which could prospectively 
occur).
The specifications of these equations are identical to those of 
Table 3 except for one change: I also include the dummy variable for 
whether or not the establishment has hired any workers who are less 
qualified than usual in the past two years as an additional independent 
variable in some equations. Given that both of these dependent vari 
ables are measured over somewhat longer time frames than current 
demand for welfare recipients, a stronger case can be made for includ 
ing a measure of labor market tightness that captures the establish 
ment's experience over a comparably longer period of time. 26 But, 
given that the current vacancy rate is correlated with this measure and 
may at least partly capture its effects, I present results from three spec-
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1 f-Statistics are in parentheses. Sample sizes are 850 and 533 for the regressions on hinng in the past two years and over the next year, 
respectively. Regression equations also include dummies for other one-digit industries (construction is omitted); MS A, central-city 
locations, and their interactions; and a constant term.
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ifications of each equation: one including only the vacancy rate, one 
including only the dummy for having hired less qualified workers, and 
one including both. I also must note the greater potential for measure 
ment error in the more subjective variable for less qualified hires and 
therefore for downward biases in the estimated effects of this variable 
on demand for welfare recipients.
The results in columns 1-3 of Table 4 do not differ dramatically 
from those presented in Table 3: the estimated coefficients on the cur 
rent job vacancy rate are roughly similar to those in Table 3, the OLS 
estimate being a bit larger and the Tobit estimate somewhat smaller. 
The variable for having hired less qualified workers has positive and 
significant effects on the past hiring of welfare recipients and on pro 
spective hiring in the Tobit equations. 27 The effects of skill require 
ments of jobs and establishment size are larger here than in the earlier 
table, as are some of the industry effects.
If we assume that, in addition to the declines in vacancy rates spec 
ified above, the tendency to hire less qualified workers will also decline 
by 50-100 percent during a recession (an admittedly arbitrary assump 
tion), then the estimates in the right-most column 3 of Table 4 suggest 
that the tendency to have hired a welfare recipient over a two-year 
period will have declined by roughly 7-14 percentage points during a 
downturn. The prospective demand for welfare recipients over the next 
year will decline by 1.3-2.1 percentage points using the OLS column-3 
estimates, and 3.3-6.1 percentage points using the tobit column-3 esti 
mates.28 These predicted changes over the business cycle are larger in 
absolute magnitude than those reported earlier, but somewhat smaller 
relative to the means of these variables that appear in Table I. 29
The smaller relative effects of the cycle, along with larger effects 
of skill needs and other establishment characteristics, suggest that esti 
mates of establishment demand for recipients over a longer time period 
might approach some "equilibrium" level that is less sensitive to short- 
term cyclical conditions and more tied to underlying characteristics of 
the establishment and its workforce. Of course, our estimated effects 
of labor market tightness on the future demand for welfare recipients 
depends on the extent to which employers project current market con 
ditions into the future, while estimated effects on past hiring also 
depend on the duration over which any current market tightness has
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been experienced. These issues add to our uncertainty over how to 
interpret these results.
Still, the values in Table 4 lend further support the notion that a 
business cycle downturn will have quite significant effects on the labor 
market demand for welfare recipients. Given that the measure of 
whether or not the establishment has hired someone with lower qualifi 
cations is relatively subjective and therefore likely measured with some 
error, the predicted effects of the cycle here are likely to be downward- 
biased. Furthermore, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 only capture the 
effects of the cycle on new hiring activity and do not reflect its likely 
effects on the retention of those previously hired as layoffs rise; these 
estimates therefore will not fully reflect the cycle's effects on the over 
all employment of welfare recipients. 30
The idea that aggregate labor market conditions affect employer 
willingness to hire less-skilled workers receives some additional sup 
port from comparisons between employer data collected in the Detroit 
metropolitan area in 1992-93 and those collected in 1997. The earlier 
data were collected just as the economy in Detroit was beginning to 
recover from the recession of the early 1990s; metropolitan-wide 
unemployment rates averaged about 7 percent over the course of that 
survey. Assuming that little else has changed in the labor market over 
this relatively short time period and that establishment and job charac 
teristics in the two samples are fairly similar, comparisons between the 
two surveys should indicate the extent to which the business cycle 
affects hiring determinants and outcomes for unskilled workers.
Though still preliminary, the data suggest that employers in Detroit 
are more willing to hire workers into noncollege jobs that lack certain 
non-essential credentials, such as high school diplomas or previous 
experience, and that they are more willing to hire black (especially 
male) applicants. 31 These results confirm that, in the context of the 
much tighter labor market that characterizes Detroit in 1997, employ 
ers are more willing to hire less-credentialed or minority workers now 
than earlier in the decade, when the labor market contained a good deal 
more slack.
204 Holzer
Regression Results: Determinants of Workplace Supports and 
Policy Responses
If employers are more willing to hire unskilled welfare recipients 
when labor markets are very tight, it might also be true that they are 
more willing to provide higher compensation or other workplace sup 
ports for these workers when markets are tight. They also might be 
more amenable to government programs or interventions that are 
designed to create employment for welfare recipients under these cir 
cumstances.
While the data do not support the notion that compensation of 
hired welfare recipients improves with labor market tightness, the other 
hypotheses listed above receive somewhat greater support. 32 Table 5 
presents results from regressions in which the dependent variables are 
a series of dummies for whether or not the employer might be willing 
to help provide any welfare recipients whom they might hire with par 
ticular workplace supports, such as transportation, child care, or train 
ing (either basic skills or job-related). We also include regressions for 
whether employers might be more willing to provide such training to 
welfare recipients if they could receive either tax credits or technical 
assistance for doing so; whether they would be more willing to hire 
recipients if they could receive a 50 percent wage subsidy for one year; 
and whether they hired welfare recipients after having contact with a 
Michigan Works! agency (for those who, in fact, had such contact). 
These equations are estimated by OLS and have the same three specifi 
cations in each case as those presented in Table 4. 33
The means in Table 5 indicate that relatively few employers would 
help provide transportation or child care to welfare recipients, though 
much larger percentages might provide training (especially if it is job- 
related). Many employers claim that their willingness to provide the 
latter would rise if they could receive tax credits or especially technical 
assistance. 34 Roughly one-third of employers report that they would 
increase employment of welfare recipients in response to wage subsi 
dies; and a majority of the firms that had contact with a Michigan 
Works! agency did subsequently hire at least one welfare recipient. 35 
The data therefore suggest that employers might be relatively respon 
sive to a variety of policy interventions designed to raise the private 
sector employment and earnings prospects of the welfare population.
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 205
The results of Table 5 also indicate that the degree of labor market 
tightness facing establishments influences their willingness to provide 
workplace supports and their responsiveness to several potential gov 
ernment policy interventions. For instance, those that have hired work 
ers in the past two years with lower-than-usual qualifications are more 
willing to provide each type of benefit or support and are more respon 
sive to each of these government interventions. 36 Despite the crudeness 
of the dependent variables and the likelihood of measurement error 
(and therefore downward bias) in the independent variable measuring 
market tightness, these effects are increases of from 3 to 16 percentage 
points in the probabilities of providing supports or responding to gov 
ernment programs; relative to the means presented in the first column 
of Table 5, these are not necessarily small effects.
In addition, job vacancy rates at the firm also have positive and at 
least marginally significant effects on a firm's willingness to provide 
transportation or child care and on its responsiveness to subsidies or 
agency intermediation. Together with the results for hiring less quali 
fied workers, these results imply that changes in these market tightness 
variables over the business cycle, of the magnitudes assumed earlier in 
this paper, would generate some significant differences in the provision 
of workplace supports and effectiveness of policy interventions on 
behalf of welfare recipients. For instance, the estimates imply that a 
recession would reduce the willingness of those who had contact with 
a Michigan Works! agency to hire recipients by roughly 7-9 percent 
age points (relative to the current level 0.59), and would reduce will 
ingness to hire more recipients in response to subsidies by 4-6 
percentage points (relative to its current level of 0.32). If anything, 
these estimates probably understate the effects of the cycle to a consid 
erable degree. 37
CONCLUSION
This paper presents data on employer demand for welfare recipi 
ents from a recent survey of employers in Michigan. We investigate 
the determinants of employers' willingness to hire welfare recipients 
either currently or in the future, as well as the tendency to have done so
Table 5 Determinants of Workplace Supports for Welfare Recipients and Responses to Policies
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-0.039 0.200
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1 Specifications 1-3 correspond to those in Table 4.
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over the past two years. We focus specifically on how such demand is 
affected by establishment-level measures of labor market tightness, 
such as job vacancy rates and their recent need to have hired workers 
with lower-than-usual qualifications. We also explore the effects of 
these variables on employer willingness to provide a variety of work 
place supports to any welfare recipients whom they might hire and on 
the extent to which their hiring or training of recipients might be 
affected by subsidies and credits, technical assistance, or labor market 
intermediation by local agencies.
The results of this study can be summarized as follows:
• Self-reported employer demand for welfare recipients is cur 
rently quite high in Michigan.
• Labor markets in Michigan are currently very tight.
• The tightness of the labor market accounts for significant por 
tions of the current demand for recipients, which will likely dis 
appear during the next recession.
• Labor market tightness makes employers more willing to pro 
vide workplace supports (such as training) to recipients whom 
they hire, and the employers are also more open to potential pol 
icy interventions on their behalf.
More specifically, employers in Michigan currently experience a 
considerable degree of labor market tightness. Job vacancy rates 
appear to be higher than current unemployment rates. About 80 per 
cent of employers report at least some difficulty finding qualified appli 
cants, and about 40 percent claim that they have hired workers recently 
with lower-than-usual qualifications. Regarding employer willingness 
to hire welfare recipients, they claim that they would be willing to fill 
about 3 percent of all of their jobs (or roughly half of their job vacan 
cies) right away with recipients, even if the latter had no high school 
diploma or recent work experience, and that they would be willing to 
hire many more over the next year. Furthermore, roughly 40 percent of 
employers claim that they have already hired one or more welfare 
recipients during the past two years. On the other hand, long-term wel 
fare recipients and especially inner-city minorities might have limited 
access to many of these jobs, for a variety of reasons.
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To what extent do the hiring difficulties of employers that are 
attributable to labor market tightness affect their willingness to hire 
welfare recipients? Our measures of market tightness and of willing 
ness to hire recipients are both particularly high in certain sectors of 
the labor market, such as small establishments and the retail trade sec 
tor. Yet, even controlling for these and other observable characteristics 
of establishments, we find that those with high vacancy rates (and, to 
some extent, those that have recently hired less-qualified workers) are 
more likely to hire welfare recipients, both currently and over the next 
year.
Using these cross-sectional estimates to predict the effects of the 
aggregate business cycle on hiring lead us to predict that a recession 
would reduce the current demand for welfare recipients by 25-40 per 
cent, and longer-term hiring by somewhat greater absolute magnitudes 
(but smaller percentage ones). Estimated effects of demand conditions 
on small establishments, and especially those in retail trade, are even 
higher than those observed overall. Of course, there are potential prob 
lems with inferring aggregate time-series economic changes from a 
cross-section of data, though the biases caused here could go in either 
direction. Measurement error in our more-subjective dependent and 
independent variables likely generate inefficiency and/or downward 
biases in these estimates, which also fail to include the effects of the 
cycle on the employment of recipients through its effects on retention 
as well as hiring. Overall, the results should be interpreted as sugges 
tive rather than definitive with regards to specific magnitudes of 
effects.
The data also imply that many firms might now be responsive to a 
wide range of potential government efforts to improve the employ 
ment prospects of welfare recipients. These include placement efforts 
by intermediaries, wage subsidies or tax credits for the hiring of disad- 
vantaged recipients (provided they are "employer-friendly"), and tax 
credits or technical assistance for providing them with training. Fur 
thermore, under tight labor markets, employers appear to be more 
willing than they otherwise would be to provide certain workplace 
supports (such as transportation, child care assistance, or training) to 
welfare recipients, and to respond to the kinds of government efforts 
mentioned above.
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Overall, these results imply that the labor market difficulties of 
welfare recipients will almost certainly grow more severe during the 
next recession. There will likely be some need to provide countercycli 
cal increases in labor demand (perhaps through some version of public 
service employment), or at least to improve the safety nets that welfare 
recipients will face during that time. The fact that some of the least- 
skilled welfare recipients have not yet entered the labor market, and 
may be reaching their time limits for assistance during the next eco 
nomic downturn, renders these problems even more urgent.
Given the apparent openness of employers to policies aimed at 
improving the employment options of recipients in tight markets, and 
given that many long-term welfare recipients in inner-city will have 
limited access to available jobs (because of their poor skills, transpor 
tation or information problems, etc.), a strong case can also be made 
for funding some of these efforts right now, especially if they are 
accompanied by serious evaluation efforts. A fair amount of funding is 
potentially available during the current period of tightness, as many 
states and localities have surpluses to spend in their welfare budgets 
and are receiving "welfare-to-work" grants from the federal govern 
ment. Of course, even if these programs are successful in improving 
the current labor market prospects of recipients, the extent to which 
those who achieve some success now will be retained by employers 
during the next downturn remains unclear, though at least some persis 
tence of positive outcomes over the cycle should be expected.
This study also suggests the need for continued research on these 
issues. Data on prospective employer demand for welfare recipients 
during the next downturn is not a perfect substitute for data on actual 
demand when that downturn occurs. This is particularly true since the 
estimated effects of labor market tightness in a cross-section of firms 
might differ substantially from the effects of an aggregate downturn that 
affects all firms. Evidence on layoffs/retention (as well as on new hire 
rates) could be provided from such data, and we could also obtain data 
on the experiences of employers with the later entrants to the market, 
who are likely to be more disadvantaged than those whom we have 
observed to date. While many such experiences will be apparent from 
supply-side data on recipients and their labor market experiences, the 
data on employers can continue to provide insights on the demand-side 
factors that contribute to the outcomes we observe among these workers.
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Notes
1. This self-selection generally implies that the average employment outcomes that 
we've observed for welfare recipients to date are biased upwards, though the esti 
mated effects of labor market conditions or policy initiatives on these employment 
outcomes might not be.
2. See Eissa and Liebman (1996), Eissa and Hoynes (1998), and Bishop (1998) for 
evidence on the recent improvements in employment rates of single women. But, 
in these analyses of aggregate data over time, it is often difficult to disentangle the 
effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit, changes in Medicare coverage, welfare 
reform, and the business cycle.
3. One possible exception to this was a survey of establishments in Milwaukee, 
administered by the Employment and Training Institute of the University of Wis 
consin at Milwaukee (Employment and Training Institute 1995). They gauged the 
number of job vacancies, both overall and in specific occupations, and compared 
them with the number of unskilled, unemployed workers in the metropolitan area. 
As of the mid 1990s, the number of unemployed workers continued to exceed the 
number of vacant jobs, despite the very low unemployment rates there.
4 Another wave of the survey will be administered to the same establishments in 
Michigan during the fall of 1999. The survey is currently being administered in 
several other metropolitan areas such as Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Los 
Angeles.
5. Michigan Works! agencies are private contractors with the various Workforce 
Development Boards established at the county level by the Michigan Jobs Com 
mission. For more detailed descriptions of their activities see Seefeldt et al. 
(1998).
6. The exact wording of these questions was as follows: "Suppose you were con 
tacted by an employment agency that was trying to place welfare recipients who 
did not have a high school diploma or any recent work experience Do you cur 
rently have any open positions that you might consider filling with these welfare 
recipients?" If yes: "How many of them would you consider employing right 
away?" For the following year: "Do you think you will have open positions dur 
ing the next year that you might consider filling with these welfare recipients?" If 
yes: "How many of them would you possibly employ at any time during the next 
year?"
7 These three industries account for almost 80% of the establishments in the survey. 
Also, "central city" refers to the city of Detroit, as well as Flint and Grand Rapids, 
but does not include other municipalities that are officially designated as "central 
cities" by the Census Bureau in these areas, such as Dearborn or Pontiac.
8. We have set missing values equal to zero for the question of whether or not 
employers had hired welfare recipients over the previous two years; these account 
for roughly 20% of the sample in this case. The wages on jobs actually filled by 
recipients, as well as those prospectively available to them, averaged between 
$6.00 and 6.50, and about two-thirds offered some type of health care coverage.
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9. Reported job availability for welfare recipients was particularly high in restau 
rants and in health care facilities and personal service establishments in the ser 
vice sector.
10. Larger establishments are more likely to have hired at least one recipient, given 
that they engage in more hiring overall, but were not as high in terms of percent 
ages of their respective workforces.
11. In Detroit, job availability for welfare recipients was actually higher in the central 
city than the suburbs, while the opposite was true in Flint and Grand Rapids.
12. The correlation between job availability currently and over the next year for wel 
fare recipients is roughly 0.6, while the correlation between availability over the 
next year and the past two years is roughly 0.3.
13. In fact, the vast majority of available jobs for welfare recipients are in relatively 
small establishments (i.e., those with 50 or fewer employees), in suburban loca 
tions that are frequently not accessible to public transit, in establishments that 
recruit unskilled workers informally, or in establishments that frequently receive 
no applications from blacks (Holzer 1998b). Thus, many potentially available 
jobs will be relatively inaccessible to poor minority residents of inner-city areas, 
who constitute large fractions of long-term welfare recipients. The basic skills 
required on many of these jobs may also put some out of the reach of long-term 
recipients with poor cognitive abilities (Pavetti 1997).
14. See, for instance, Abraham (1983) and Holzer (1989) for evidence that unemploy 
ment rates usually exceed job vacancy rates by considerable amounts at all points 
in the business cycle. The question used in this survey to gauge job vacancies 
asks about all vacant jobs that the employer is currently trying to fill, while the 
question used in other surveys has generally also stipulated that these vacancies 
be available for immediate occupancy. It seems quite unlikely that a large per 
centage of vacancies that employers are currently trying to fill would only be 
available for future occupancy, though such a restriction might reduce the current 
vacancy rate to the 4-5% range.
15. For instance, when we analyze the most recently filled job in each establishment, 
we find that employers do not require (or even strongly prefer) high school diplo 
mas, previous experience, or training in roughly 17% of these jobs, and they also 
do not require reading/writing or arithmetic in just 11%.
16. This assumes that the errors are not correlated with the independent variables of 
interest
17. Dummies for all one-digit industries are included, with construction as the omit 
ted category. Locational variables include dummies for metropolitan area, central 
city, and interactions between them.
18. See Davis, Holtiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg 
(1985), and Holzer (1994, 1996).
19. Measures of overall hiring activity or recent difficulty in finding qualified appli 
cants did not generate significant estimates in these equations after controlling for 
the job vacancy rate.
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20. The three measures of skill demand that appear in Table 1 all generated qualita 
tively similar estimates when used as independent variables in these equations.
21. The dependent variable might be censored if, for example, very weak demand 
generates "negative hiring" or layoffs of welfare recipients while measured will 
ingness to hire is zero.
22. Given the discrepancy that we noted above between traditional measures of 
vacancy rates and those presented here (note 14), we assume that current rates 
could be in the range of 4-6% if measured comparably to more traditional mea 
sures.
23. Calculations of predicted values using tobit estimates must also allow for the 
probability that individual observations were censored at the outset. The sample- 
wide predictions here do not appear to differ substantially from those generated 
using the OLS estimates.
24. The estimates will be upward-biased if the firm-specific components of job 
vacancy rates have larger effects on demand for recipients than do the more cycli 
cal components. This will be true if, for example, high-turnover firms regard wel 
fare recipients as potentially more stable sources of labor than the ones on which 
they currently draw. But it is also possible that such firms have limited costs asso 
ciated with such turnover, in which case temporarily high demand might be more 
costly and generate greater effects on their hiring behavior.
25. For instance, the figures presented in Freeman and Rodgers (1998) show that the 
employment rates of less-educated young black males (i.e., those aged 16-24 with 
12 or fewer years of education) have varied by roughly one-fourth to one-third 
over the last few business cycles. Hoynes (1998) also shows that demand for less- 
skilled females is more cyclically sensitive than that of less-skilled males. Neither 
paper focuses exclusively on high school dropouts or other unskilled workers 
whose employment experiences might be more comparable to those of welfare 
recipients.
26. Indeed, these variables had little significant effect in any of the estimated equa 
tions for current willingness to hire welfare recipients but had more effect in equa 
tions for past or future hiring.
27. The percentage of jobs currently filled by workers with low qualifications also 
generated significant effects in the OLS version of the equation for future hiring, 
though it performed considerably less well than the dummy variable for any such 
hiring in some other equations presented below. While the continuous version of 
this variable might generally be preferred to the categorical one, it is likely that 
the former are measured with more error as well.
28. In other words, the lower end of the range of predictions was generated by using 
the lower bound changes in both independent variables, while the upper end of the 
predictions was generated using the upper bound changes in both cases.
29. For instance, the predictions from the OLS equations suggest that the probability 
of hiring any welfare recipient over a two-year period should decline by 17-33% 
in a recession, while the percentage of jobs available to recipients over the next 
year should decline by 14-22%.
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30. The percentage decline in the overall demand for labor among welfare recipients 
will thus reflect the relative magnitudes of declines in retention as well as in new 
hiring. Davis, Holtiwanger, and Schuh (1996) suggest that the former are gener 
ally more important in explaining the variation in unemployment rates over the 
business cycle, as changes in movements "into" unemployment appear to domi 
nate changes in movements "out."
31. For instance, specific experience was absolutely necessary or strongly preferred in 
56% of non-college jobs filled m 1992-93 but only in 49% in 1997, even though 
the fraction of newly filled jobs that were white collar was higher in the earlier 
period. The ratio of the percentage of new hires that are black to the percentage of 
applicants that are black rose from 0.78 to 0.85 as well.
32. The effects of vacancy rates and the hiring of less-qualified workers on wage lev 
els and provision of health benefits on jobs actually filled by welfare recipients 
and those prospectively available were generally negative but not significant, even 
after controlling for establishment characteristics such as industry, size, and loca 
tion.
33. For the first six of these dependent variables, we assign the value of 1 to both 
"yes" and "maybe" responses and the value of 0 to "no."
34. The relatively small numbers of employers who answered "maybe" to these ques 
tions are counted among the positive answers here. Missing values are excluded 
from the sample.
35. More evidence on the likely effects of wage subsidies and intermediary efforts 
appears in Holzer (1998b). The magnitudes of the reported hiring increases in 
response to hypothetical wage subsidies are generally consistent with estimates of 
labor demand elasticities for unskilled workers. But, firms often showed little 
knowledge of existing federal tax credits for hiring welfare recipients and often 
seemed unwilling to claim these credits even when they were aware of them and 
eligible to receive them. These results suggest that tax credits might be much 
more effective when provided in an "employer-friendly" fashion and when 
accompanied by significant outreach efforts, perhaps by intermediaries who han 
dle the paperwork (see also Katz 1998). While a majonty of the firms that had 
contact with an agency hired recipients, only about 17% of the total reported any 
such contact.
36. Of all of these estimates, significant levels are marginal only in the case of job- 
related training.
37. For instance, the likelihood that establishments have contact with the agency at all 
probably declines in a recession as well, especially for those cases where the con 
tact was initiated by the establishment rather than the agency.
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Part III 
How Are the States Responding?
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What Will the States Do When 
Jobs Are Not Plentiful?
Policy and Implementation Challenges
LaDonna A. Pavetti 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended the individual entitlement to welfare 
benefits under the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Chil 
dren (AFDC) program and eliminated the companion welfare-to-work 
program, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training pro 
gram created by the Family Support Act of 1988. PRWORA provides 
each state with a block grant to establish a Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program.
In contrast to the AFDC program (which provided cash assistance 
for as long as needed) and to the JOBS program (which encouraged 
recipients to participate in long-term education and training programs), 
TANF provides short-term, work-oriented assistance to poor families 
with children. TANF recipients are required to work once they are job- 
ready or after receiving assistance for not more than 24 months (and 
less at state option), and persons are eligible to receive TANF assis 
tance for only 60 months out of their lifetime. To ensure that state 
TANF programs emphasize work, PRWORA requires states to meet 
steadily increasing work participation rates to receive their full block 
grant.
WELFARE REFORM IN A ROBUST ECONOMY
Given that PRWORA mandates a work-oriented assistance sys 
tem, the economic conditions under which states began their programs
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could not have been better. In most areas of the country, welfare 
offices shifted to a work-based system during a time when jobs were 
plentiful. When PRWORA was signed into law in August 1996, the 
unemployment rate was just 5.2 percent, down from almost 7 percent 
four years earlier. By October 1998, the unemployment rate had 
declined even further, to 4.6 percent; for women over the age of 20, the 
unemployment rate was just 4.0 percent. Although unemployment 
rates remain higher for population groups who traditionally have had a 
harder time finding employment, unemployment rates have declined 
for these groups as well. For example, persons over the age of 25 years 
of age without a high school diploma currently face an unemployment 
rate of 6.8 percent, down from 8.5 percent in August 1996, and African 
Americans face an unemployment rate of 8.6 percent, down from 10.7 
percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998). There are, however, areas of 
the country that have not shared in the good fortunes of the current eco 
nomic boom; for example, former coal mining regions in Kentucky and 
Virginia are currently experiencing unemployment rates of nearly 20 
percent.
A strong, robust economy with low inflation rates and unprece 
dented policy and programmatic changes in the welfare system have 
resulted in significant declines in the number of families receiving cash 
assistance; between January 1993 and June 1998, that number declined 
by 39 percent, from 4.96 million to 3.03 million families. Sixteen 
states experienced at least a 50 percent reduction in the number of fam 
ilies receiving assistance. However, with caseload declines of 18 and 
24 percent, respectively, California and New York (the states with the 
two largest caseloads) experienced significantly smaller caseload 
declines than most other states and the nation as a whole. Hawaii, the 
only state with an increased caseload, provided cash assistance to 38 
percent more families in June 1998 than in January 1993 (Administra 
tion for Children and Families 1998).
As a result of the steep decline in AFDC/TANF caseloads, most 
states have been able to implement major work-based reforms in a 
resource-rich environment. A recent General Accounting Office study 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1998) found that the amount of 
TANF funds available to states for 1997 was $4.7 billion more than 
states would have had under the old AFDC formula. The median 
increase for states was 22 percent, with 46 states having more money
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than they would have had under AFDC formula. Since the enactment 
of PRWORA, states also have achieved budgetary savings by reducing 
state expenditures on welfare programs to the 75 or 80 percent "main 
tenance of effort" (MOE) required by federal law. Even with the state 
budgetary savings, 21 states are spending more per recipient than they 
were prior to the implementation of TANF (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1998).
On top of their TANF funding, over the next several years states 
and localities will have access to close to $3 billion in additional funds 
from the Welfare-to-work grants program (legislated in 1997) to 
implement work-based strategies for hard-to-employ welfare recipi 
ents. Some communities are using these funds to expand existing pro 
grams; others are using them to develop more intensive short-term 
training and/or supported work programs, or to provide existing and/or 
new services to underserved groups such as noncustodial fathers. 
Through the Child Care Development block grant, states also received 
additional funding to expand their child care programs for welfare 
recipients and/or for the working poor. Several states have used these 
additional funds to fully fund their child care program for welfare 
recipients and to eliminate or significantly reduce the waiting list for 
child care for working poor families.
Implementing work-oriented reforms in a resource-rich and job- 
rich environment has meant that states have been able to require the 
majority of TANF applicants or recipients to participate in work or 
work-related activities without developing long waiting lists, as was 
often the case under the JOBS program. Given the low unemployment 
rate, they have tended to rely on low-cost job search strategies while 
providing support services, especially child care and transportation 
assistance, to families who cannot afford to pay for these services on 
their own.
Now that caseloads have declined, many states have started to 
expand their welfare-to-work programs to help recipients retain jobs 
and advance to better jobs, instead of just focusing on getting recipi 
ents into jobs as they have in the past. For example, Rhode Island has 
implemented a statewide job retention unit to provide assistance to 
recipients who have been placed in employment and to employers who 
have hired recipients. Utah is providing training and paying for addi 
tional supervision for some welfare recipients who are placed in
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unsubsidized employment. Because many families remaining on the 
TANF rolls are harder-to-employ, some states have started to experi 
ment with ways to help families facing a broad array of personal and 
family challenges make the transition from welfare to work. Oregon, 
North Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey have implemented pro 
grams to identify and refer recipients to substance abuse treatment pro 
grams. Washington, Kansas, and Minnesota are implementing 
programs to identify and provide services to recipients with learning 
disabilities. Because they have multiple barriers to employment, many 
of the families left on the welfare rolls are likely to require more 
resources to make the transition to employment than those who have 
already left the rolls. For now, the extra resources that states and local 
ities have at their disposal have created an environment that is welcom 
ing of new ideas and supports investment in promising (but not yet 
proven) strategies to help welfare recipients with limited attachment to 
the labor force become self-sufficient.
IMPLEMENTING WORK-BASED REFORMS WHEN JOBS 
ARE MORE SCARCE
When the economy changes and firms are laying off more workers 
than they are hiring, federal, state, and local decision makers and pro 
gram operators will face a different set of policy and programmatic 
choices than they face in the current environment. Given PRWORA 
mandates and that widespread support exists for a work-based assis 
tance system, it is unlikely that a downturn in the economy will result 
in a shift away from the current emphasis on employment. Thus, the 
major challenge decision makers will face is identifying options for 
maintaining a focus on work in an environment where unsubsidized 
employment is more difficult to find, where welfare entrances will 
increase and exits will decrease, and where financial resources no 
longer expand to meet the increased demand for assistance.
PRWORA gave states unprecedented authority to decide how they 
would use their fixed TANF funds to meet the income, employment, 
and support service needs of poor families with children. PRWORA 
does, however, provide broad programmatic guidelines that have
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shaped the design of many state TANF programs and will affect states' 
ability to respond to an economic downturn. For example, PRWORA 
defines the activities that can count towards a state's work participation 
rate and specifies the number of hours a recipient must participate in 
allowable activities. PRWORA also set a lifetime limit on assistance 
and the fraction of a state's caseload that can be exempt from the time 
limit. As a result of the requirements PRWORA places on states, Con 
gress and the federal government will have a major role to play in 
developing an appropriate response to an economic downturn, or states 
will face programmatic and financial difficulties.
Within PRWORA's framework, states and localities have imple 
mented a variety of strategies to transform their cash assistance sys 
tems into systems that mandate and support work. Table 1 provides 
examples of the types of policies states have implemented. At the core 
of nearly all of these reform efforts are job search assistance and job 
placement programs, generally referred to as "Work First" programs. 
These programs range from independent job search programs (such as 
those implemented in Virginia, where recipients mostly are required to 
look for employment on their own and report regularly on their 
progress) to more structured group job search programs such as those 
implemented in Oregon and Nebraska (where recipients participate in 
structured job search activities such as how to complete an application, 
write a resume, and conduct themselves in a job interview). Even if 
different in their day-to-day operation, these programs share a common 
philosophy regarding world: any job is viewed as a good job, and pro 
gram efforts are geared towards helping recipients enter the labor mar 
ket as quickly as possible (Brown 1997; Holcomb et al. 1998).
In many states, the work expectations set forth through these pro 
grams have been reinforced with more stringent financial penalties for 
noncompliance (sanctions), more generous earned-income disregards 
that allow more recipients to continue to receive cash assistance while 
they are working, and time limits to create a new social contract that 
presents assistance recipients with a very different set of expectations 
and choices than they have faced in the past. While some states like 
California and Washington have relied primarily on incentives to 
encourage parents to enter the paid labor market, other states such as 
Wisconsin have relied more on penalties for not complying with work 
mandates. A number of states, like Massachusetts and Florida, have








Immediate job search; 
unsubsidized employment 
required at 18 months





Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
Benefit reduction
Initial benefit reduction 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance




60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
60 months, followed by 
reduction in benefits
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
48 months, followed by 
termination of benefits2
Earnings disregard policy
100% of earnings in first 3 
months, then 20%
$225 and 50 percent of 
remainder
Vanes by county
$200 and 50 percent of 
remainder
Massachusetts Work or community 
service required within 
60 days for families with a 
child over the age of 6; no 
job search or work require 
ment for other families
Initial benefit reduction 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
24 months out of 60, 
followed by termination 
of benefits




Michigan Immediate job search Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
None $200 and 20% of remainder
Minnesota Job search for 8 weeks, 
followed by assessment 




Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
36%
Mississippi Immediate job search Immediate loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
100% for first 6 months if 
full-time employment is 
obtained within 30 days after 
job search is required; 
otherwise $90
New Jersey Immediate job search,
followed by various work 
readiness activities
Initial benefit reduction, 
followed by loss of all cash 
assistance
60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
100% for first month, then 50 
percent
New York Determined by counties; 
immediate job search and 
community work 
experience are common
Benefit reduction 60 months, followed by 
reduction in benefits3
$90 and 42% of remainder
Texas Job search immediately Benefit reduction 60 months, followed by 
termination of benefits
$120 and 1/3 of remainder for 
four months; $120 for eight 
months; then $90
Washington Job search or other work 
activities after assessment 
and development of an 
Individual Responsibility 
Plan












Benefit reduction or loss 
of all cash assistance4
Most stringent 
time limit




Source: Gallagher et al. 1998.
1 Information is presented for the 13 states that are a part of the Urban Institute's "Assessing the New Federalism" project, a multi-year 
project designed to examine state choices and outcomes associated with the implementation of PRWORA.
2 In addition to the 48-month lifetime limit, Florida also has a 24-out-of-48-month time limit for job-ready recipients and a time limit of 
36 out of 72 months for long-term recipients with poor job skills and little work experience.
3 In addition to benefits being reduced, payments are provided in the form of vendor payments to cover the family's major expenses such 
as rent or utilities.
4 Wisconsin uses a "pay for performance" system of determining benefits. If a recipient works some, but not all of the required hours, 
their grant is reduced by the minimum wage for every hour not worked. If a recipient does not work any of the required hours, they do 
not receive any of their cash assistance.
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combined incentives and penalties. With a few exceptions, most states 
have imposed lifetime limits on the number of months families can 
receive TANF assistance. These limits have created a sense of urgency 
not found in previous welfare-to-work programs.
When the economy weakens, decision makers and program opera 
tors are likely to face five key challenges: 1) reallocating program 
expenditures to account for larger assistance caseloads; 2) reassessing 
what constitutes work participation and for whom participation is 
required; 3) identifying strategies for continuing to provide work 
incentives and work supports when resources are limited; 4) reassess 
ing time limits to take into account the more limited availability of 
jobs; and 5) maintaining a focus on strategies to help the hardest-to- 
employ find jobs and to help recipients keep their jobs longer and move 
into better jobs. Politics, fiscal realities, programmatic goals, and 
administrative capacity all are likely to influence the way in which 
states and localities resolve these challenges.
Reallocating Program Expenditures to Account for Larger 
Assistance Caseloads
States have had additional resources to spend on welfare-to-work 
activities and supportive services for welfare recipients because they 
are spending less money providing cash assistance to families. When 
jobs are not as readily available as they are now, caseloads are likely to 
begin to increase. It is possible that cash assistance caseloads will not 
increase to their previously high levels. Nonetheless, because welfare- 
to-work program activities and support services are now essential com 
ponents of state TANF programs, for the first time states will be forced 
to weigh the tradeoffs between allocating resources to cash grants and 
other services that help parents to find and maintain work.
Although states and localities now have the authority to deny cash 
assistance to families seeking assistance if expenditures for cash bene 
fits begin to exceed budget allocations, there are no indications that 
states will pursue this course of action. Even though PRWORA ended 
the entitlement to cash assistance, states have continued to treat the 
receipt of TANF benefits as an entitlement; that is, all families who 
apply for assistance and meet the eligibility criteria (including any 
work requirements) receive cash assistance.
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Some states, however, have tightened the eligibility requirements, 
resulting in a smaller pool of eligible families. For example, Idaho's 
caseload declined by 77 percent between January 1997 and June 1998, 
primarily because the state began to count income from the Supple 
mental Security Income (SSI) program when determining eligibility 
for TANF cash assistance. Most states that have tightened eligibility 
requirements have done so by imposing work-related requirements on 
families when they apply for assistance. For example, 16 states require 
parents to look for work before their application for assistance is 
approved (Maloy et al. 1998). If caseloads begin to increase rapidly 
during a recession, other states may begin to include additional sources 
of income when determining eligibility. However, states may be less 
inclined to impose work requirements as a condition of eligibility since 
fewer applicants are likely to find jobs and more families are likely to 
turn to the welfare system because they have just lost a job.
Because TANF funding is fixed, if states continue to maintain the 
entitlement to cash assistance and caseloads begin to increase, states 
are likely to begin to look for "non-essential" services that can be 
reduced or eliminated in order to meet the cost of providing cash assis 
tance to a larger number of families. In addition, states that have 
shifted primary responsibility for the design and implementation of 
TANF programs to county governments or other local entities are 
likely to face difficult decisions about how to allocate limited resources 
to local entities with very different needs and priorities. To further 
complicate the situation, states are likely to be making these decisions 
at the same time they are required to place large numbers of their 
TANF caseloads in acceptable work activities. This complex set of cir 
cumstances is likely to result in a search for new and cheaper alterna 
tives for maintaining a focus on work.
Reassessing What Constitutes Work Participation and for Whom 
It is Required
Several key features that have distinguished current welfare-to- 
work programs from their predecessors are likely to form the basis of 
discussions about how to maintain an emphasis on work when fewer 
jobs are available and resources are more limited than they are now. 
Chief among those features are the emphasis on job search and other
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work activities, the expansion of work participation requirements to the 
majority of welfare recipients, and the emphasis on personal responsi 
bility. All of these issues are likely to be revisited if the economy 
weakens. However, given that states have approached welfare reform 
differently, the extent to which each of these issues is revisited is likely 
to vary from state to state.
PRWORA is explicit in its definition of what constitutes participa 
tion in work activities. In contrast to the former JOBS program that 
emphasized placement in long-term education and training activities, 
the allowable activities under TANF are much more directly oriented 
toward work. Activities that can count toward a state's work participa 
tion rate include: 1) unsubsidized or subsidized private or public sector 
employment; 2) on-the-job training; 3) work experience; 4) job search 
and job readiness assistance for up to six weeks; 5) community service 
programs; 6) provision of child care services to an individual partici 
pating in a community services program; and 7) vocational educational 
training (limited to 12 months for any individual and to 30 percent of 
those required to participate).
Under the JOBS program, only a small fraction of the AFDC case 
load (less than 10 percent) was mandated to participate in program 
activities, primarily because all families with children aged three and 
younger were exempt from participation. In addition, due to limited 
resources, many parents who were required to participate spent long 
periods of time on waiting lists and never actually participated in pro 
gram activities.
Under TANF, mandatory program participation has been extended 
to a substantially larger share of the TANF caseload. PRWORA gives 
states the option to exempt parents from participating in work activities 
if their youngest child is under the age of one. Only five states have 
chosen to exempt families caring for a child over the age of one year 
from their work participation requirements; 1 22 states require parents 
with children under a year to participate in program activities. In 1997, 
among the 39 states for which data is currently available, 61.5 percent 
of TANF adults were subject to the TANF participation rates (Adminis 
tration for Children and Families 1998).
Over time, as Table 2 shows, the share of the caseload required to 
participate in program activities and the intensity of participation 
increases. In FY 1997, states were required to have 25 percent of all
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families participating in work activities for a minimum of 20 hours per 
week; by FY 2002 the participation requirements increase to 50 per 
cent of the caseload participating in work activities for a minimum of 
30 hours per week. States also are required to meet significantly 
higher two-parent participation rates.
Underlying the shift to a mandatory work-based assistance is the 
belief that it is reasonable to require families to meet a set of expecta 
tions in exchange for government assistance. Given the time and 
energy local offices have invested in changing recipient and worker 
expectations, states and localities are likely to be quite reluctant to shift 
away from an emphasis on work and personal responsibility, even in an 
economic downturn when fewer jobs are available. Instead, states and 
localities will be faced with a difficult set of choices around how and 
whether to redefine what constitutes program participation, how to 
expand community work experience and subsidized work opportuni 
ties, and whether to reduce the pool of recipients required to participate 
in program activities. The experiences of states to date provide some 
indication of the magnitude of this challenge.
The strength of the economy has made it possible for many states 
to meet then" work participation requirements for all families primarily 
through a "pro rata reduction" in the participation rate to account for 
the decline in a state's caseload, unsubsidized employment, and partic 
ipation in job search. Participation in other work activities such as sub-
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sidized employment or community work experience has been less 
common.
The data presented in Table 3 illustrate the importance of the pro 
rata reduction and the extent to which states have been able to rely on 
the strength of the economy to meet the TANF work participation rates. 
Because of its significant caseload decline, Wisconsin was only 
required to have 8 percent of its TANF caseload that is subject to the 
TANF work participation requirement participating in work activities; 
with 53 percent of families participating in work activities, Wisconsin 
far exceeded the participation rate for FY 1997. The majority of fami 
lies in Wisconsin worked in unsubsidized jobs or participated in job 
search, although a sizable number also participated in work experience. 
Although California met its work participation requirement, it did so 
only by a small margin. Unlike Wisconsin, California primarily met its 
work participation targets through unsubsidized unemployment; only a 
small fraction of parents met the participation requirement by partici 
pating in job search, and an even smaller fraction met the requirement 
by participating in subsidized employment, on-the-job training, work 
experience, or community service.
Even during an economic downturn, job search programs are likely 
to remain at the core of state efforts to help welfare recipients find jobs. 
Although it is likely to take many recipients longer than the six weeks 
currently allowed under PRWORA to find employment, a substantially 
higher unemployment rate will not mean that such programs will need 
to come to a halt. Although few new jobs may be created during an 
economic downturn, normal job turnover, especially in low-wage jobs, 
will continue to produce job openings for welfare recipients to fill. In 
fact, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which welfare recipients, with 
better access to job search assistance and job developers who have cul 
tivated relationships with employers, may have an easier time finding 
employment than other low-skilled, unemployed persons who are left 
completely on their own to find employment in a slack labor market.
Even if job search remains the core of state and local welfare-to- 
work efforts, when fewer jobs are available, there is likely to be a greater 
need for alternative work-related activities such as community work 
experience or subsidized employment programs. A comparison of two 
localities in Virginia with dramatically different labor markets illustrates 
this point. In Virginia, TANF recipients with a child 18 months or older
Table 3 TANF Work Participation for All Families, Fiscal Year 1997
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SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families 1998.
a The adjusted work participation rate takes into account the "pro rata reduction" that the state received due to the decline in its TANF
caseload. 
b Recipients may be participating in more than one activity; thus, the data presented here reflects a duplicated count of participants.
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are required to look for work for 90 days and then work for pay or par 
ticipate in a Community Work Experience Program (CWEP) where they 
"work off' their grant. Recipients who work for pay can continue to 
receive their full cash assistance grant as long as their income remains 
below the poverty line, creating an unambiguous incentive for anyone 
who can work for pay to do so. A year after Lynchburg—a community 
of 66,000 people with an unemployment rate of 3.3 percent in 1995— 
implemented welfare reform, 54 percent of the parents enrolled in the 
locality's welfare-to-work program had found full-time work and 14 
percent part-time work; only 7 percent had participated in CWEP. In 
stark contrast, a year after Wise County—a rural community of 40,000 
people with an unemployment rate of 17 percent in 1995—implemented 
welfare reform, 27 percent of parents had found full-time work, 24 per 
cent had found part-time work, and 26 percent had participated in 
CWEP.
Because states have been successful at placing recipients in unsub- 
sidized jobs, only a few states have developed alternative work activi 
ties for recipients who have not found employment. Oregon, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Vermont, and Washington have developed 
subsidized employment programs where TANF grants are used to 
reimburse employers for recipients' wages; however, all of these pro 
grams are quite small. New York City is the only locality that operates 
a large CWEP program. Most recipients who participate in the pro 
gram work alongside city workers, cleaning parks or helping with cler 
ical tasks such as filing; some also work for nonprofit organizations. 
Because these programs have been used so little, few states or localities 
will have an infrastructure in place that will facilitate the placement of 
large numbers of recipients in alternative work activities when it 
becomes more difficult to place recipients in unsubsidized jobs.
The experience of states with subsidized employment and commu 
nity work experience programs is one of implementation difficulties, 
even on a small scale (Holcomb et al. 1998). It is often difficult to 
recruit employers to participate in subsidized employment programs, 
especially if substantial paperwork is required. Community work 
experience programs are somewhat easier to implement because recip 
ients continue to receive their TANF grant. However, CWEP place 
ments often pose a significant management challenge, especially if
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placements are limited in duration and the recipients placed in the pro 
gram face substantial barriers.
The data in Table 4 suggest that if caseloads stayed at their current 
level, many states would have to substantially increase the number of 
parents participating in work activities to meet the 50 percent work 
participation standard that will be expected in FY 2002. California, for 
example, would need to more than double its current participation rate. 
There are, however, states such as Alabama, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
that could meet the FY 2002 work participation standard with their 
current level of participation in work activities. Because the high par 
ticipation rates in these states reflect large numbers of parents who are 
working in unsubsidized employment, when fewer jobs are available 
these states may find themselves facing very similar issues as states 
that currently have lower participation rates.
Table 4 Hypothetical TANF Work Participation in Fiscal Year 2002
Additional participation
Adjusted work Participation rate needed to meet 2002 
participation standard achieved standard5 (percentage 

















































a The FY 2002 adjusted work participation standard assumes the TANF caseload 
remains at its current level. To reflect the increase in the work participation rate, this 
adjusted rate is 25 percentage points higher than the FY 1997 adjusted standard.
b The increase in participation is obtained by substracting the FY 2002 adjusted work 
participation standard from the 1997 state participation rate.
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Implementing large-scale employment programs when financial 
resources are tight and work participation rates are increasing is likely 
to pose significant challenges—and may, in fact, be impossible. Job 
search programs are low cost because services can be provided in a 
large group setting with limited individualized assistance. Because 
subsidized employment or community work experience programs 
require more attention to individual circumstances and needs, they will 
cost substantially more than the job search programs most localities are 
currently operating. A lower-cost alternative would be to require recip 
ients to participate in less-structured community activities that they 
arrange on their own. Michigan operated such a program as the first 
stage of reforming its welfare system. Recipients were required to sign 
a "social contract" in which they agreed to participate in activities that 
made a positive contribution to the communities in which they lived. 
Participating on a resident council of a public housing development, 
volunteering at Head Start or a child's school, or volunteering at one's 
church are examples of the kinds of activities that could count toward a 
recipient's social contract obligation. Recipients were required to sub 
mit a form indicating they had completed their social contract activi 
ties, but only minimal enforcement and monitoring occurred (Pavetti, 
Holcomb, and Duke 1995).
Without some type of backup program requirement such as Michi 
gan's social contract in place, states may have a difficult time empha 
sizing work, at least to the degree that it is currently emphasized. 
Localities that are currently operating alternative work programs, even 
if on a small scale, are likely to face far fewer challenges when jobs are 
much less available than those states and localities that have no knowl 
edge of what it takes to operate such programs. Nonetheless, they too 
will face significant issues operating programs that are substantially 
larger than those currently in place.
Currently, states can place 30 percent of those required to partici 
pate in work activities (i.e., 30 percent of 25 percent in FY 1997, or 7.5 
percent) in education or vocational education programs. Relaxing this 
constraint to allow more parents to participate in these activities would 
provide states with additional program alternatives for recipients who 
are unsuccessful at finding employment. Expanding the definition of 
activities to include more traditional education programs (such as adult 
basic education or GED preparation programs) would increase these
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options even further. The advantage of allowing education and training 
programs to count as allowable program activities is that these pro 
grams exist in most local communities and can often expand in a rela 
tively short time to meet excess demand.
At the federal level, and in many states, the current emphasis on 
work was hard-won, and there is likely to be substantial resistance to 
broadening the definition of work activities to include additional edu 
cational activities or increasing the fraction of recipients who can par 
ticipate in vocational training programs. States already approach 
education and training quite differently. Those that currently view edu 
cation or training as an acceptable program activity are more likely to 
support making education and training available to more of the case 
load during a recession. Illinois has recently proposed extending the 
time limit for recipients who want to further their education. In 
Nebraska, education or training is an acceptable program activity as 
long as it can be completed within the state's 24-month time limit. 
However, in Virginia, participation in an education or training program 
is only permitted if it is combined with work. In the end, the decision 
on whether such expansions are appropriate even when jobs are not 
available is likely to be influenced by fiscal realities. To the extent that 
welfare offices can rely on educational programs that already exist in 
local communities, these programs may be substantially cheaper than 
developing new alternatives.
Instead of redefining what constitutes work participation or 
expanding expensive subsidized employment or community service 
programs, it is possible that Congress and the states would opt to 
reduce the pool of recipients required to participate in work activities. 
The 22 states that require parents with children under the age of one to 
participate in program activities could decrease the pool of recipients 
required to participate in work activities without changes in federal 
law. However, changes in federal law would be required to exempt 
families with children over the age of one. Especially in states where 
the emphasis on work over education and training is especially strong, 
reducing the pool of persons required to work may be more feasible 
politically than changing the definition of what constitutes work.
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Continuing to Provide Work Incentives and Work Supports
Work incentives in the form of earned income disregards and work 
supports such as child care and transportation have been an important 
component of state efforts to reform the welfare system. They have 
provided recipients with an incentive to go to work and TANF workers 
with a tool to reward recipients in their efforts to find work. Although 
recent research shows that, when combined with other program com 
ponents such as sanctions or time limits, work incentives result in 
higher levels of employment and higher income (Miller et al. 1997; 
Bloom et al. 1998), it may be difficult to maintain these investments 
when there is more competition for a fixed set of financial resources. 
Although the fraction of the caseload that combines work and welfare 
is larger than it was prior to the expansion of earned income disregard 
policies, working recipients still account for a minority of TANF recip 
ients. Between July and September 1997, 18 percent of the total TANF 
caseload was working. The variation from state to state was substan 
tial: only 3 percent of recipients were working in Texas compared with 
47 percent in Connecticut. As suggested by Wise County's experience, 
in a slack labor market it is possible that more families will only be 
able to find part-time work, resulting in an increase in the number of 
families who combine welfare and work. If this occurs, there may be 
pressure to control the costs of offering this additional assistance to 
working families. On the other hand, working recipients could help a 
state meet their work participation rates; the cost of providing partial 
grants to more recipients might be cheaper than implementing and 
managing large-scale subsidized work or CWEP programs.
The reduction in TANF caseloads has allowed many states to shift 
financial resources from providing cash grants to families to programs 
that help families pay for child care and transportation. Under the 
JOBS program, limited funds for these supportive services often 
resulted in long waiting lists. Even when families could identify edu 
cation or training programs in the community in which they could par 
ticipate at little or no cost, limited funds for child care often made it 
impossible for them to do. We are likely to see similar situations 
occurring if caseloads begin to increase, although it will occur in a 
more complex environment. Some states have used a portion of their 
TANF funds and their additional child care dollars to eliminate waiting
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lists for child care for working poor families. If more families begin to 
receive cash assistance and are required to participate in program activ 
ities almost full-time, child care resources will undoubtedly be 
stretched. Because child care is no longer an entitlement for cash 
assistance participants, families receiving cash assistance and working 
poor families will are likely to find themselves in direct competition for 
the same child care dollars.
Reassessing Time Limits
Although it is impossible to predict when we might begin to see a 
downturn in the economy, it is likely to occur around the same time 
that time limits begin to kick in and high work participation rates are in 
effect. Although there is reason to be concerned about what will hap 
pen when time limits hit, many states have implemented extension pol 
icies that will provide them with procedures to address the situations of 
recipients who have looked for work but have been unable to find it. 
Virginia, for example, provides unlimited extensions to families who 
hit the time limit in areas with high unemployment rates. Some states 
with extension policies in place have already made widespread use of 
those extensions for families who have played by the rules (Bloom et 
al. 1998), which may set the tone for other states to do so as well.
If the economy weakens and remains weak for an extended period 
of time, there may be a need to examine the possibility of allowing for 
extensions to the federal time limit and/or increasing the fraction of the 
caseload who can be exempted from the time limit. Currently, 
PRWORA allows states to exempt 20 percent of their caseload from 
the 60-month lifetime time limit, meaning that 20 percent of a state's 
caseload can receive benefits for more than 60 months. It is up to 
states to decide who will be exempted from the time limit. Although 
PRWORA does not make a distinction between extensions and exemp 
tions, states do make this distinction. Parents exempted from the time 
limit are parents who are not expected to meet the state's work require 
ments. Common exemptions include advanced age and a parent who 
is disabled or caring for a disabled child. Extensions to the time limit 
are generally granted to parents who are expected to work but have 
been unable to find work. Even if the 20 percent exemption ends up 
being sufficient to cover the number of families who are not expected
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to work, it is unlikely to be sufficient to cover the additional needs of 
families who can work but can't find jobs.
Due to the extremely strong emphasis on work and personal 
responsibility, it is possible that gaining political consensus to extend 
time limits may be less difficult than gaining consensus to expand the 
definition of what constitutes participation in work activities. In most 
states, time limits have been implemented in conjunction with full fam 
ily sanctions. This means that if policies are implemented as they are 
intended, the only families that will be affected by time limits are fam 
ilies that have played by the rules and have been unable to make it on 
their own. Families that do not play by the rules will have lost their 
benefits due to sanctions long before time limits hit. While there may 
be some opposition to extending time limits when jobs are not avail 
able (and especially when resources are limited), time limits may be 
less of an issue during an economic downturn than we might initially 
anticipate, especially if states are able to continue to mandate participa 
tion in work activities for families who have exhausted their time limit.
It is too early to have learned very much about how time limits 
have affected the behavior of recipients. However, early implementa 
tion analyses suggest that time limits have created a sense of urgency 
in local welfare offices and local communities that did not exist prior to 
welfare reform (Bloom and Butler 1995; Holcomb et al. 1998). One 
dilemma decision makers will face when jobs are not available is how 
to extend time limits for families who are unable to find employment 
while maintaining the sense of urgency that time limits have created. 
That sense of urgency has brought many communities together to iden 
tify opportunities for collaboration and to create common program 
goals, building on each organization's strengths to provide welfare 
recipients with the resources they need to succeed on their own. If 
time limits are relaxed and the sense of urgency is reduced, it is unclear 
whether community-based reform efforts will have garnered sufficient 
momentum to continue. It is interesting to note that in Wise County, 
Virginia, where recipients who exhaust their time limit will be eligible 
for benefits for an extended period of time because of the high unem 
ployment rate, the community has banded together to bring jobs to the 
area and to create opportunities for recipients to work in CWEP posi 
tions that might lead to future employment. The sense of urgency that
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exists in the county mirrors that found in other counties with signifi 
cantly lower unemployment rates.
Maintaining a Focus on Job Retention, Job Advancement, and 
Strategies for the Hard-to-Employ
Concerns about long-term welfare dependency provided the cata 
lyst to dramatically alter the purpose and structure of providing cash 
assistance as an entitlement. In spite of this focus on reducing long- 
term welfare dependency, most state and local efforts have emphasized 
reductions in caseload, not distinguishing which types of welfare recip 
ients were leaving the welfare rolls. To increase work among welfare 
recipients, most states have focused on strategies that have worked for 
recipients with moderate, but not more severe, barriers to employment. 
Many of these recipients probably would have had relatively short 
stays on welfare without any assistance or prodding. Those in the 
midst of long stays on welfare are most likely to still be on the welfare 
rolls today.
Now that caseloads have declined and states have more financial 
resources per recipient available, many states have turned their atten 
tion to strategies to help the hardest-to-employ, many of whom are 
long-term welfare recipients. Some states are working on integrating 
substance abuse treatment into their welfare-to-work programs by co- 
locating substance abuse professionals on site; others are trying to 
identify recipients with learning disabilities and provide accommoda 
tions such as specialized testing or job coaches for them; others are 
developing supported work programs, building on programs developed 
for persons with developmental disabilities or chronic mental health 
problems. Except in a few isolated programs, these strategies were not 
part of earlier welfare-to-work efforts.
Prior to the current round of reform, many hard-to-employ recipi 
ents were exempt from participating in welfare-to-work activities; oth 
ers who were not exempt languished in a holding status because TANF 
workers had neither the time nor the resources to work with them. The 
current resource-rich environment provides states and localities with 
an unprecedented opportunity to identify promising strategies for 
working with this group of families. A downturn in the economy has 
the potential to stall or significantly reduce these efforts. We know lit-
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tie about what strategies might work best for this group of families; in 
times of competition for scarce resources, states will be far less likely 
to invest in strategies that do not have a proven track record than they 
are in the current environment.
Similarly, the decline in caseloads has allowed states to begin to 
think about longer-term strategies for helping welfare recipients stay 
employed longer and move into better paying jobs. If resources 
become strained, these efforts are likely to be perceived as luxuries 
rather than necessities. Thus, like efforts to find promising strategies 
for the hard-to-employ, these efforts are likely to be halted if the econ 
omy weakens.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE POLICY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Many factors will undoubtedly affect how policymakers and pro 
gram administrators respond to a change in the economy. Two factors 
stand out as especially important: the extent to which caseloads 
increase when the unemployment rate begins to climb and the extent to 
which states and localities have created a stable infrastructure to sup 
port their current reform efforts.
How Much and How Fast Caseloads Increase
The magnitude of the problems states will face in maintaining a 
focus on work will largely depend on how much and how fast case 
loads rise. The more caseloads rise, the fewer resources states will 
have for providing alternative work or training activities for families 
unable to find employment in the paid labor market, for providing 
earned income disregards and work supports, and for maintaining their 
current efforts to promote job retention and identify strategies for the 
hardest-to-employ. Although research based on historical data sug 
gests that caseloads will rise substantially when the unemployment rate 
rises, there are several reasons why these models may overestimate 
caseload increases in the current policy environment.
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First, if a substantial fraction of recipients have left welfare for 
work and the economy continues to stay strong for awhile, we should 
expect some families who lose their jobs during an economic downturn 
to qualify for unemployment insurance. Only after an extended period 
of unemployment should these families need to turn to the welfare sys 
tem for support. While it is too early to tell how many families may 
fall into this category, as more employment data becomes available for 
recipients who have left the welfare rolls, it should be possible to esti 
mate the fraction of recipients who appear to meet the eligibility crite 
ria for unemployment insurance and will not immediately need to turn 
to the welfare system for support. However, in a recession, many 
workers exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits. This will be 
more of a problem if the recession is deep and long.
Second, assuming states continue to mandate participation in 
employment-related activities and impose full family sanctions, fami 
lies who are unwilling or unable to comply with these requirements 
will continue to be ineligible for benefits. Although there is no 
research that examines how much full family sanctions or noncompli- 
ance with applicant job search requirements have contributed to the 
decline in the AFDC/TANF caseload, the large number of families 
sanctioned would suggest they have played a nontrivial role. If work 
requirements become less stringent or are expanded to allow broader 
participation in education and training activities, it is possible that 
some families who previously failed to comply with work require 
ments may return to the welfare rolls. In addition, if sanctioned fami 
lies are now relying on family and friends who fall on hard times, they 
are likely to return to the welfare system if no other alternatives are 
available to them.
Third, with a more stringent work mandate in place, more recipi 
ents may find work in an economic downturn than would have prior to 
the implementation of such mandates. That is not to say that recipients 
will not find it very difficult to find employment. However, if recipi 
ents are required to look for work even in times of high unemployment, 
the speed with which and rate at which families leave welfare for work 
should be higher than they would have been during earlier years with 
similarly high unemployment rates when such mandates were not in 
place. Again, Wise County is a case in point. Although Wise County's 
caseload has not declined as fast as the state as a whole (40.2 percent),
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between June 1995 and April 1998 the county's caseload declined by 
18.5 percent.
The Stability of the New Welfare Infrastructure
States and localities are all at different stages of shifting to a work- 
based assistance system. While some states started to implement 
major reforms only recently, others implemented major reforms long 
before welfare reform passed at the federal level. States and localities 
that have a longer history of implementation will not be immune to the 
policy and implementation issues that all states and localities will face 
during an economic downturn. However, they are likely to be in a bet 
ter position to develop alternative program strategies and to redeploy 
staff resources. Organizations that are still in flux and have not yet 
developed a new, stable infrastructure to accommodate a focus on work 
will face an especially difficult time in responding to a downturn in the 
economy. Change takes time and is difficult for most staff, even when 
they believe the changes are positive. Implementing new changes 
before the first changes take hold could prove to be a disaster for local 
offices that are still trying to create an environment that promotes and 
supports work.
If TANF caseloads increase, food stamp and Medicaid caseloads 
will undoubtedly increase as well. While states have dealt with 
increases in these programs in the past, the environment in which these 
programs are currently operating has changed to accommodate the 
implementation of a work-based assistance system for families with 
children. To provide TANF program workers with reduced caseloads 
that make it feasible for them to focus on work-related and eligibility 
activities, many offices have increased the caseloads of workers who 
work with food stamp and Medicaid recipients not receiving TANF 
benefits, making it far more difficult for the latter workers to increase 
their caseloads any further.
Although states with lower caseload declines are likely to have a 
more difficult time meeting work participation rates in the short term, 
their current experiences may put them in a better position to adjust to 
a downturn in the economy. The strategies they are implementing are 
less likely to rely on the availability of the "extra" resources that states 
with very large caseload declines have available. In addition, they are
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more likely to have (or be putting into place) strategies that will help 
them to meet the work participation rates, without the advantage of an 
extremely large caseload reduction credit. For example, Kentucky and 
New York primarily have met their work participation requirements 
through actual participation rather than caseload reduction credits. 
New York operates a large community work experience program; Ken 
tucky makes extensive use of vocational education and work experi 
ence in addition to unsubsidized employment.
CONCLUSION
A downturn in the economy is inevitable; at some point, policy- 
makers at the federal, state, and local levels will be faced with deci 
sions about how to sustain a work-based assistance system when jobs 
are less readily available. While it seems unlikely that policymakers or 
program operators would shift away from a focus on work, it may be 
necessary to broaden the definition of what constitutes participation in 
a work activity. Such a definition might include more liberal use of 
vocational education or training programs and might also include 
active participation in community activities such as volunteering in a 
child's school. The other alternative will be to develop more alterna 
tive program activities such as community work experience or public 
service employment programs, but these programs often are costly to 
operate. With a fixed level of funding, states and localities will be 
faced with difficult choices about how to balance competing interests 
and program goals. Although it is impossible to fully prepare for an 
economic downturn, the choices states and localities make now will 
significantly affect the issues they will face when jobs are not as 
readily available as they are now. Given the range of choices available 
to them about how to spend their TANF and Welfare-to-work dollars, it 
is probably in every state's interest to begin, even if on a small scale, 
the development of a community service, work experience, and/or sub 
sidized employment program now while the economy is still strong. 
Developing the infrastructure for such a program in a resource-rich 
environment is likely to be far less daunting than it will be when 
resources are tight and employment opportunities are limited. States
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and localities have made significant progress in shifting to work-based 
assistance; nonetheless, welfare reform remains a work in progress. 
The ability to weather an economic downturn will be an important test 
of whether it is possible—and what it takes—to sustain an employ 
ment-focused assistance over the long term.
Note
1. Although states can choose to exempt families with a child over the age of one 
from participating in work activities, these families are included in the state's base 
of families who are subject to a work requirement for purposes of calculating a 
state's work participation rate.
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Cyclical Welfare Costs in the 
Post-Reform Era
Will There Be Enough Money?
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Although an economic downturn causes hardship for many indi 
viduals, those at the bottom of the income distribution are particularly 
hard hit. Poverty rates typically climb, and many of the newly destitute 
turn to the government for assistance, increasing the costs of safety net 
programs at precisely the time when the slowdown in economic activ 
ity leads to a reduction in tax revenues. Through 1996, the federal gov 
ernment covered at least half of these costs in the main cash assistance 
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the 
states made up the difference. Sweeping welfare reform legislation 
enacted in that year replaced AFDC, however. The new cash assistance 
program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), provides 
each state with a federal block grant, the amount of which does not 
depend upon the business cycle.
This new system creates potential difficulties for a state's ability to 
finance benefit payments during a recession. AFDC represented a very 
small share of the federal budget, and cyclical fluctuations in its costs 
were a tiny contributor to the annual budget deficits that ballooned dur 
ing the past two recessions. Because the federal government can easily 
obtain credit on financial markets, financing these additional costs was 
a trivial issue. States, on the other hand, face constraints that the fed 
eral government does not. In fact, many states have balanced budget 
requirements that do not allow them to spend more than the tax reve 
nues they collect. The debate preceding welfare reform recognized 
this problem, and the 1996 legislation created a contingency fund to
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provide additional resources to states experiencing serious economic 
downturns.
This paper will address the burden imposed on states by cyclically 
induced increases in the demand for welfare. The first part will esti 
mate how much states likely will be forced to spend on additional wel 
fare payments in the event of an economic downturn. I use data from 
1976-1996 on welfare expenditures and economic activity in all 50 
states and the District of Columbia and estimate the sensitivity of over 
all (state and federal) welfare costs to a recession. Then I review the 
specific details of the TANF program and the federal contingency fund 
that will determine how these costs will be split between federal and 
state governments. My findings indicate that the financial burden 
imposed upon some states is likely to be quite high because payments 
from the contingency fund will be inadequate to cover the welfare- 
related costs of a recession. Moreover, payments from the fund will 
not commence until well into a recession.
The high burden imposed upon states raises the question of the 
manner in which they will fund these cyclical expenditures. Although 
welfare reform may have been too recent for states to establish mecha 
nisms to address this problem, other state-administered programs, like 
the unemployment insurance (UI) system, have similar difficulties. 
This system has been in place long enough that the experiences with it 
may serve as a relevant example.
The second part of this paper, therefore, examines the financing of 
UI, with particular emphasis on the ability to cover the additional ben 
efit payments that are required during a recession. After providing 
details of the institutional arrangements of the financing system, I 
explore the historical ability of the system to provide adequate 
resources to fund high cyclical expenditures. I then simulate the 
resources required to weather recessions of different magnitudes in the 
future and determine whether current funding patterns are sufficient to 
meet these needs. Unfortunately, the results of this analysis do not 
bode well for many states' abilities to save for a rainy day.
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HOW MUCH DOES A RECESSION COST?
Research addressing the cyclical pattern of welfare activity has 
largely focused on changes in the size of the welfare caseload.' For 
instance, several recent studies indicate that a 1-percentage-point rise 
in the unemployment rate increases the number of people on welfare 
by roughly 4 to 6 percent (Blank 1997; Council of Economic Advisers 
1997; Levine and Whitmore 1998; Blank and Wallace, this volume; 
and Bartik and Eberts, this volume). Although such an expansion of the 
welfare rolls probably will have similar effects on expenditures, the 
cyclical effects may differ somewhat if the composition of the caseload 
changes (towards, say, larger families) or if states impose cyclical 
adjustments in the generosity of their benefits. Therefore, this section 
of the paper replicates a common approach taken to examine caseload 
cyclically, but focuses on actual welfare spending instead.
Specifically, the methodology employed is analogous to that used 
in Council of Economic Advisers (1997) and Levine and Whitmore 
(1998), which focused on explaining trends in the size of the welfare 
caseload. Using federal fiscal-year data from 1976-1996,1 estimate 
OLS regression models of the following form: 2
Eq.l f _ _ 
+ Js + Jt + trend x js + e^,
where
ESit = AFDC expenditures in state s in fiscal year ?,
a = the intercept,
U = the fiscal year unemployment rate,
B =real maximum AFDC benefits in 1996 dollars for a
three-person family,
YS and y, = state and year fixed effects, respectively, and 
e = a residual.
Lagged values of the unemployment rate are included along with the 
contemporaneous level because individuals may exhaust other sources 
of support before turning to the welfare system for help. Because 
Blank (1997) reported that welfare caseload effects hit their peak 18
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months following an increase in unemployment, I include up to two- 
year lags with the annual data available here. The year fixed effects 
capture time-varying factors that affect all states in a given year. Such 
factors might include changes in welfare policy (like OBRA 1981 or 
the Family Support Act of 1988), other changes in policies targeted to 
low-income individuals (like the Earned Income Tax Credit or Child 
Care and Development Block Grant), or changes in national attitudes 
regarding welfare receipt that may have been linked to the welfare 
reform debate. The state fixed effects control for time-invariant differ 
ences among states, such as differences in industrial composition that 
may affect less-skilled workers or attitudes towards welfare recipients. 
A state-specific linear trend is included to capture typically slow-mov 
ing changes in the characteristics of the low-income population, like 
teen and nonmarital birth rates, that may differ among states. 3
Consistent with Blank's findings, I indeed find a lag in the impact 
of a recession on welfare expenditures (Table 1). In the year the unem 
ployment rate begins to rise, no statistically significant effect on expen 
ditures occurs. These effects become significant in the following year 
and even bigger in the year after that (although differences between the 
two lagged coefficients are not statistically significant). To interpret 
these findings, consider a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemploy 
ment rate that lasts at least two years. Summing the three coefficients 
indicates that three years into a recession, annual welfare expenditures 
would have increased by almost 4.75 percent. As expected, benefit 
generosity is strongly positively correlated with expenditures; a 10 per 
cent increase in the maximum welfare benefit yields an identical 
increase in welfare spending.
Table 1 Coefficients for the Effect of Economic Activity on Welfare 
Expenditures3
In of maximum Unemployment rate Unemployment rate Unemployment rate 
AFDC benefit in year t in year t-\ in year t-2
104.8b O511.49**c 2.78** 
(5.25)________(0.45)________(0.59)________(0.42)
a The dependent variable is the total expenditure on welfare by the federal and state 
governments, measured in natural logarithms. Estimates are obtained from a model 
including state and year fixed effects along with state-specific trends.
b Coefficients are multiplied by 100; standard errors are in parentheses.
c **_ signiflcant at the 5% level
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In Table 2,1 apply the estimates from this model to simulate the 
additional welfare costs of a recession based on 1997 spending levels.4 
I consider the additional spending that would be generated by reces 
sions equal in magnitude to the three most recent cyclical downturns. 
Unemployment rates in these recessions peaked in 1975, 1982, and 
1992 at 8.5, 9.7, and 7.5 percent, respectively, providing a range of 
levels of hardship. In each case, welfare expenditures are assumed to 
begin at the 1997 level of about $23 billion in total welfare spending 
before the recession begins. Additional expenditures are calculated as 
the unemployment rate rises from its low point in the first row of the 
table. These calculations are made for the following five years, 
because most of the additional costs resulting from a recession are 
accrued over this period. The costs vary from $6.8 billion to $13.7 bil 
lion in 1997 dollars.
These results must be interpreted with some caution because the 
underlying data cover the 1976-1996 period, in which the welfare sys 
tem was significantly different than it is now in the aftermath of wel 
fare reform. In particular, the emphasis on moving recipients to work 
may increase the sensitivity of welfare costs to the business cycle. To 
the extent that potential welfare recipients are successful in obtaining 
employment during an expansion, these individuals are at a greater risk


































Total five-year costs $11.5 $13.7 $6.8 
(billions of 1997 dollars)3____________________________
a Costs are calculated from year 2 to year 7.
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of experiencing unemployment during a recession and may find them 
selves requesting assistance from the welfare system (Gustafson and 
Levine 1998). 5 This suggests that the estimates in Table 2 of cyclical 
increases in welfare costs are likely to be understated. 6 Nevertheless, 
these estimates provide a basis upon which to evaluate the financing of 
welfare spending in future recessions.
WHO WILL PAY THESE COSTS?
In previous recessions, states were significantly shielded from the 
excess welfare costs during an economic downturn because the federal 
government reimbursed the state according to a formal schedule 
(called the Medicaid matching rate) that mandated higher rates of 
reimbursement for states with lower per capita income. The federal 
government paid half the costs of welfare payments in wealthier states, 
like California and Connecticut, and up to about three-quarters of the 
costs in poorer states, like Arkansas and Mississippi.
Welfare reform replaced this system with one based on annual 
block grants to states. Through the 2003 fiscal year, each state will 
receive a lump-sum payment equal to the amount of federal funds it 
received under the old formula in the 1994 fiscal year (with no adjust 
ments for inflation). Note that these payments are unrelated to the 
actual welfare expenditures made by the state.
Although it appears that state governments will face all additional 
welfare costs brought about by a recession under this block grant, two 
important features of TANF may mitigate these costs. 7 First, the fed 
eral government established a $2 billion contingency fund designed to 
provide resources to states should the economy experience an eco 
nomic downturn. A state may use the contingency fund if its own 
expenditures exceeded the 1994 level and one of the following two 
conditions are met: 1) the state's unemployment rate over a three- 
month period exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 10 percent higher than 
that in the corresponding period in either of the two preceding calendar 
years, or 2) the state's food stamp caseload exceeds the 1994 or 1995 
level by 10 percent. 8 Once triggered, contingency funds will be used to 
match additional state expenditures at the Medicaid match rate. 9
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Second, some states will enter the next recession with unexpended 
funds allocated in earlier years that can help finance higher cyclical 
welfare costs. The availability of these funds is the result of the decline 
in welfare rolls over the past few years. Nationwide, the number of 
people receiving welfare fell by over 40 percent between January 1994 
and June 1998; the decline in some states was even greater. The num 
ber of welfare recipients in Wyoming and Idaho fell by more than 
three-quarters, and even some larger states such as Florida and Massa 
chusetts experienced about a 50 percent decline. But the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation requires states to maintain spending of their own 
funds on TANF and other welfare-related programs (called "mainte 
nance of effort" or MOE) at between 75 and 80 percent of their 1994 
expenditures. For those states with large declines in caseloads, main 
taining the required level of state spending while using all of the fed 
eral funds allocated to them would force them to spend considerably 
more on each case still on the rolls. Alternatively, states may choose to 
spend less of the federal funds than they are entitled to and save the 
remainder for future needs, such as a recession. Current law requires 
that any unspent funds remain in the federal treasury, but they are ear 
marked for future TANF spending by those states with claims on them.
Unfortunately, these sources of funds will not provide sufficient 
assistance for many states in meeting the higher demand for welfare 
during a recession. Two limitations of the contingency fund will 
reduce its value in helping states. First, the federally matched reim 
bursement system, in essence, replicates the approach used to fund all 
cyclical welfare costs prior to welfare reform, except that the federal 
obligation is capped at $2 billion. Therefore, only a small share of the 
cost of an economic downturn, which I conservatively estimate as $6.8 
to $13.7 billion, will be covered. More importantly, funds from this 
source are only available to states that spend at least as much of its own 
funds as it did in 1994 (i.e., 100 percent MOE). With average state 
caseload declines to date of 40 percent, substantial increases in state 
spending will be required before reaching this level, indicating that 
states may not be able to access the federal contingency fund until well 
into a recession, if at all. As for previously unexpended funds, they 
currently exist only for those states that have experienced very steep 
declines in caseloads. Many states, including California and New 
York, currently have no such funds available.
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These issues are highlighted in Table 3. The number of welfare 
recipients fell by 20 percent nationwide between January 1994 and 
January 1997, while the average decline was only 14 percent in the 10 
states shown. The two largest states, California and New York, experi 
enced relatively small declines of 5.5 and 13.5 percent, respectively. 
Column 2 shows each state's 1997 annual expenditure of its own funds 
for TANK 10 Column 3 shows the amount that each state would have to 
spend to hit 1994 levels and satisfy the 100 percent MOE required by 
the federal contingency fund. The values in column 4 (calculated as 
the difference between columns 2 and 3) represent the shortfall in state 
TANF spending that would need to be eliminated before federal con 
tingency funds could be activated. The last row of column 4 indicates 
that all states would need to increase spending by $3 billion, with addi 
tional spending of $729 million and $562 million required in Califor 
nia and New York alone. These levels are surely higher today based on 
the continuing decline in caseloads in 1998; therefore, $3 billion is a 
minimum figure.
Columns 5 through 7 of Table 3 report the extent to which states 
are spending the federal funds allocated to them. In the 1997 fiscal 
year, about $13.4 billion was awarded to all states and the District of 
Columbia, but $1.3 billion was never spent. This money will be avail 
able in future years to those states in an amount commensurate with 
their balance. However, not all states share in this surplus equally; in 
particular, states with higher welfare expenditures are less likely to 
benefit in the future from current savings. The 10 highest spending 
welfare states saved less than half of the total unspent, even though 
they account for over two-thirds of the federal allocation. Even within 
this group, savings are largely limited to Florida and Massachusetts, 
two of the states in this group with very large reductions in caseloads. 
Of the two highest spending states, California used all of its funds, 
while New York saved less than $100 million (about 2 percent) of its 
annual welfare spending.
The results of this analysis suggest that many states are still likely 
to be responsible for the vast majority of additional welfare expendi 
tures. In states that have experienced very large caseload declines, or 
for those who will do so in the near future, the savings from previously 
unexpended federal awards that have accrued before a recession hits 
may provide a strong buffer from the higher anticipated costs at that
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SOURCE: All of the data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1998).
a TANF expenditures reported in column 2 are computed as full-year equivalents because states had until the end of the 1997 fiscal year
to implement their TANF program. Expenditures of federal funds include unliquidated obligations. 
b Weighted average for top 10 states is 13.9%.
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time. The need for resources from the contingency fund may not come 
until late in a recession, if at all, by the time these states use up their 
unexpended funds and increase their own spending back to 1994 lev 
els. In states that have experienced only moderate declines in their 
welfare caseloads, including many of the largest states like California 
and New York, little will likely be available in the form of previously 
unexpended federal funds. Significant additional state spending will 
be required before money from the federal contingency fund can be 
released, and that money will cover just a small share of the additional 
welfare costs incurred during a recession. These are the states that are 
the most at risk in the event of a cyclical downturn.
FINANCING CYCLICAL COSTS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE SYSTEM
The results presented so far indicate that some states, particularly 
many of the larger ones, will face the burden of paying for a large share 
of the costs of increased welfare benefits during a recession. In these 
states, a state-level rainy-day fund would be required to weather the 
storm without facing the difficult decision of cutting back on welfare at 
a time when it is needed most or finding other sources of funding at a 
time when tax revenues are falling. (Some critics of the 1996 reform 
have expressed concern that the new law may lead states to stop enroll 
ing new cases or to cut benefits significantly when faced with increased 
demands for welfare during a recession.) Although some states have 
already established such funds, few of the large states have done so. In 
addition, the level of savings is small in these funds. 11
Because welfare reform is so recent and states have had no experi 
ence with TANF in a cyclical downturn, it is understandable if states 
are not fully prepared for the next recession. To determine whether or 
not states are likely to learn to effectively manage these costs in the 
long-run, I compare states' experiences with financing another pro 
gram that involves large cyclical cost increases, the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system. 12 Although UI and welfare are very different 
programs with different target populations and institutional arrange 
ments, such a comparison may help gauge states' degree of foresight in
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planning for the increased costs of transfer payments during a reces 
sion. Therefore, I will begin by describing the institutional features of 
the UI system and the historical patterns of solvency, and then present 
an analysis of whether or not state UI programs are adequately pre 
pared for a future recession. 13
The UI system pays weekly benefits to individuals with a sufficient 
work history who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. 
Because rates of job loss and the length of time it takes to find a new 
job increase during recessions, the cost of providing UI benefits varies 
with the business cycle in much the same way as welfare costs. The 
financing to pay for these benefits is obtained through a tax on employ 
ers. The federal tax is equal to 6.2 percent of their federal taxable pay 
roll. 14 However, a tax credit of 5.4 percent is available to firms in states 
that have met federal guidelines which require that, among other 
things, states utilize some form of experience rating (i.e., tax rates must 
be lower for firms that lay off fewer workers). Because all states meet 
these guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 
percent of federal taxable payroll. Part of the federal revenues col 
lected in excess of federal administrative expenses goes into a trust 
fund used to finance loans to states whose trust funds have become 
insolvent.
The tax revenue that the states collect is deposited into a UI trust 
fund; fund balances are called net reserves. As the economy expands, 
net reserves typically grow, and they are drawn down during a reces 
sion. A commonly reported statistic that normalizes net reserves to the 
size of the state's workforce is the "reserve ratio," the ratio between net 
reserves and total payroll in the state.
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF UI TRUST FUND ADEQUACY
Figure 1 displays the reserve ratio aggregated across all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia from 1961 through 1996. 15 As expected, a 
strong cyclical pattern is observed. The reserve ratio grew during the 
expansions of the 1960s, late 1970s, mid to late 1980s, and the mid 
1990s and declined in the years surrounding cyclical troughs of 1971, 
1975, 1982, and 1991. Although savings accumulate during expan-
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Figure 1 Ratio of Net Reserves to Total Payroll
-1 J Year
sions, they have not always been sufficient to pay the greater costs 
incurred during a recession. A large number of states experienced a 
deficit during the 1975 recession and were forced to borrow funds from 
the federal government. Federal funds were available interest free at 
that point, but the extent of borrowing led to 1981 legislation that insti 
tuted interest payments on loan balances. This policy change occurred 
too late to forestall the massive borrowing that took place during the 
recession in the early 1980s; net reserves aggregated over all states 
were in deficit at that time.
UI trust funds weathered the recession in the early 1990s rather 
well compared with the experience of the previous two recessions. 
Several factors may explain this positive outcome. First, the incentive 
to generate a larger trust fund (brought about by interest charges on 
federal borrowing) led states to change their tax and benefit structures 
so as to accumulate greater reserves. Second, the economy underwent 
a lengthy and robust expansion in the mid to late 1980s that generated 
extra revenue through larger taxable payrolls and fewer and shorter 
unemployment spells. Third, the subsequent recession was rather mild 
compared with the two preceding it.
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A final factor that may have led to the maintenance of positive net 
reserves during this last recession is the declining share of unemployed 
workers who collect UI benefits. As shown in Figure 2, throughout the 
mid 1970s, upwards of 60 percent of unemployed workers received UI. 
Through the early 1980s, however, that share fell to about 40 percent 
and has remained roughly constant since then. A substantial literature 
trying to explain these trends over time has found that they may be 
attributable to declining unionization, the changing industrial structure 
of the economy, the taxation of UI benefits, and other factors (Corson 
and Nicholson 1988; Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Anderson 
and Meyer 1997). Regardless of the reason, the smaller the share of 
unemployed who collect UI, the lower the benefit payouts are. A 
recession of any particular magnitude as measured by total unemploy 
ment will now draw down net reserves in the UI trust fund at a slower 
pace.
Based upon the strong performance of the UI financing system 
from the mid 1980s through the recession of the early 1990s, a puz 
zling trend in the past few years is the rather anemic growth in trust 
funds in the presence of a strong economy. The absolute increase in















the reserve ratio between 1993 and 1996 was considerably smaller than 
that observed in past expansions of this length and size.
In fact, these statistics aggregated over the entire country mask 
even more startling patterns that are seen when looking at individual 
states. Figure 3 displays funding patterns for three larger states (New 
York, Maryland, and Texas). The main cyclical discrepancy between 
these states is the prolonged recession observed in Texas through the 
1980s in response to low oil prices. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, 
all states had UI trust funds that were at similar levels. Although trust 
funds in Maryland appear to have grown at a rate similar to those 
observed across the nation in past expansions, trust funds in New York 
and Texas have barely increased at all. Not only are their reserves 
growing very slowly, they are also very small in absolute terms, and 
New York and Texas are not alone. Other states like California, Con 
necticut, and Missouri all have reserve ratios below 1, an unusually low 
level for this stage of an economic expansion.
Figure 3 Ratio of Net Reserves to Total Payroll, Three States
—*— Maryland U New York —•— Texas
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ARE STATE UI TRUST FUNDS BIG ENOUGH?
Low levels of reserves do not necessarily indicate that state funds 
are at risk of insolvency in future recessions. States could be respond 
ing to trends in the labor market — like the declining share of unem 
ployed workers who collect UI — which imply that benefit payments in 
future recessions will be less costly than in the past. To examine this 
possibility in more detail, I simulate the drain on UI trust funds 
brought about by future recessions of various magnitudes.
The methodology employed here is similar to that used to estimate 
the costs of additional welfare spending during a recession. Specifi 
cally, I estimate a model of the form:
Eq. 2 RR5 , = a + IUR5 ,PJ + IUR, t _J2 
+ Js + Jt + trend x js + es t
where IUR represents the insured unemployment rate, which equals 
the number of UI recipients divided by the number of employees cov 
ered by the UI system, multiplied by 100. This specification represents 
a reduced form model, as parameters of state UI systems (like tax rates 
and benefit levels) are not included. 16
The results, reported in Table 4, show that unlike for welfare 
spending, the costs of a recession for the UI system begin mounting 
right away. The coefficient on unemployment in year t is negative and 
significant. Individuals who lose their jobs may be less reluctant to 
apply for UI benefits, perhaps because of less social stigma compared 
to collecting welfare, and may not wait to draw down their resources 
before filing a claim. Also, some welfare recipients apply for assis 
tance only after they exhaust UI benefits. Therefore, as soon as job 
loss begins to rise, claims for UI begin to rise. The costs continue to 
mount over the next two years as job-finding rates for the unemployed 
may be slow to recover following a cyclical trough. These results indi 
cate that a 1 -percentage-point increase in insured unemployment rates 
that persists for at least two years will lower the UI reserve ratio by 
about 0.9 percentage points.
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Table 4 Coefficients for the Effect of Economic Activity on the UI Reserve Ratio3
IUR in year t IUR in year t-l IUR in year t-2
-0.314 -0.285 -0.266 
______(0.033)___________(0.043)___________(0.032)_____
a Estimates are obtained from a model including state and year fixed effects along with 
state-specific trends.
The impact of recessions of different magnitudes, based on these 
estimates, is reported in Table 5. The top panel gives the insured unem 
ployment rates before, during, and after the past three recessions. Com 
paring these values with those reported in the top panel of Table 2, 
which lists comparable values for the total unemployment rate, pro 
vides important insights. First, Table 2 indicates that the recession in 
the mid 1970s was less severe than that in the early 1980s. Unemploy 
ment peaked at an annual average of 8.5 percent in the former, com 
pared with an average of almost 10 percent for two consecutive years in 
the latter. Yet structural changes in the labor market and the UI system 
that have led to a smaller share of unemployed workers receiving bene 
fits occurred over this period. As a result, the insured unemployment 
rate in the mid 1970s recession far surpassed that in the early 1980s. In 
1975, the total unemployment rate reached 8.5 percent and the insured 
unemployment rate climbed to 6.1 percent, indicating a ratio of insured 
to total unemployment of over 72 percent; that ratio had fallen dramat 
ically, to 48 percent, in 1982 (4.7/9.7). This comparison highlights the 
importance of the declining share of insured to total unemployment. 
Even though the recession of the early 1980s was more severe, it was 
less costly to the UI system than the previous recession.
The bottom rows of Table 5 reports the estimated reduction in the 
UI reserve ratio that would result based on each of these three reces 
sions. The high ratio of insured to total unemployment in the mid 
1970s recession makes that the most costly: the reserve ratio is esti 
mated to fall by 1.89 percentage points. The early 1990s recession, 
which was relatively mild and followed the decline in the ratio of 
insured to total unemployment, had a considerably smaller effect, low 
ering the reserve ratio by 0.75 percentage points. 17
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Table 5 Insured Unemployment Rates in Past Recessions and UI Reserve Ratio
































Drop in the UI reserve ratio 1.89 1.10 0.75 
at trough
Lower bound of 95% 1.61 0.94 0.69 
confidence interval
Upper bound of 95% 2.17 1.26 0.81 
confidence interval
How would UI reserves weather a recession in the future? In 1996, 
the reserve ratio aggregated over all states stood at 1.43. Therefore, 
even a recession as severe as that experienced in the early 1980s would 
not deplete aggregate UI trust funds. These results suggest that the 
reserve ratio would fall by 1.10, leaving a positive balance of 0.33 
across the country as a whole. Alternatively, based on patterns of UI 
receipt in the mid 1970s, a recession could exhaust the fund, as the 
estimated decline in the reserve ratio of 1.89 is greater than the present 
level. Such an outcome seems rather unlikely, however, under the 
present circumstances. Even if the ratio of insured to total unemploy 
ment reached 50 percent (which has not happened in almost 20 years; 
see Figure 2), the peak insured unemployment rate of 6.1 percent 
recorded in 1975 would amount to a total unemployment rate of 12.2 
percent. Levels of unemployment that high have not been recorded 
since the Great Depression. These results suggest that UI trust funds 
aggregated over all states are likely to remain solvent through the next 
recession despite the relatively low rate of savings throughout the cur 
rent recovery.
This conclusion is somewhat misleading, however, because it 
ignores the variation in current levels of trust fund reserves among
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states. Table 6 presents values of the reserve ratio for all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia in 1996, ranked from lowest to highest. Five 
states (New York, Texas, Missouri, Connecticut, and the District of 
Columbia) have reserves that are low enough that even a mild reces 
sion, coupled with a low ratio of insured to total unemployment (like 
the experience of the early 1990s), would exhaust their trust fund; 
compare their reserve ratios in Table 6 with the 0.75 value in Table 5 
(rightmost column, first row below divider). An experience similar to 
that of the early 1980s would wipe out all savings in four additional 
states, including California. However unlikely it is that the experience 
of the mid 1970s would be repeated, in a nationwide recession of that 
size, more than half of the states' trust funds would become insolvent. 
Regardless of the size of the recession, some of the states that are in the 
most perilous position regarding UI financing, like California and New 
York, are the same ones that might expect future difficulties in financ 
ing cyclical welfare costs.
One additional exercise that may be of interest is to determine the 
states that are very unlikely (with less than a 5 percent probability) to 
experience a deficit in their UI trust fund during recessions of different 
magnitudes. To do this, I constructed 95 percent confidence intervals 
around the point estimates of the effect of the different recessions on 
reserve ratios. The high end of the interval is of most interest because 
it tells us the largest fall in the reserve ratio that we may reasonably 
expect based on past recessions (Table 5, last row). The results indi 
cate that no additional states are at risk or falling into deficit in a mild 
recession, although California is close to the cut-off. In a moderate 
recession (at least in terms of UI receipt) like that of the early 1980s, 
five additional states, including Massachusetts and Illinois, fail to meet 
this stricter test of having sufficient fund reserves. In the most severe 
recession considered, 34 states are at risk of depleting their UI trust 
funds, including all the larger states with the exception of Virginia.
What do these results regarding the UI system tell us about states' 
ability to plan for higher cyclical transfer payments in general and, per 
haps, welfare spending in particular? It appears that a number of states 
have sufficient foresight that they will be able to cover the higher UI 
costs associated with a recession. One may infer that over time these 
states will apply similar thinking in planning for higher cyclical wel 
fare costs. On the other hand, some states exhibit far less fiscal fore-
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor (various dates).
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sight in UI and may not be expected to save sufficient funds to pay for 
higher welfare costs in the event of a recession. Unfortunately, two of 
these states include California and New York, that together account for 
about 40 percent of total welfare spending.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Many states, particularly the larger ones, will be liable for a large 
portion of cyclically related increases in welfare spending. The exist 
ence of the federal welfare contingency fund, which provides resources 
to states during bad times, is designed in such a way that accessing 
these funds will be difficult. States will be required to spend a consid 
erable amount of their own money before federal money can be 
obtained, and then it is only provided on a matching basis. Some 
states will be able to take advantage of federal funds that had previ 
ously been allocated but were unused because of very large declines in 
caseloads. Many of the largest states, including California and New 
York, have experienced more moderate caseload declines, however, 
and have not been able to save much (if any) of their federal allocation. 
In these states, the burden of facing the welfare cost increases associ 
ated with a cyclical downturn largely will be borne by them.
Because the absence of state-level rainy-day funds to cover these 
additional costs may be attributable to inexperience, I considered 
states' ability to establish sufficient fiscal discipline to cover cyclically 
related cost increases observed in the UI system. The record of the UI 
system should not leave one with tremendous optimism that states will 
be able to weather the financial storm that a recession will bring in 
terms of additional welfare spending. In the two recessions preceding 
the relatively mild downturn of the early 1990s, many states exhausted 
their UI trust funds. Although two prolonged recoveries have sur 
rounded the last mild recession, state trust fund reserves are not sub 
stantial and have been growing very slowly over the past several years. 
The fact that a smaller share of unemployed workers collect UI today 
than 20 years ago has helped; funding requirements for future reces 
sions are not quite as substantial as they once were. Nevertheless, any 
thing other than a very mild recession will still cause financial
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difficulties for UI systems in many states. In fact, the larger states like 
California and New York, which are particularly at risk in terms of 
financing cyclically related welfare costs, are among the weakest in 
terms of the financial stability of their UI systems.
Moreover, UI enjoys considerably greater popular support com 
pared to welfare. In light of states' reasonably poor record of financing 
the costs of additional UI spending during a recession, it seems 
unlikely that they will do a better job of accumulating funds to cover 
additional welfare spending. States will, therefore, be faced with the 
reality of raising taxes when such increases are likely to be quite 
unpopular, reallocating funds from other areas of its budget during a 
time of general revenue shortfalls, or cutting benefits precisely at the 
time that need will be the greatest.
Alternatively, states may be playing a sophisticated game of 
"chicken" with the federal government in much the same way that they 
do in the UI system. During periods of high unemployment, job seek 
ers are much more likely to exhaust their UI benefits simply because 
jobs are not available. States could accumulate greater reserves in 
anticipation of this and extend the maximum benefit duration to help 
compensate those unable to find work, but they do not do this. Instead, 
they wait for the federal government to provide extended benefits at no 
cost to the states, which it has done in virtually every recession in the 
past 40 years. 18 The fact that states like California and New York seem 
destined to face a shortfall of welfare funding when a recession occurs 
may simply indicate that they are anticipating a bailout by the federal 
government. Even if states win at this game, the victory will not come 
without costs. Based on the track record of the UI system, when addi 
tional welfare funding is provided by the federal government in an eco 
nomic downturn, this assistance is likely to be poorly timed, com 
mencing months or years after a recession begins. In the interim, states 
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1. Boyd and Davis (1998) estimated the effect of a recession on welfare expendi 
tures, but they assumed that costs per case remain constant and applied previous 
estimates of the sensitivity of the welfare caseload to changes in unemployment.
2. These regressions are weighted by the state population in each year to yield 
parameter estimates that are representative of the entire country.
3. If differences among states over time are nonlinear, they will not be captured by 
these trends and, if these differences are correlated with the unemployment rate, 
the estimated effect of the business cycle on welfare expenditures will be biased.
4. The level of spending used here is based on 1997 full-year equivalent state TANF 
expenditures, as well as state expenditures of federal block grant funds as reported 
in columns 2 and 6 of Table 3. For additional details, see the discussion of that 
table and its notes.
5. This effect may occur even if employment gains do not generate caseload 
declines. If welfare recipients are successful in gaining part-time employment 
that reduces, but does not eliminate, their need for public assistance during an 
expansion, an economic downturn will likely increase their level of need.
6. In the somewhat more distant future, a countervailing effect may occur as more 
and more people reach their lifetime limit on benefit receipt and will not be able to 
return to welfare when the economy turns down.
7. A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) provides more detail on 
the institutional arrangements discussed here.
8. The exact requirements that must be met before contingency fund money may be 
released to a state are actually somewhat more stringent. Welfare reform legisla 
tion allows states to use their own funds to establish welfare-type programs out 
side the scope of the TANF program. States that spend at least 75 to 80 percent of 
their fiscal year 1994 expenditures on TANF and these other programs are in com 
pliance with federal guidelines. To access the contingency fund, however, states 
must spend at least 100 percent of their 1994 expenditures on state TANF pro 
grams only, not including state spending on these other programs.
9. Payments from the fund are limited to 20 percent of the state's grant for that year.
10. Welfare reform legislation allowed states until the end of the 1997 fiscal year to 
institute their own TANF programs; therefore, reported TANF spending for 1997 
only reflects the portion of the year following each state's implementation. For 
purposes of comparison, all 1997 state expenditures reported here have been con 
verted into " full-year equivalent" spending.
11. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) reports that among 10 states surveyed 
(California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, 
Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin), only Colorado, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin 
have created state-financed rainy-day funds specifically targeted to cover cycli-
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cally related welfare expenditures. In each case, the amount saved represents only 
a few percent of annual operating costs.
12. Vroman (1995) also used the UI system to draw lessons for funding welfare pay 
ments in an environment with federal block grants.
13. Vroman (1998) provided an alternative treatment of the topics addressed here and 
arrived at similar conclusions.
14. For additional discussions of UI financing issues, see Blaustem, Cohen, and 
Haber (1993), Levme (1997), Miller (1997), and Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman 
(1997).
15. When the current UI system first began operating in the 1930s, pessimistic actuar 
ial assumptions based on unemployment patterns from the Great Depression and 
the full employment economy generated by World War II led to a very large sur 
plus in state trust funds. Through the 1950s, states increased benefit generosity 
without increasing tax liabilities to bring down these surpluses. Because of these 
events, trust fund reserves did not begin to show the expected cyclical sensitivity 
until the 1960s, so the analysis reported here uses data beginning in 1961. All UI 
data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration.
16. I have also estimated alternative specifications that include these program param 
eters and obtained similar results to those reported. Although any exercise that 
includes parameters such as these runs the risk of introducing a "policy endogene- 
ity" (policy responding to market conditions), the problem is particularly severe in 
UI. For instance, many states have tax schedules that depend upon the level of 
reserves in the state's UI trust fund. As reserves fall, scheduled tax rates rise, 
making identification of the effect of taxes on reserves difficult For this reason, I 
have chosen to report the more parsimonious specification.
17. These findings are based on point estimates and do not take into consideration the 
fact that a standard error is associated with the estimated effect of a recession on 
the UI reserve ratio. Because these parameters are estimated with some error, a 
state with, say, a reserve ratio of 0.9 may still run out of funds in a mild recession 
(like that of the early 1990s) that is estimated to reduce the reserve ratio only by 
0.75
18. A formal federal system of extended benefits has been in place since 1970, but 
changes in the labor market have made it virtually impossible to activate these 
additional payments (Woodbury and Rubin 1997).
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The States, Welfare Reform, 
and the Business Cycle
Howard Chernick 
City University of New York
Therese J. McGuire 
University of Illinois at Chicago
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) dramatically changed the financial arrange 
ment between the federal government and the states concerning cash 
assistance for poor families. Previously, Aid to Families with Depen 
dent Children (AFDC) was jointly financed by the two levels of gov 
ernment through a federal matching-rate grant at an average matching 
rate to the states of about 60 percent. Under this arrangement, when 
the economy contracted and AFDC spending rose, the federal govern 
ment was responsible for 60 cents of each dollar in increased spending 
in the average state. Under the new arrangement, the federal govern 
ment provides a fixed amount under a block grant set equal to the level 
of the federal AFDC grant amount in 1994. Because most states had 
relatively high case loads and correspondingly high spending in 1994, 
the block grant amounts are quite generous relative to Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) spending requirements in the 
prosperous years since passage of the 1996 act, but prosperous times 
will not last forever. Under this new arrangement, when the economy 
next contracts and the demand for income assistance increases, the 
states will be solely responsible for each dollar increase in spending on 
cash assistance.
Our purpose in this paper is to speculate on the cyclically of state 
fiscal responses under this new regime. In particular, how will they 
respond during the next recession? We draw lessons from several 
strands of the literature, including estimates of the spending responses 
of governments to matching and block grants, and we consider some 
new evidence. We also summarize studies that examine the incentives 
states have to mimic their neighbors' spending levels, as well as studies
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of the substitutability of spending across programs. We conclude that 
the "price effect" of the shift from matching grants to block grants is 
likely to be small, at least in the short run; that the strength of the 
"neighbor effect," and thus the likelihood of a race to the bottom, is 
also small if not uncertain; and that the evidence that different welfare 
programs are close substitutes for one another in a state's budget is 
suggestive, but tentative.
We also review the literature on how state revenues and expendi 
tures vary over the business cycle and during contractionary periods. 
This research, although recent and sparse, generally finds that states 
that rely on progressive income taxes and narrowly based sales taxes 
have revenue systems that exhibit high cyclical variability. Thus, dur 
ing economic contractions, such states are less able to maintain spend 
ing programs without adjusting tax rates upward. Definitive evidence 
on spending is more difficult to come by because of the difficulty of 
generating policy-free measures of expenditures. Still, part of the 
interest is in examining the decisions made by policymakers in the face 
of recession; preliminary evidence indicates that most states maintain 
or increase spending (and revenues) virtually across the board in con 
tractions. While this finding of countercyclical spending is not surpris 
ing for the matching-rate program (AFDC), it is interesting that other 
state spending not stimulated by matching rates also tends to be coun 
tercyclical. Cautious speculation based on these findings, coupled with 
the emerging consensus that the price effect may be small in the short 
run, leads us to hazard a guess that state spending on welfare may not 
decline as greatly as some have predicted when the next recession 
occurs.
Trends in state and local welfare spending from 1980 to 1995 are 
displayed in Table 1. As shown in the first column, cash assistance as a 
share of total expenditures fell from 3.3 percent in 1980 to 2.2 percent 
in 1994. It is particularly notable that cash assistance declined as a 
share of the budget between 1990 and 1995, despite a sharp increase in 
the number of recipients. The decline reflects cuts in the maximum 
benefit over this period and the decision by a number of states to drop 
their General Assistance programs during the recession. 1
In contrast to cash assistance, total welfare expenditures grew as a 
share of state and local expenditures, from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 14.3 
percent in 1995. The increase was particularly pronounced in the
Table 1 State and Local Outlays on Public Welfare3
Total state and local expenditures on public welfare State and local own-source expenditures on public welfare1*














































Source: Personal income. Economic Report of the President, 1998, Table B-2. Total state and local expenditures: Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1998, Table #499 and 1989, Table #446. Public welfare expenditures, own-source revenues, and public welfare from 
federal government. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1998, Table #506 and 1989, Table #453. Cash assistance: Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 1998, Table #508, and U.S. House of Representatives 1996, Table 8-1.
a Public welfare includes both cash assistance to needy persons and vendor payments for medical care and other services to needy per 
sons; it excludes completely federal welfare programs, such as food stamps.
b State and local expenditures on public welfare minus federal intergovernmental revenues for public welfare.
c Own-source revenues include taxes and other non-intergovernmental grant revenue sources, such as charges and fines.
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1990s, increasing from 11.3 percent to 14.3 percent. Welfare expendi 
tures also grew as a share of personal income, increasing by almost a 
percentage point between 1990 and 1995. The increase in total welfare 
spending is due primarily to the rapid growth in Medicaid, reflecting an 
increase in mandated coverage, increases in utilization and reimburse 
ment, and rapid medical price inflation (Coughlin, Ku, and Holahan 
1994). State and local own contributions to cash assistance also fell 
from 1980 to 1995, while own contributions to total welfare spending 
increased slightly, from 5.6 percent of own-source revenues in 1980 to 
6.5 percent in 1995.
LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE ON GRANTS-IN-AID 
AND COMPETITION AMONG NEIGHBORING STATES
In this section, we describe federal and state cash assistance pro 
grams and we review the literature on the effects of matching and 
block grants on spending, neighborhood effects, and program substitu 
tion.
Federal Financial Incentives for Cash Assistance Programs
Under the TANF program, states receive a block grant that is 
approximately fixed in nominal terms. TANF replaced the AFDC pro 
gram, which provided open-ended matching assistance to states. To 
receive its full block grant allocation, a state is required to contribute 
overall state funding equal to at least 80 percent of the sum of FY 1994 
expenditures on AFDC, JOBS, emergency assistance, and welfare- 
related child care programs; this is known as the Maintenance of Effort 
(MOE) requirement. 2 Not only do states lose a dollar of TANF funds 
for every dollar they fall below the MOE requirement, but they are then 
obliged to raise spending beyond the MOE level to offset the federal 
penalty.
In the AFDC program, the mean federal matching rate was 60 per 
cent, with states paying 40 cents for an additional dollar of cash assis 
tance. With TANF, the marginal price has risen to 1. If the stimulative 
price effect of open-ended matching aid exceeds the lump-sum grant
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effect for nonmatching categorical assistance, then over time one 
would expect TANF to induce a substantial reduction in state spending 
on cash assistance.
Given the price increase, the crucial parameters in predicting and 
explaining the expenditure response of states to the TANF block grants 
are the elasticity of benefits and of total expenditures with respect to 
the matching rate. These elasticities must be compared with the expen 
diture response per dollar of nonmatching categorical aid for welfare. 
The price elasticity can, in principle, be estimated using variations in 
state matching rates. However, we have no direct experience with cash 
assistance as a block grant, so to predict the effect of the block grant, 
we must also examine the state spending response to nonmatching aid 
for other categories of welfare spending.
State spending on AFDC or TANF is also influenced by the avail 
ability and benefit levels of other federal welfare programs. The exist 
ence of multiple programs with overlapping coverage and differential 
federal financial sharing rules provides a fiscal incentive for states to 
substitute among programs, with the goal of maximizing the federal 
contribution per dollar of own resources. The strongest incentive for 
substitution is between the federally funded Food Stamp and Supple 
mental Security Income programs and cash assistance. Almost all 
recipients of cash assistance are eligible for and receive food stamp 
benefits. Because food stamps are close to cash in their effect on recip 
ient budgets, state policymakers are likely to view the two forms of 
assistance as fairly close substitutes. Food stamps are indexed to infla 
tion and impose an implicit tax on recipients in terms of reducing food 
stamps by 30 cents for each additional dollar of cash benefits provided 
by the states. This tax implies that, so long as the level of cash assis 
tance under AFDC or TANF exceeds the food stamp disregard of $134 
per month, the cost to the states of raising total cash benefits by a dollar 
is approximately $1.43. 3
At any point in time, few AFDC/TANF recipients also receive ben 
efits under the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Liebman 
1996). Hence, for any given recipient, states cannot directly substitute 
the EITC for cash benefits, as they can in the case of food stamps. 
However, the expansion in EITC benefits in the 1990s has substantially 
increased the value to TANF recipients of moving from not working to 
part-time work (Coe et al. 1998). The lower a state's cash benefit level,
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the greater the increase in family income from part-time work. By 
contrast, a low-benefit reduction rate as earned income increases tends 
to reinforce the EITC work incentive. Thus, the decisions of a number 
of states to both decrease their maximum benefit levels and increase 
their income disregards may be partly a response to the EITC. 4
Previous Estimates of Matching-Rate Price Effects
Benefit Levels
Many studies attempt to explain variation among states and over 
time in AFDC benefit levels, caseloads, total spending, and spending 
on welfare more broadly defined. AFDC benefits (total expenditures) 
are assumed to depend on state income, the federal matching rate, 
demographic controls, and, in some models, other welfare programs 
and benefit levels in neighboring states.
The major studies have been summarized in several review papers 
(Chernick 1998; Ribar and Wilhelm 1999). Results from some fre 
quently cited studies are shown in Table 2, which reports estimates of 
the income and price elasticities and of the food stamp substitution 
effect. There is considerable variation in the estimated elasticities. 
The price elasticity is relatively large in Baicker's (1998) analysis of 
the period 1948-1963, in the Gramlich and Laren study (1984), and in 
a Craig and Inman (1986) analysis of total welfare expenditures. By 
contrast, price elasticities are small, and sometimes positive, in Moffitt 
(1990) and the Ribar and Wilhelm papers (1994, 1999).
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994, 1999) provided a careful econometric 
review and replication of most of the studies of AFDC benefit level 
determination. They concluded not only that matching rate effects are 
small, but also that, controlling for unobserved characteristics of states 
through state fixed effects and common national trends through year 
dummies, income elasticities are substantially less than 1. For exam 
ple, in an OLS specification, they found that the income coefficient is 
reduced from 0.593 to 0.357 with the addition of state fixed effects. 
The general implication of the Ribar-Wilhelm analysis is that state 
AFDC benefit levels are much less sensitive to economic variables than 
earlier studies indicated.
The Gramlich and Laren (1984) estimates, which received consid 
erable attention, found large effects of federal matching rates and sub-
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stantial neighbor effects. Their model is based on the concept that 
while more recipients increases the cost of raising benefit levels, higher 
benefits in turn increase the number of recipients, both from within a 
state and by encouraging migration from other states. The conven 
tional way to estimate such a model is to find variables that affect ben 
efits but not the number of recipients and other variables that affect 
recipients but not benefits. Such variables serve as instruments to iden 
tify the two equations. Given the difficulty in finding acceptable 
instruments, Gramlich and Laren estimated a reduced form model 
using the same variables (income, price, unemployment, and neighbor 
benefits) for each equation. They then used the model's structure to 
infer the extent to which the pure price and income effects on benefit 
levels are dampened by the fact that any increase in benefit levels 
brings with it an increase in the number of recipients.
Gramlich and Laren's model was estimated for the period 1974- 
1981 and used a restricted sample of 33 states that were on the open- 
ended Medicaid matching formula at that time. Chernick (1999) rees- 
timates the Gramlich-Laren model for the period 1984 to 1995, using 
the full sample of states. This reestimation yields substantially lower 
price elasticities than in the earlier period, and higher income elastici 
ties. Price effects are significant at conventional levels only when the 
dependent variable includes food stamps. In general, reestimation sup 
ports the conclusion of Ribar and Wilhelm that price effects are small 
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Total Welfare Spending
The evidence suggests that higher benefit levels lead to higher 
numbers of recipients (Blank 1997). Therefore, if higher federal 
matching rates do have a positive effect on benefit levels, we would 
expect matching rates to have a bigger effect on total spending than on 
benefit levels alone. While studies using data from earlier periods 
(Gramlich and Larenl984; Craig and Inman 1986; Baicker 1998) sup 
port this expectation, more recent evidence does not. For example, 
Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) found that the elasticity of AFDC 
expenditures with respect to the state share is -0.1, while Craig (1993) 
found no effect of matching grants on AFDC expenditures. The small 
effects in the Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm study reflect the very low 
estimated price elasticities for benefits; in the Craig study, they reflect
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the offsetting effect of higher matching rates raising benefit levels but 
lowering caseloads. This evidence reinforces the conclusion that, on 
average, the short-run effects of eliminating matching rates will be 
small.
Estimation Issues
The AFDC matching rate (the Federal Medicaid Assistance Per 
centage) is inversely correlated with state personal income per capita. 
Collinearity is not perfect because the formula sets an upper bound for 
the state share at 50 percent. This collinearity makes it difficult to dis 
entangle the true price and income effects. We can write the benefit 
equation as
Eq.l InB = a l \nS + a2 lnY(S)
where B is the benefit level, S is state share, and Y is state income per 
capita. 7(5) is the inverse of the formula determining the relationship 
between state share and income. The estimated price effect will be 
equal to
Because £YS is negative, the stronger the income elasticity a2, the 
smaller will be the estimated price effect. In typical specifications of 
the benefit model, both state share and income have significant positive 
effects on benefit levels. Once state fixed effects and time variables are 
controlled for, the coefficient on state share remains positive but has a 
much smaller size and is no longer significant.
One way to identify the price effect is to define price as the (per 
capita) cost of raising benefits by a dollar for all recipients:
Eq.3 p = (l-™)
where m is the federal matching rate, R is the number of recipients, and 
N is the population. This approach imposes the restriction that the
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marginal effect of a change in the matching rate be the same as the 
effect of a change in the number of recipients. However, if the 
response to a matching rate change is not the same as a response to 
variation in the recipient ratio, then it is incorrect to infer the effect of 
matching rate changes from this multiplicative term. A second prob 
lem is that the recipient ratio is endogenous to benefit level decisions, 
imparting an upward bias to the estimated price effect. Ribar and Wil- 
helm (1999) presented an extensive set of tests of for price exogeneity. 
They concluded that their findings of modest income effects and weak 
price effects are not very sensitive to the choice of instruments.
An alternative approach to identifying the matching rate effect is to 
exploit the fact that the matching rate has a lower bound of 50 percent. 
For the 11 states at this lower bound (in 1996) it is possible to estimate 
a pure income effect. This method, proposed by Craig (1993), yields a 
significant matching rate effect on AFDC benefit levels for the period 
1965-1989. However, in a replication of the Craig study for the period 
1981-1995, Chernick (1999) finds that the matching rate has no effect 
on either benefits or total expenditures.
A Consensus of Sorts
A prior review paper (Chernick 1998) concluded that the appropri 
ate range for the price elasticity estimates was from 0.2 to 0.3. These 
estimates imply a predicted decline in average benefit levels as a result 
of shifting from matching to block grants of somewhere between 15 
and 30 percent, and a slightly higher decline in total expenditures. The 
high-end estimates from the literature, which would imply reductions 
in spending of as much as 75 percent, are rejected by Chernick because 
they used selected sub-samples of states and failed to identify the key 
parameters. Very low estimates are rejected on the grounds that the 
price term (state share times the recipient ratio) was misspecified.
The econometric evidence on matching rate effects is buttressed by 
considering state fiscal responses to the federal SSI program, estab 
lished in 1974. SSI is similar in fiscal structure to a block grant. The 
analysis found that when public assistance to the aged, blind, and dis 
abled (AABD) was converted from a matching grant to states to an 
indexed grant going directly to individuals, states responded by gradu 
ally reducing their share of total funding and their absolute dollar com-
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mitment. By 1996, the value of state supplementation had fallen by 21 
percent.
The most recent statistical analyses find lower matching rate elas 
ticities, ranging from zero to about 0.15. Chernick (1999) attempts to 
replicate the major prior studies with data from 1983 to 1995 and finds 
that estimated elasticities were smaller than before. The reduced effects 
of matching could reflect a real behavioral change in how states respond 
to federal matching rate subsidies, or they could reflect an increase in 
the offsetting role of state income in determining benefits and expendi 
tures. The implicit food stamp tax on AFDC, by raising the price of 
benefits in all states, may further obscure the role of matching rate vari 
ation in state spending decisions. Taken at face value, the matching rate 
estimates imply that the equilibrium reduction in average benefit levels 
from ending the matching subsidy would be no more than approxi 
mately 10 percent. This reduction would in turn imply a reduction in 
the state contribution to cash assistance of at most 25 percent.
However, this conclusion is subject to a number of caveats. First, 
the increase in the price of cash assistance under the block grant is far 
larger than the prior variation in price under the AFDC program. Our 
only recent experience with such a substantial change comes from the 
SSI program, and (as discussed above) this program has been accom 
panied by a substantial decline in state contributions. This decline is 
particularly telling in that SSI recipients are mostly viewed as the 
"deserving poor," and are likely to be treated more favorably by states 
than mothers on welfare. Historical analyses (Wallis and Gates 1998; 
Baicker 1998) suggest that matching grants played a crucial role in 
expanding state commitments to assist the needy. These analyses sug 
gest that the relatively small predictions from the recent literature, 
while they may be a good guide to the short run behavior of states, 
probably underestimate the long-run expenditure adjustments that will 
take place under the TANF block grant.
A second caveat is that the TANF legislation gives states much 
greater flexibility in determining public assistance spending. Under 
AFDC, the main margin along which spending could be adjusted was 
changes in benefit levels, while under TANF there are more margins of 
response. For example, states can set shorter time limits and adjust 
income disregards. Some states have saved money by setting shorter 
time limits but spent money by allowing recipients to keep more of
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each dollar earned. These changes make it more difficult to use fiscal 
response parameters estimated under the prior regime as predictors of 
behavior under the block grants.
The initial fiscal response to TANF has been dominated by a sharp 
drop in caseloads. Between 1994 and mid 1998, AFDC/TANF case 
loads fell by 40 percent, and by June of 1998 were at their lowest level 
since 1972. This sharp drop, due partly to the strong economy and 
partly to state policy choices (Levine and Whitmore 1998; Blank 1997; 
Figlio and Ziliak 1998) means that public assistance costs have 
declined dramatically in most states. Because the state MOE require 
ment must be satisfied in each year, while federal TANF funds can be 
banked for use in future years, states have tended to use their own 
funds first to satisfy the MOE and then draw down TANF funds. 5 Thus, 
the drop in state spending under TANF is primarily a reflection of 
declining caseloads rather than the long-run response to the price effect 
of the block grants.
Neighbor Effects
If there is significant mobility of potential recipients in response to 
benefit level differentials, then welfare spending in each state may be 
influenced by spending in neighbor or competitor states. Even if actual 
migration effects are small, state politicians may feel particularly vul 
nerable to the charge that the state is attracting indigents from other 
states by virtue of its generous benefits. This interdependence could be 
exacerbated by the fact that under TANF the federal government will 
no longer share in any increase in state expenditures, while states will 
realize 100% of the savings from reduced spending.
A simple test of whether competitive pressures have increased in 
recent years is to examine variation in benefit levels across states. 
Between 1984 and 1995, the mean of state maximum benefits adjusted 
for inflation declined by about 10 percent, but the coefficient of varia 
tion remained at 36 percent. However, the variation in AFDC benefits 
plus food stamps was not only lower than for AFDC alone but showed 
some decline, from 19 percent to 16 percent. This suggests that in the 
1980s and 1990s there has been a small amount of convergence in the 
total benefit package across states.
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The most powerful test for the race to the bottom would come from 
evidence that the number of recipients in a given state is positively 
affected by benefit differentials between that state and its "neighbors," 
however defined. A weaker test would be provided by evidence that 
benefit levels move in tandem with those of their neighbors. The latter 
evidence is more difficult to interpret. Such behavior could represent 
one state responding to the decisions of other states; alternatively, it 
could imply that both are subject to common economic or political 
influences.
Evidence on the migration effect is mixed. Aggregate studies cov 
ering the 1980s and early 1990s show no evidence that a state's ratio of 
AFDC recipients to population was sensitive to benefit level differen 
tials, whereas there is some evidence of sensitivity in prior periods. 
(Gramlich and Laren 1984; Ribar and Wilhelm 1994; Shroder 1995). 
Among the aggregate studies, both Gramlich and Laren (1984) and 
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994) found that AFDC recipiency ratios are sen 
sitive to neighbors' AFDC benefit levels in the period 1976 to 1981. 
However, data from the 1980s (Ribar and Wilhelm 1994; Schroder 
1995; Craig 1993) exhibit no such evidence. The lack of effect could 
reflect the narrowing of the combined AFDC-food stamp differentials 
referred to above.
Using micro data to study the interstate migration effect, Gramlich 
and Laren (1984) and Blank (1988) found that in the 1970s, though 
only a very small proportion of welfare recipients move between states 
in any given year, those moves are much more likely to be from low- 
benefit to high-benefit states. Levine and Zimmerman (1995), cover 
ing the period 1979-1992, and Walker (1994), using 1980 data, found 
little or no support for the welfare magnet theory. Borjas (1997) found 
that recent immigrants are disproportionately attracted by California's 
high benefit levels. Reviewing these papers, Brueckner (1998) noted 
the contradictory nature of the evidence on welfare migration. Except 
for the Borjas study of immigrants in a single state, the evidence does 
not indicate an increase in such migration in the 1980s.
The evidence on strategic interaction between states in benefit lev 
els is stronger than the direct evidence on migration. For the 1980s, 
Ribar and Wilhelm (1994) found that a dollar increase in geographic 
neighbor benefits leads to an increase in own benefits that ranges from 
23 to 55 cents. In a recent review paper, Brueckner (1998) cited papers
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by Figlio, Wolpin, and Reid (1998) and Saavedra (1998) as providing 
"strong evidence that a given state's benefit choice is affected by bene 
fit levels in nearby states." A consensus estimate from this literature 
would be that a dollar change in neighbor benefits leads to about a 30- 
cent change in own benefits.
In Chernick's (1999) investigations of the neighbor effect, the 
neighbor results are found to be quite sensitive to specification. For 
example, when both own and neighbor benefits are measured by com 
bined AFDC plus food stamp benefits and the model is estimated in 
first-difference form, neighbor effects have a negative rather than a 
positive effect on own benefits. When maximum AFDC benefits are 
adjusted for implicit tax rates, the neighbor effect is insignificant. 
Instrumental variables estimation yields similar results. It is only when 
published maximum benefits is the benefit measure that the strong stra 
tegic interaction effect is apparent. These preliminary results suggest 
that in the most visible aspect of welfare policy, the maximum benefit, 
changes are indeed copied by neighbor states. However, using a 
broader measure of state "generosity," the links are much weaker.
Even if neighbor effects are important, it is not an automatic impli 
cation that the block grants will lead to a race to the bottom. A neces 
sary condition for that race to occur is for the price elasticity to be of 
some reasonable magnitude. If the price response is small, then even if 
the interstate competition effects are potentially large, the leapfrogging 
effect of a race to the bottom will not be triggered. Because the con 
sensus price elasticity estimates are rather low, this suggests that the 
block grant alone will not be sufficient to kick off a strong race to the 
bottom.
Program Substitution
As discussed above, the fact that most AFDC recipients are auto 
matically eligible for food stamps and Medicaid provides an opportu 
nity and an incentive for states to substitute both of these programs for 
cash benefits. Several studies suggest that this substitution is important. 
Moffitt (1990) argued that observed declines in AFDC benefits 
could reflect a substitution of food stamps and Medicaid for AFDC, 
rather than a decrease in generosity towards the poor. To test this 
hypothesis, he compared combined benefits for AFDC, food stamps,
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and Medicaid in 1984 to the benefit level that would be predicted based 
on an earlier year (1960), prior to the introduction of food stamps and 
Medicaid. He found that actual benefit levels for the sum of AFDC, 
food stamps, and Medicaid were within $10 of predicted benefit levels. 
In a replication of the Moffitt approach for the years 1983 and 1993, 
Chernick (1999) finds that the 1983 structure overpredicts the 1993 
combined AFDC, food stamp, and Medicaid benefits by between 7.5 
and 9 percent. Thus, in the period 1983 to 1993, program substitution 
can explain most (but not all) of the decline in AFDC benefits.
The Moffitt and Chernick findings are relevant to PRWORA 
because they show substantial program substitution even when cash 
assistance was matched by federal dollars. With the conversion of fed 
eral aid for cash assistance from matching to lump-sum grants and the 
fact that states can now use a portion of the block grant money for in- 
kind expenses such as child care and training, we expect even stronger 
substitution in favor of Medicaid and food stamps under PRWORA.
Recent research by Katherine Baicker investigated federal man 
dates aimed at changing state spending on specific categories of wel 
fare and their effect on state budget allocations across other categories 
of spending. This research is relevant to understanding the implica 
tions of PRWORA, because the act requires states to move recipients 
into employment, a requirement that is likely to involve increased 
spending by states on training, placement, and child care. In an exami 
nation of the effect of federal Medicaid expansions on state budgets 
over the period 1983 to 1995, Baicker (1998) found that states tended 
to accommodate required increases in spending for health care for the 
indigent by decreasing spending on other components of the broader 
state welfare budget. State tax revenues and spending on nonwelfare 
categories of the state budget were largely unaffected. These results 
should be treated with caution because of difficulties in interpreting the 
data on Medicaid spending. Nonetheless, the findings indicate some 
amount of "stickiness" in state budgets; i.e., federally mandated 
increases on one program for the needy are likely to result in state deci 
sions to decrease spending on related programs, in some cases without 
much of an effect on overall welfare spending.
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THE VOLATILITY OF STATE REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
The federal welfare reform debate and the resulting legislation, as 
well as state-instigated welfare changes enabled by federal waivers, 
have occurred against the backdrop of one of the longest continuous 
economic expansions in modern U.S. history. The inevitability of a 
recession at some point compels the question of how state welfare 
spending under the new policies is likely to respond to the accompany 
ing fiscal stress. Indeed, because of the strong economy, the switch 
from a matching grant under AFDC to a block grant under TANF will 
not have significant consequences for the states until the next recession 
occurs. A nascent literature examines the revenue-readiness of states 
to weather a turn in the business cycle, the fiscal experience of the 
states during previous recessions, and state spending on welfare over 
the business cycle.
Sobel and Holcombe (1996) used national measures of income and 
retail sales to proxy state revenue bases and estimated short-run elastic 
ities to capture the cycle-related variation in the major state tax 
sources. They found that corporate income is the most volatile compo 
nent of the tax base, followed by nonfood retail sales. Personal income 
and retail sales including food exhibit similar short-run elasticities of 
approximately 1, while motor fuel usage and liquor sales are the least 
volatile. The elasticity estimates are relatively stable over time and 
thus can be used to inform the design of tax policy to address future 
economic contingencies.
Dye and McGuire (1998) argued that the structure of state taxes is 
important to determining their volatility. They proxied the structures 
of the personal income and general sales taxes—the two largest reve 
nue raisers for state governments—of each of the 48 states having 
these taxes and estimated state-specific cyclical elasticities, assuming 
that each state's income distribution and personal consumption pat 
terns (the bases for the two taxes) are the same as those for the nation. 
Their analysis recognized that when the next recession occurs, the 
states will be responsible for any increase in spending beyond the level 
of the TANF block grant. Their aim was to assess which states are
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likely to be the most resilient to economic downturns (i.e., to have the 
least volatile revenues over the cycle).
The most salient feature of state personal income taxes for deter 
mining short-run elasticity is the progression in their rates; thus the 
building blocks of an estimate of the volatility of a state's income tax 
consist of different income categories. Dye and McGuire found that 
the short-run elasticity rises monotonically from near zero for the low 
est income group to over 4 percent for the highest income group. 
When they applied the different state tax structures to these income 
components, they found that the cyclical elasticity estimates for the 
individual income tax range from 0.95 to 1.68. Because of the mono- 
tonicity with respect to income brackets of the elasticity estimates, 
states with a greater degree of progression in their income tax systems 
(e.g., Connecticut and Nebraska) have more volatile income taxes.
A similar analysis for the general sales tax, where differential treat 
ment of various categories of spending distinguishes the different state 
tax structures, results in cyclical elasticity estimates for the general 
sales tax in the range of 0.85 to 1.37. The states with the most volatile 
sales taxes have narrow bases that exclude food for home consumption 
(e.g., Maryland and Vermont). California has both a progressive 
income tax and a narrow sales tax base, resulting in the distinction of 
having the highest cyclical elasticity for the combined income and 
sales taxes. By this measure, California is the state most vulnerable to 
the next recession and thus least able to pick up where federal block 
grant dollars will leave off.
Mattoon and Testa (1992) examined the fiscal experience of state 
and local governments during each contractionary period over the last 
50 years. They found that fiscal behavior is countercyclical (i.e., 
expenditures rise relative to revenues during downturns), indicating 
perhaps that elected officials are keen to maintain services in reces 
sions. Blackley and Deboer (1993) attempted to explain the decisions 
by states to increase revenues during the most recent 1990-1991 reces 
sion. They found that both political and economic forces were behind 
the discretionary state revenue increases of the early 1990s and that the 
depressing effect of the recession explained a fair portion of the reve 
nue increases.
Three recent papers examine welfare spending over the business 
cycle and during periods of contraction; they take quite different
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approaches but present findings and conclusions that are mutually sup 
portive. Powers (1998) simulated spending on AFDC/TANF over a 
recent 20-year period under different financing scenarios and calcu 
lated a measure of variability that relates each state's expenditures on 
welfare to its unemployment rates. Boyd and Davis (1998) also simu 
lated spending on AFDC/TANF but restricted attention to the two 
recent recessionary periods. The third paper, by Dye and McGuire 
(forthcoming), examines actual state revenue and expenditure streams 
during state-specific business cycles and periods of recession.
Powers (1998) compared actual spending on AFDC over the period 
1976-1995 to simulated spending on TANF programs under two dif 
ferent assumptions about state responses to the shift in federal financ 
ing from a matching grant to a block grant. The "lower bound" 
simulations assume that states are quite sensitive to the price increase 
associated with the financing change and that states will choose to 
spend only the bare minimum required by the federal government. The 
optimistic "upper bound" simulations assume that each state will 
choose to maintain total spending on TANF programs to the level 
under the AFDC program regardless of the declining support of the 
fixed federal block grant over time (declining because of inflation). 
Powers was most interested in comparing the overall level of spending 
on welfare of these two TANF regimes to the actual level of spending 
under AFDC over the period, but she also calculated a measure of vari 
ability for each state under each scenario from a regression of the log 
change in expenditures on the log change in the unemployment rate 
over the period 1976-1995. She found that the estimated relationship 
under each of the three scenarios is zero for most states, suggesting 
that AFDC/TANF spending is not related in a systematic way to the 
cycle. The reliability of this result is weakened by the fact that the 
effects of unemployment are estimated contemporaneously, while 
other studies show that the biggest effect of unemployment on case 
loads occurs some 18 months after an increase in unemployment.
Boyd and Davis (1998) focused on the national recessions of 
1980-1982 and 1990-1991 and calculated the amount by which state 
spending on welfare would have increased due to rising unemployment 
if TANF had been in place (i.e., if states had been solely responsible 
for increased spending at the margin) and states had provided benefits 
to the resulting new cases consistent with existing state-specific benefit
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levels. In other words, they calculated the expenditure increase needed 
to maintain welfare spending during the past two recessions under a 
TANF-like regime. They allow the severity of recessions to vary from 
state to state according to actual experience, but the assumed responses 
under a TANF regime are not allowed to vary. Thus, their findings 
reflect how states with varying economic conditions, benefit levels, and 
caseloads might have reacted had TANF been in place during the past 
two recessions.
It is useful to compare these assumed responses under Boyd and 
Davis to actual state behavior during the most recent recession. Cali 
fornia and Michigan both cut their nominal benefit levels substantially, 
though California had a big increase in caseloads (37 percent from 
1990 to 1994) while Michigan's caseloads were approximately con 
stant. New York and Texas kept nominal benefits unchanged despite 
substantial caseload growth. Thus, there was substantial variation in 
state responses to recessionary conditions.
Boyd and Davis found a wide range of expenditure increases across 
the states, reflecting the differences in the severity of recession and the 
generosity of welfare programs across the states. On average, the 
deeper recession of the early 1980s would have resulted in an increase 
in welfare expenditures (as a percentage of state general fund budgets) 
of 1 percent. This figure seems small, but when compared with an aver 
age of 3 percent for state expenditures on AFDC as a percentage of state 
general fund budgets, it can be viewed as important. Some states are hit 
much harder than others. California, in particular, was estimated to 
experience expenditure increases of over 2 percent in each of the reces 
sions, due to its higher-than-average benefit levels, higher-than-average 
case loads, and higher-than-average increase in unemployment during 
the recession of the early 1990s. In contrast, states in the southeast 
(with the exception of West Virginia) were estimated to experience 
below-average increases in expenditures as a share of their budgets 
under recession, in large part because of their low benefits.
Extrapolating from these findings to the next recession, Boyd and 
Davis seem to assume that states will succumb to fiscal pressures and 
reduce spending on welfare, but it is still an open question whether 
states will, in fact, choose to cut back welfare spending when the next 
recession occurs in the brave new world defined by TANF.
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Dye and McGuire's (forthcoming) analysis attempts to shed some 
light on this open question. They examine actual revenues and expen 
ditures, with an explicit focus on years of recession for each of the 49 
states that experienced contractions during the period 1977-1995 
(Florida did not experience a decline in gross state product [GSP], the 
measure of recession employed in the study, for any year during this 
period). The use of actual revenues and expenditures (as opposed to 
measures free of policy changes) is dictated by the lack of policy-fixed 
data for expenditures. An advantage to using actual revenues and 
expenditures is that they reflect not only automatic changes due to 
changes in economic conditions, but also the discretionary decisions of 
state decision makers, which is of interest in a study of the responses of 
states to economic distress.
For each state, Dye and McGuire calculate an elasticity of actual 
revenues (or expenditures) with respect to (declines in) GSP as the 
ratio of the percentage change in revenues (or expenditures) with 
respect to the percentage change (decline) in GSP. 6 They find that the 
calculated elasticity is negative for the individual income tax, the gen 
eral sales tax, and total tax revenues for many states and on average, 
indicating that discretionary decisions are taken to counter the effects 
on revenues of the economic downturn. Similar calculations result in 
negative elasticities on average for total nonwelfare spending (-1.68), 
public welfare spending (-7.58), AFDC spending (-1.27), expendi 
tures on K-12 education (-1.02), and expenditures on higher educa 
tion (-3.01), indicating that states on average increase spending on 
these categories during contractionary periods. 7 The fact that AFDC 
spending is countercyclical on average is not surprising given the 
nature of the program, but the fact that education and other nonwelfare 
spending is also countercyclical for most states is surprising. Dye and 
McGuire interpret this preliminary evidence as supportive of the idea 
that states tend to maintain spending across the board during reces 
sionary times. Since spending on nonwelfare programs is not financed 
by federal matching grants, it may not be unreasonable to expect states 
to increase taxes in order to maintain spending (including spending on 
welfare) even under TANK
Dye and McGuire caution that their results are preliminary and 
require greater exploration. In particular, state-specific behavior often 
differs from average behavior and is oftentimes not easily explained.
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For example, in contrast with the countercyclical findings for educa 
tion spending for the U.S. average, the elasticity during recessions for 
K-12 education spending in Massachusetts is calculated to be cyclical, 
while the elasticity for higher education is weakly countercyclical.
Taken together, the studies of actual state fiscal behavior during 
recessionary periods and the studies simulating state welfare spending 
under the new TANF block-grant arrangement point to a cautious con 
clusion that the next recession need not result in large cuts in welfare 
spending, and may well result in an effort by most states to maintain 
their welfare policies and programs even as new cases are generated by 
the economic contraction. This conclusion is cautious for several rea 
sons: 1) simulations outside of actual experience are always subject to 
wide margins of error; 2) the federal funding change for AFDC/TANF 
programs is dramatic and not just a change at the margin; and 3) sev 
eral states (for example, Mississippi, Idaho, and Pennsylvania in Dye 
and McGuire's analysis) do exhibit cyclical (as opposed to noncycli- 
cal) spending on welfare, even under the AFDC matching-rate funding 
arrangement.
In assessing the impact of the change from federal matching grants 
to block grants on state spending and revenues, bear in mind the small 
share of total state expenditures attributable to AFDC/TANF spending. 
The largest state public welfare program by far is Medicaid, and it is 
still financed by a matching grant from the federal government. Thus, 
overall spending on public welfare programs is likely to continue to be 
highly countercyclical.
Finally, we comment on the likely efficacy of the contingency fund 
implemented as part of the 1996 welfare reform act and designed to 
provide additional federal funding for states experiencing dire eco 
nomic conditions. Both Powers and Boyd and Davis note that states 
must spend at 100 percent of their 1994 levels in order to qualify for 
the contingency fund, a restriction that is likely to keep many states 
from qualifying. On the other hand, the argument that the fund at $2 
billion is insufficient to cover the increased spending of states in a 
recession is not wholly convincing, given Boyd and Davis's estimate of 
an expenditure increase for the aggregate of all states of $2.5 billion 
due to the recession of the early 1990s.
Boyd and Davis' estimate of $2.5 billion is significantly smaller 
than Levine's (1998) estimate of $7.3 billion over five years. The
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major reason for this difference is that Levine estimated a much larger 
expenditure response for a given increase in unemployment than the 
consensus estimates employed by Boyd and Davis. Second, Levine's 
estimates assumed sustained increases in spending over a longer period 
than Boyd and Davis. Levine's aggregate expenditure response 
appears implausibly high in light of the smaller state-specific responses 
simulated by Boyd and Davis. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
fact that Boyd and Davis assume that states would have maintained 
benefit levels and covered all eligible recipients with their own reve 
nues, if TANF had been in place during the previous two recessions. 
This is a generous assumption about state spending behavior. If states 
choose instead to cut benefit levels, as some did during the most recent 
recession, then the aggregate spending increase would be even smaller.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A consensus seems to have emerged concerning the likely impact 
on welfare spending of a switch from matching to block grants. Recent 
econometric estimates suggest that the elasticity of spending with 
respect to matching rates is small, ranging from zero to 0.15. If cor 
rect—and there remains considerable uncertainty about the exact mag 
nitude of the price effects—these elasticities imply cuts in benefit 
levels of no more than 10 percent and declines in the state share of 25 
percent at most. Even this relatively modest response will not occur 
immediately, because the sharp drop in welfare caseloads has yielded a 
block grant windfall and reduced the budgetary pressure on states from 
welfare spending.
With regard to competition with other states, states do seem to fol 
low their neighbors in making adjustments to benefit levels. However, 
the results on this type of interdependency are weak enough—and the 
importance of unmeasured state characteristics strong enough—that 
we do not predict the dramatic convergence in benefit levels implied by 
the phrase "race to the bottom."
Regarding program substitution, over a 20-year time period, evi 
dence suggests that there has been considerable substitution between 
federal programs such as food stamps and SSI and shared state-federal
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programs. This substitution should accelerate under the incentives of a 
fixed block grant. Thus, looking ahead, say, 10 years or more, we 
speculate that state-financed cash assistance will be lower as a share of 
total welfare expenditures, including food stamp and Medicaid outlays.
We stress that considerable caution is warranted in predicting gov 
ernment behavior under any radical change in institutional setting. We 
have had several decades of experience with federal financing of 
AFDC under a generous matching grant; we have had less than two 
years of experience of federal financing of TANF under a generous 
block grant. Patience and diligence in monitoring state responses are 
called for.
At the same time, analyses of actual state fiscal behavior during 
recent periods of economic contraction are somewhat sanguine about 
the ability of the state sector to weather the next recession under the 
new TANF regime. This literature is very new and many unanswered 
questions remain. In addition, much of the analysis has not adequately 
accounted for behavioral changes in response to the new financing 
arrangements. The most encouraging evidence that state spending on 
welfare may not be dramatically reduced during the next (and first 
post-TANF) recession is provided by Dye and McGuire (forthcoming), 
who find that, with notable exceptions, most states did not reduce 
spending on nonwelfare programs, including K-12 and higher educa 
tion—programs not financed by matching grants from the federal gov 
ernment—during recent recessions. These results are provocative 
rather than definitive (there are some puzzling results state by state), 
but they suggest that state spending behavior during periods of declin 
ing gross state product (periods of economic and fiscal distress) may 
differ greatly from secular trends in spending and from state spending 
behavior in good times. Additional research is needed to understand 
the causes and consequences of decisions made by individual states 
concerning welfare spending in difficult economic times.
Notes
We thank Sheldon Danziger, Greg Duncan, Julie Cullen, and Bob Schoeni for 
helpful comments.
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1. Between 1991 and 1994, 11 states actually cut the nominal value of their maxi 
mum benefit level, while only 6 states increased benefits enough to maintain their 
real value.
2. The MOE requirement falls to 75 percent for states that meet federal work partic 
ipation rate requirements.
3. Under the AFDC matching rate regime, if a state cut benefits by a dollar or moved 
a recipient from AFDC to SSI, it saved only 40 cents for every dollar of reduced 
spending. Under TANF, it saves a full dollar. If the recipient also gets food 
stamps, when the states cuts cash benefits by a dollar, food stamp benefits go up 
by about 30 cents.
4. Disregards still vary substantially across states. For example, in California a fam 
ily gets to keep the first $225 in earnings per month and loses 50 cents per dollar 
thereafter. In Washington state, TANF benefits are reduced by 50 cents from the 
first dollar of earnings.
5. In FY97, 28 states reduced their own expenditures to the MOE minimum, 18 
states were below their 1994 level but above the minimum, and 5 states increased 
their expenditures relative to their 1994 levels of spending (Lazere 1998).
6. The authors experiment with different lag structures for spending and GSP and 
find the results to be fairly robust on average.
7. The findings of countercyclical spending on average are consistent with the 
results in Mattoon and Testa (1992).
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